This brief note examines the judicially ordered seizure of Instagram accounts in Iran, highlighting its illegality under Islamic Republic law. It also provides digital security recommendations for preventing account blocking or recovering seized accounts, as discussed in the third episode of the Seventh Layer podcast.
After the 2009 election protests, official and organized restrictions on cyberspace and Iranian users’ activities intensified. In policy-making, the creation of the National Information Network was pursued, and in legislation, the Computer Crimes Law was enacted.
Meanwhile, cyber units within the Revolutionary Guard and Basij forces monitored and arrested online activists through projects like “Spider” (Ankaboot).
The deletion of posts opposing the Islamic Republic on Instagram, the blocking or limiting of certain accounts and hashtags, has been reported multiple times since the November 2019 protests. This trend, which some attribute to interference by elements of the Islamic Republic in Instagram, has taken on a new form in recent years.
What has happened is that posts from Instagram pages have been deleted, users have been prevented from accessing their accounts, and notices posted on these pages cite actions “by order of the judicial authority.”
Deleted pages include those of popular women—athletes, actresses, or singers—as well as professional women’s pages in fields like fashion, medicine, cosmetology, and cooking. Pages related to dance and music, along with those sharing political, religious, or social opinions, have also been targeted.
Notably, pages of influencers, artists, and athletes with larger followings are more at risk of being blocked than other groups.
A comprehensive look at the government’s approach to accessing user accounts reveals clear traces of discrimination and increased pressure on women. In a brief examination, the number of women’s accounts blocked by judicial order is significantly higher, with reasons cited such as failure to observe mandatory hijab or “acts contrary to public decency.”
In contrast, men’s accounts have faced far fewer blockings, indicating that the government has doubled its pressure on women not only in the streets but also in cyberspace. Women are disproportionately targeted by the security and judicial forces of the Islamic Republic.
It’s worth noting that the blocking of women’s accounts has accelerated and intensified after the “Woman, Life, Freedom” protests, prompting the government to adopt serious measures in this regard.
According to a Filterwatch report, in December 2023 and January 2024, pressure on Instagram accounts took a new form. Many accounts were emptied of content overnight, replaced by a poster covering the entire page that announced the account had been blocked “by order of the judicial authority.”
This action, illegal under existing legal frameworks, not only disregards the principle of legality in crimes and punishments but also infringes on Iranian users’ rights to freedom of expression and privacy. While many business-related pages have been blocked due to their online activities, this cannot directly threaten their business licenses. Legally, restricting user pages in cyberspace is permissible only if specific instances of computer crime have occurred.
Based on this, the only legally backed and enforceable restriction is a judicial order to filter that page; taking control of the account lacks any legal basis.
In the case of Instagram—already filtered in Iran—additional restrictions may seem redundant. However, examining the notices published on seized Instagram accounts reveals a prominent phrase: “by order of the judicial authority.” This language suggests that the judiciary intends to instill fear among social media users as a deterrent. The phrase “by order of the judicial authority” is used when no court ruling has been issued, and the case remains under investigation. Depending on the agency handling each account’s case, the notices displayed on Instagram pages vary.
In some published posters, the FARAJA police (Law Enforcement Command, formerly NAJA) is identified as the executor of the judicial order.
To access users’ accounts, agents resort to methods like obtaining passwords from the account owner or admin through arrest or intimidation, thereby seizing control of the accounts from the operators (admins).
All these actions lack legal authorization according to Article 247 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the regulations on the implementation of judicial oversight and security orders.
Given the illegal process pursued by the judiciary and executive agents in seizing users’ accounts—achieved by pressuring the operators of these pages—the necessity of adhering to key digital security measures to counter unauthorized access becomes more critical than ever. Simple precautions can sometimes prevent severe penalties and irreversible consequences.
