In the 1990s and 2000s, the Iranian government employed various methods to combat satellite technology. From broadcasting jamming signals using meat delivery trucks to confiscating satellite dishes and even sending interference to satellite signals from Cuban soil, they tried numerous tactics. However, little information about these behind-the-scenes efforts was ever leaked to the public.
While this issue may not be a pressing concern today, revisiting it—especially through the words of someone directly involved at the time as a parliamentarian and vice-chairman of the Telecommunications Commission—can shed light on the roots of the government’s digital totalitarianism in Iran.
Alongside addressing current issues in information technology and digital rights, the “Seventh Layer” podcast strives to compile a brief oral history of censorship and digital resistance. In its sixth episode, and the first installment of this series, we interviewed Ali Akbar Mousavi Khoeini, a Washington-based university researcher who served as the vice-chairman of the Telecommunications and Communications Commission during the sixth session of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Parliament).
In this conversation, Mousavi Khoeini reveals details about the clandestine use of jamming methods directly implemented by security forces and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
According to Ali Akbar Mousavi, in the 2000s, the Frequency Department of the Ministry of Communications used devices mounted on vehicles to monitor the sources of these jamming signals. In a report presented to then-President Mohammad Khatami, the National Security Council, and the sixth parliament, they announced that “military institutions, namely the IRGC, are behind this action—sending jamming signals.”
Mousavi Khoeini further emphasizes that the IRGC “was transmitting these jamming signals from several fixed locations such as Pardisan Park, Jamaran, and a cement factory in southern Tehran, directing them towards antennas and high points. But more interesting and bizarre was that they had commissioned ‘meat delivery trucks’ to carry out this task on the move. The Ministry of Communications discovered that inside these vehicles were telecommunications equipment that fired these signals directly at densely populated apartment buildings with satellite dishes on their roofs—as if they were directly targeting the people.”
We know that global standards, prohibitions, and strict regulations exist regarding the intensity and power of radiation and the minimum safe distance from living beings. However, according to Mousavi, the military forces, disregarding these health regulations, “would come right next to people and fire towards the rooftops.”
Mousavi notes that during discussions between parliament members and the Telecommunications Committee with officials from the IRGC’s parliamentary group about these jamming signals, “We tried hard to convince them that this method was wrong in terms of health and information dissemination. But they said, ‘We do not take orders from the parliament and the government; we have the Commander-in-Chief (the Supreme Leader) and work under his supervision.'”
Later, after Mousavi Khoeini’s persistent follow-ups and some interviews about the source of these jamming signals, their constant transmission was halted for a while.
However, according to the former parliament member, “After some time, in reports sent by people to the parliament, it was stated that these jamming signals were present for a few minutes and then not for a few minutes, disrupting people’s nerves and mental health. We realized that the meat trucks were sometimes there and sometimes not. Then we discovered that these jamming signals were being sent not just in Tehran but across the country. We also realized that they had targeted the satellite source from somewhere outside Iran because if the source was inside Iran, the Ministry of Communications could have found it.”
This digital rights activist further emphasizes that persistent investigations revealed that the source of these jamming signals was in “Cuba”:
“Fidel Castro announced that there was nothing in his country. But when pressure mounted and the parliament warned then-Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi that this action was inappropriate and damaging to Iran’s reputation, investigations confirmed it. It was found that security agencies outside the embassy near Havana were sending these jamming signals. Fidel Castro himself was embarrassed by this affair, retracted his denial, and announced that he had expelled these individuals from Cuba. Those censorship activities were halted in that phase.”
A Multi-Faceted Approach to Satellite Jamming
Looking at the process of jamming satellites resembles the multi-dimensional approach of the government towards the internet in Iran—a method where they reduce bandwidth, make the internet expensive, and disrupt foreign traffic.
The Lie of ‘Combating Cultural Invasion’
In another part of his talk with the “Seventh Layer” podcast about people’s access to satellite TV in Iran, Mousavi Khoeini mentions that during the sixth parliament, representatives requested the legalization of satellite usage. He says that the government’s intent behind filtering and blocking people’s access to the internet and satellite was to prevent them from accessing spaces that provided free information, and claims like combating cultural invasion were nothing but lies.
