This article marks the second anniversary of the Woman, Life, Freedom movement, which emerged following the death of Mahsa Jina Amini in the custody of the Guidance Patrol. It reflects on the experiences of individuals detained during the 2022 protests and offers practical advice for activists and protesters on securing their social media accounts and communication devices.
Episode 3 of Season 2 of the Layer 7 podcast features conversations with several individuals detained during the 2022 protests. Through their stories, the episode provides insight into how security forces handled protesters’ personal accounts, mobile phones, and laptops, offering important safety tips for those involved in activism.
The Role of Mobile Phones in Surveillance and Repression
With the widespread use of smartphones in Iran, security forces have increasingly relied on information extracted from these devices to incriminate dissenters, activists, and protesters. During the nationwide protests following Mahsa Amini’s death, this tactic was once again a prominent tool in the government’s efforts to suppress dissent.
Numerous unofficial reports indicate that accusations based on evidence retrieved from mobile phones have led to harsh prison sentences for protesters. One such individual, Nazanin Keynejad, who actively participated in the early days of the Mahsa movement and was arrested in autumn 2022, recounts how security forces confiscated all her electronic devices, including her laptop and phone, during their initial raid on her home.
Now living in France, Nazanin shared her experiences with Layer 7, emphasizing that just hours before her arrest, she had deleted all her tweets, Telegram messages, and photos from her phone and asked a trusted friend to deactivate her Twitter account. Despite her precautions, her phone had no password-protected apps, and security agents accessed its contents by obtaining her device’s password. Shockingly, during interrogations at Evin Prison, her interrogators questioned her about files and messages she believed she had deleted, suggesting they had recovered the information.
After her release and the return of her phone, Nazanin was stunned to discover that much of the supposedly deleted content was still intact. She speculates about how security forces had managed to recover the data. Filterwatch, a group focused on digital security in Iran, believes such claims require thorough investigation to verify whether Iranian authorities have the technological capability to retrieve deleted data from confiscated devices.
Learning from Nazanin’s Experience
Nazanin’s story underscores the importance of establishing a trusted system for managing passwords and accounts. Activists are advised to share their passwords with a reliable person who can deactivate accounts if communication is lost for a specified time. Additionally, protesters should install remote data-wiping software on their devices, granting access to someone trustworthy who can erase the data if the device is seized.
Interrogation Tactics and Data Exploitation
Interrogators often aim to intimidate detainees by implying they have accessed all the information stored on their devices. However, the data interrogators use may be collected from multiple sources, including the Siam System, which identifies unique device identifiers within 600 meters of telecommunications towers, enabling the authorities to track individuals during protests.
Taraneh M., an artist living in Iran who was detained during the Woman, Life, Freedom movement, shared her perspective with Layer 7. Unlike Nazanin, Taraneh had prepared for potential arrest by rigorously securing her devices, deleting sensitive information, and setting self-destruct timers for private chats. Nevertheless, her interrogators presented her with a thick file of her social media posts, some dating back five years. They taunted her by saying, “We’ve been following you for years.”
The psychological toll of such invasive surveillance has left Taraneh feeling as though she lives in a “glass tank” under constant observation. Even after her release, she hesitates to discuss personal matters over the phone, fearing eavesdropping. “I feel like no conversation is just between me and the person I’m speaking with,” she explains. “There’s always a sense that someone else is listening, ready to use my words against me or others later.”
Mohammad’s Account: The Costs of Digital Activism
Mohammad, another interviewee, recounts his experience of being detained alongside 11 others, five of whom were arrested for their activities on social media. One of his cellmates had been sentenced for “blasphemy” due to tweets criticizing Iranian authorities, despite using a pseudonym and having only 300 followers. Mohammad advises activists to use reliable data-wiping software to ensure deleted information cannot be recovered. He also recommends removing phone numbers from social media profiles to avoid easy identification.
Digital Security Recommendations
Mohammad suggests using complex alphanumeric passwords instead of patterns or numeric codes, as authorities have been known to force detainees to unlock their phones physically. He also highlights the importance of password managers, two-factor authentication that doesn’t rely on SMS, and secure messaging apps like Signal or Session to limit access to sensitive information.
The report by Iran in Darkness compiles a list of apps and tools designed to enhance digital security for protesters, including measures to minimize unauthorized access to personal data and social media accounts. The guidance is structured into three categories: secure communication and preparation before protests, tools and practices for participating in demonstrations, and actions to take in the event of arrest or device confiscation.
Given that nearly all data stored on mobile phones—videos, photos, notes, browsing history, social media interactions, messaging app conversations, and location data—can be used against activists, these precautions are crucial. By adopting these tools and practices, activists can significantly reduce their vulnerability to digital surveillance and repression.
