Following a period of severe digital disruption, internet connectivity in Iran has begun showing signs of a gradual but highly contested restoration. This report details the unfolding factional power struggle over Iran's digital borders, highlighting a dynamic shift from high-level national security shutdown orders to recent, conflicting judicial interventions. Because this transition began only today, the situation remains fluid, and our team is actively monitoring network data to assess the true scope of connectivity. This ongoing analysis covers the initial, fragmented return of limited traffic on fixed-line networks, the selective unblocking of specific global platforms, and the legal battle between the Pezeshkian administration and hardline regulatory figures. Additionally, we analyze our team's working hypothesis surrounding the "Internet Pro" initiative as a crisis-management experiment, following observations of its sudden removal from a major telecom provider.
Current Connectivity Status and Reconnected Platforms
At the moment, network monitoring shows an increase in traffic originating from inside Iran, particularly on fixed-line networks, as some providers begin coming back online. Among the first global websites, search engines, and platforms reported as accessible to some users are Wikipedia, the App Store, Pinterest, Canva, Threads, Yahoo, and Dropbox, alongside services related to PlayStation and Xbox.
Because these changes only began today, the reconnection process remains highly fragmented, and many users continue to report that parts of these services remain entirely inaccessible. It is too early to predict the definitive trajectory of this restoration. Following the January protests, for example, some providers were similarly reconnected, yet approximately 50 percent of the country’s total international internet traffic remained permanently disrupted. Our team is continuing to gather information and monitor whether current traffic levels will stabilize or face further restrictions.
Factional Battles and the Judicial Tug-of-War
Internet access in Iran has increasingly become a weaponized tool in the power struggle between competing political factions. The faction opposed to open internet access leveraged its position within the Supreme National Security Council, particularly its secretariat, to order a full internet shutdown on February 27, coinciding with the beginning of geopolitical tensions involving the U.S. and Israel.
In contrast, on May 25, 2026, a directive issued by the President and head of the Supreme National Security Council to restore internet access faced immediate domestic resistance. Hardline opponents filed a complaint with the High Court, resulting in a ruling that suspended the implementation of the “Cyberspace Regulation Headquarters” directive, which had been aimed at returning the country’s internet conditions to their pre-January 2026 state.
In a supplementary clarification, the Administrative Justice Court stated that it had “not entered into the issue of whether international internet access should be cut or restored.” However, because the Court considers the underlying structure of the “Cyberspace Regulation Headquarters” to be “illegal,” it declared all of its directives and resolutions legally unenforceable. Despite this judicial roadblock, the Ministry of Communications under the Fourteenth Government announced that it is moving forward with the President’s written order to restore internet access for users, emphasizing that the rollout will happen gradually.
The Network of Opponents: Key Figures Resisting Reopening
The effort to challenge the President’s reopening order in court is seen by political observers as an intentional institutional weakening of President Pezeshkian’s authority. The opposition is coordinated by a network of officials deeply embedded in Iran's cyberspace governance and regulatory frameworks.
Among the prominent figures is Mohammad-Amin Aghamiri, who has served since 2022 as the Secretary of the Supreme Council of Cyberspace and head of the National Cyberspace Center, and was retained in the Pezeshkian administration. He is a graduate of Sharif University of Technology and the son-in-law of Mohammad-Javad Larijani. During the previous administration, he also served as Deputy Minister of Communications and head of the Radio Communications Regulatory Authority. According to media reports, Kamyar Sadeghi, Reza Taghipour, Rasoul Jalili, and Mohammad-Hassan Entesari were among those who, under Aghamiri’s coordination, filed a complaint with the Administrative Justice Court to prevent the reopening of internet access.
Rasoul Jalili is considered one of the influential figures in Iran’s filtering and cybersecurity policy space. He is a co-founder of several knowledge-based companies in the field of cybersecurity and heads the Secure Communication Systems company affiliated with Sharif University of Technology. He has also served as head of the Network Security Center at Sharif University and has collaborated with national innovation and SMS infrastructure development projects. Jalili has repeatedly advocated for “regulated governance” of cyberspace, emphasizing stronger control over foreign platforms and reducing dependence on services he describes as being under external influence, and he has publicly supported the continuation of filtering policies.
