{"id":6041,"date":"2026-10-14T13:37:07","date_gmt":"2026-10-14T13:37:07","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/?p=6041"},"modified":"2026-10-15T09:40:18","modified_gmt":"2026-10-15T09:40:18","slug":"network-monitoring-september-2026-regime-fear-of-filtering-failure","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/2026\/10\/14\/network-monitoring-september-2026-regime-fear-of-filtering-failure\/","title":{"rendered":"Iran\u2019s Government Fears Its Filtering Is Failing: From the \u201cBlackout\u201d to Declaring War on Starlink"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Developments over the past month show that communications controls are expanding rapidly into every layer of users\u2019 digital lives. <\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">This includes <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.zoomit.ir\/iran-news\/468503-iran-starlink-terminals-shutdown-technology-aghamiri\/\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">official<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> announcements targeting satellite internet technologies, cutting off\u00a0 SIM cards and phone lines of Instagram-based businesses, conditioning infrastructure access on identity verification, and linking services and network resources to real-world identities.<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> Taken together, these tools and practices mean that control is no longer limited to the pathways that users take to access the internet. Instead, user identities, communication tools, businesses, IP addresses, and even their access to everyday services are increasingly becoming points of pressure and control.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Meanwhile, the state of the network itself shows no sign of returning to normal. Throughout the month, users reported widespread VPN instability and short, recurring disruptions to international internet connectivity. A fresh decline in Iranian traffic on Cloudflare\u2019s network, coinciding with these disruptions, heightens concerns that filtering tactics are shifting toward specifically targeting censorship-circumvention tools.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<h3><b>Key Findings<\/b><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b>Government concern over declining filtering effectiveness against satellite internet: <\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">\u00a0Recent\u00a0<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.fastwebvodafone.it\/area-media\/comunicati-stampa\/fastweb-e-starlink-partnership-per-una-sperimentazione-tecnica-per-estendere-la-copertura-mobile-nelle-aree-rurali\/\"> <span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Direct to Cell<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> trials around the world, which can render traditional network-control tools ineffective, have prompted the government to resort to\u00a0<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.zoomit.ir\/iran-news\/468503-iran-starlink-terminals-shutdown-technology-aghamiri\/\"> <span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">threats<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> of signal jamming,<\/span>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.taadolnewspaper.ir\/fa\/news\/405509\/%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%84%DB%8C%D9%86%DA%A9-%D8%A2%D8%AE%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%86-%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%AE-%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%AA-%D8%AD%DA%A9%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%86%D8%AA\"> <span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">power cuts<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, and<\/span>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.zoomit.ir\/iran-news\/468499-iran-protests-norway-starlink-activities\/\"> <span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">diplomatic<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> pressure.<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> Technical assessments, however, indicate that attempts to completely shut down Starlink across Iran in January 2026\u00a0 also failed and that achieving a nationwide shutdown is not technically feasible in the future either.<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b>SIM cards transformed from communication tools into instruments of punishment:<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> Blocking the mobile and landline services of online businesses, and making reconnection conditional on \u201ccontent clean-up\u201d and compliance with dress-code rules, has<\/span>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.zoomit.ir\/report\/467142--blackout-business-phone-lines-fashion-dress-code-\/\"> <span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">turned<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> infrastructure access directly into a tool for economic punishment and enforced self-censorship.<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b>Identity verification made a precondition for infrastructure access:<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> Mandatory visual identity verification at IRNIC, together with the registration of end-user identities for international internet access on domestically hosted servers, has created an \u201cidentity\u2013phone\u2013IP\u201d chain that strengthens and institutionalizes regulatory tracking of digital activity back to specific individuals.<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b>Inadequate regulatory response to \"data depletion\" complaints:<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> Although the regulator rejected the existence of systematic under-delivery, its own assessment confirmed that some domestic IP addresses that had not been properly updated were being charged at international traffic rates.<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> This issue cannot be resolved without providing auditable itemized usage records and independent verification.