“People thought that one of their independent means of information dissemination at that time was satellite. The government cited cultural invasion as the reason for confronting satellite dishes and crackdowns, which was among the concerns of the leadership. We [in the sixth parliament] said, fine, if the issue is only cultural and so-called pornographic films, it’s evident that society and families also prefer some limitations for their children, just as there are legal age limits of 13 and 18 worldwide.
We proposed sending those concerned about cultural issues in a delegation to Islamic countries like Malaysia to see what measures they had taken regarding satellites. Representatives from IRIB (Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting), the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, and other concerned entities were sent to those countries for visits.
After they returned, I recall asking Mr. Zarghami—who is now the Minister of Cultural Heritage but was then the parliamentary deputy of IRIB and frequently came to the parliament for his job—how the trip was. They said, yes, there are technical methods in these countries; for example, one is a delay mechanism—they introduced delays if they wanted to censor certain scenes—but people legally used satellite.
The former parliament member points out that even in the law, the parliament had allowed IRIB to be responsible for satellite dishes and to implement the methods of Islamic countries. However, after the satellite law was passed in the parliament, the Guardian Council opposed it.
When Satellite Saved Thousands of Lives
In another part of the conversation, Mousavi Khoeini highlights the importance of the free flow of information by mentioning an incident where satellite usage saved thousands of Iranian lives.
“Behind the mountains of Tehran, towards Lavasan and the area leading to Latian Dam, there are rivers along which buildings had been constructed, and they still exist. Subsidiaries of the IRGC had mass-built in that area. A citizen contacted one of the Los Angeles-based networks, saying he had observed that the sewage systems of these houses weren’t working properly and that wastewater was directly flowing into the river, ultimately reaching Latian Dam.
That single phone call from a citizen via satellite television saved thousands of lives. If he had tried to make that call through domestic media like IRIB, they would have certainly stopped him, and it wouldn’t have been broadcast. But follow-ups eventually showed that the citizen was right, and the sewage was stopped.”
The Early Days of the Internet in Iran
The period when Mousavi Khoeini was active in the Islamic Consultative Assembly coincides with what can be termed the “emergence of the internet” in Iran. However, since the internet was not widespread in Iran at that time, society wasn’t particularly sensitive about how it was provided or news related to it. But today, looking back at the events of those years and the legislative path, we realize that the government has been pursuing a project of infrastructure monopoly and controlling internet provision in Iran from the very beginning.
In another part of his interview with “Seventh Layer,” Ali Akbar Mousavi refers to the government’s monopolistic tendencies regarding mobile phones, stating that the government didn’t even allow people to use “modems” in their homes, and parliamentarians had to impeach the Minister of Communications to break these monopolies.
“I was among those who initiated the impeachment. We brought the minister to the parliament to explain this issue. During this time, I personally noticed that Mr. Haddad Adel, who was the head of the minority faction and had a family relationship with the Supreme Leader, privately and discreetly expressed the dissatisfaction of the Leader’s office with this impeachment. I said this isn’t a personal matter; it’s about people’s rights.”
In response to Mousavi’s stance, Haddad Adel, in a “threatening” tone, told him that some institutions (the IRGC) believed he had personal interests opposing the Leader’s wishes.
“I said if such a thing exists, they should definitely investigate and publish the evidence because I am confident that neither I nor my close relatives have any personal involvement, directly or indirectly, in any company. If there is, let them publish it.”
Mousavi Khoeini continues by stating that ultimately, the parliament succeeded in lifting the monopoly on mobile phone usage and ISPs: “Licenses were issued to about a thousand coffee shops, ISPs, and ICPs. They were charged license fees, and these matters were established in the country’s budget.”
The Unyielding Desire for Monopoly
More than twenty years after that incident, although the technological ecosystem in Iran has become much larger and more complex, the desire for monopoly among the rulers of the Islamic Republic has not diminished in the slightest. The goals they pursued at the parliamentary level back then are now being realized through appointed bodies like the Supreme Council of Cyberspace or a homogenous parliament aligned with the government.
From creating the National Information Network to the desire to seize startups, all indicate the insatiable appetite of the government for monopolization, surveillance, and monitoring of people’s daily activities in the technology domain.
In this environment, which does not present a clear outlook for us, our constant hope lies with civil activists in Iran, especially digital rights activists and individuals who, without any fame or expectation, are working tirelessly. They strive to stand against the government’s construction of a massive digital wall that disrupts the free flow of information between the inhabitants of Iran and the world and to create breaches in it.