Other key figures include Reza Taghipour Anvari, a current member of parliament who previously served as Minister of Communications and Information Technology during the second term of President Ahmadinejad and later as presidential advisor on ICT affairs. In the 11th Parliament, he was among the supporters of the “Protection Plan” internet regulation bill. Mohammad-Hassan Entesari is the former Secretary of the Supreme Council of Cyberspace and former head of the National Cyberspace Center, while Kamyar Sadeghi serves as a member of the Supreme Council of Cyberspace and a faculty member at Shahid Beheshti University.
How this power struggle unfolds will likely parallel the trajectory of the Islamic Republic’s broader geopolitical negotiations. While a minimal opening in domestic internet access may serve as an indicator of a diplomatic shift, the situation remains highly volatile as anti-negotiation domestic forces continue to assert influence.
Real-Time Observations: The Status of the "Internet Pro" Scheme
Alongside these shifting connectivity levels, our team has observed a notable change in one of the Islamic Republic’s major internet policy initiatives: the “Internet Pro” plan. Coinciding with yesterday's official announcements regarding the return of the internet, our team noticed that the sales page for this service was abruptly removed from the website of the Mobile Telecommunication Company of Iran (MCI / Hamrah Aval). This plan, implemented by actors including the Secretariat of the Supreme National Security Council, the CEO of MCI, and the Chamber of Commerce, was intended to form a new component in the broader framework of a “tiered internet” system in Iran.
It is critical to note that it is far too soon to determine whether the Internet Pro program has been completely terminated or permanently cut across the country. Because these developments are unfolding rapidly, we have only observed this specific disruption with one provider, and the Filterwatch team continues to gather data to see if other network operators follow suit.
Internet Pro as a Crisis Experiment
Based on our preliminary analysis, our team’s working theory is that the Iranian government rolled out the Internet Pro program as a controlled pilot experiment. By introducing it dynamically, authorities likely intended to assess its technical functionality and determine how effectively a stratified access model can be deployed to manage communications and mitigate economic fallout during times of severe domestic and geopolitical crisis. Providing selective access to corporations, Chamber of Commerce members, and government-supported entities serves as the state's mechanism for economic damage control. By keeping vital business sectors globally connected, the regime aims to keep the core economy functional and insulated from international isolation, even while completely severing the general population from the global network.
The scheme itself stems from a July 2025 regulation approved by the Supreme Council of Cyberspace titled “Facilitating the Activity of Digital Economy Businesses.” While marketed as a utility to support commerce, it legally authorized this stratified system of internet access. Under this model, security institutions map out layers of access using whitelists, granting different tiers of connectivity to users depending on their professional or political alignment. In official discourse, authorities referred to Internet Pro as “stable internet,” meaning it was a premium, heavily monitored connection intended for a specific class of users who would remain insulated from security-driven national shutdowns.
Initially restricted to members of the Chamber of Commerce, the service eventually bled into the broader market. Commercial activation SMS messages were sent to ordinary citizens, and black-market brokers began selling Pro access outside official frameworks at highly inflated prices. Critically, Internet Pro highlighted a structural shift in Iranian censorship from a traditional blacklist model (where the internet is open except for blocked sites) toward a strict whitelist model (where the internet is blocked by default, and only pre-approved platforms are accessible). By utilizing schemes like Internet Pro and white SIM cards, authorities have been testing this default-off mechanism on controlled segments of the population.
While conditions on the ground remain highly fluid today, the infrastructure tested during this pilot suggests that authorities are actively developing the capacity to sever the general public from the global network during crises while keeping state-sanctioned tiers active. The Filterwatch team will continue to update our findings as more concrete network connectivity and provider data becomes available.