<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b><\/b><b>Gap between official statistics and network reality:<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> The CEO of the Telecommunication Infrastructure Company claimed that traffic had recovered to 90% of its previous level, a figure inconsistent with independent Kentik data, which places it at around 60%.<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> At the same time, severe VPN instability, recurring disruptions to international connectivity, and a decline in Cloudflare traffic suggest filtering is shifting toward selectively targeting circumvention tools.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><b>Part One: Policy<\/b><\/h3>\n<h4><b>From Network Control to a War on Satellite Connectivity<\/b><\/h4>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">While telecom operators globally test Direct-to-Cell technology to expand coverage and reduce reliance on terrestrial infrastructure, Iranian authorities are taking an increasingly aggressive stance against these emerging tools.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">On September 14, Italian operators Fastweb and Vodafone, in partnership with Starlink, successfully\u00a0<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.fastwebvodafone.it\/area-media\/comunicati-stampa\/fastweb-e-starlink-partnership-per-una-sperimentazione-tecnica-per-estendere-la-copertura-mobile-nelle-aree-rurali\/\"> <span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">connected<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> a standard 4G smartphone directly to Starlink\u2019s satellite network using Direct to Cell technology in an area without mobile network coverage, requiring no satellite dish or antenna.<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> During the trial, the phone was able to receive text messages and mobile data and run services including WhatsApp video calls and Google Maps.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In Iran, where satellite options reduce reliance on state-controlled infrastructure, the government has expanded countermeasures beyond traditional filtering and blackouts. These now include radio-frequency jamming, equipment confiscation, criminalization, power cut threats, and diplomatic pressure. <\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">During the nationwide internet shutdown in January 2026, <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2026\/jan\/10\/irans-internet-shutdown-is-strikingly-sophisticated-and-may-last-some-time\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">media outlets<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> reported Iran using jamming and electronic warfare equipment to disrupt Starlink.<\/span> <span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Those reports have now, for the first time, been officially <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.zoomit.ir\/iran-news\/468503-iran-starlink-terminals-shutdown-technology-aghamiri\/\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">acknowledged<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> at the highest level of Iran\u2019s cyberspace policymaking apparatus.<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> On October 5, Seyed Mohammad Amin Aghamiri, Secretary of the Supreme Council of Cyberspace, stated that Iran managed to disable Starlink terminals \u201cin a controlled manner\u201d during what he termed the \u201cJanuary coup,\u201d adding that additional countermeasures remain available. <\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">An expert from the <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/connect.starlink4iran.com\/en\/\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">NasNet<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> group told Filterwatch that Iranian officials\u2019 claims of having \u201cdisabled Starlink\u201d do not align with observations on the ground:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">\u201cThe repeated claims by Islamic Republic officials that they shut down Starlink do not match what we actually saw. In January, they were able to disrupt Starlink connectivity in some parts of Tehran, but what happened was more like a three- to four-day technical confrontation. The Islamic Republic was jamming Starlink connections, while Starlink kept releasing updates that allowed terminals to start working again.\u201d<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Describing the changes Starlink made during the January protests, the expert added:\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">\u201cBefore these updates, packet loss in some parts of Tehran reached as high as around 80 percent. After Starlink made changes, that figure dropped to roughly 10 percent, and after about four days the connection reached a relatively stable state. During the disruption, Starlink also limited upload speeds to around 1 Mbps, while download speeds remained almost normal throughout.\u201d<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">He also stressed that the Iranian government\u2019s efforts to disrupt Starlink are continuing: <\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">\u201cThe Islamic Republic has never been able to completely disable Starlink across Iran, even for a single moment. Technically, it can deploy jamming equipment and cause disruption in parts of major cities, but extending that level of disruption across the entire country is not feasible. Starlink is also not defenseless against these measures and has the ability to adapt and respond technically. The experience of the war in Ukraine has also shown that even Russia has been unable to shut Starlink down completely.\u201d<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">On October 4, one day prior to Aghamiri\u2019s statement, the Director General for International Peace and Security at Iran\u2019s Ministry of Foreign Affairs<\/span>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.zoomit.ir\/iran-news\/468499-iran-protests-norway-starlink-activities\/\"> <span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">summoned<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> the Norwegian ambassador and formally called on Norway to take action to halt Starlink\u2019s activities in Iran.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Additionally, Iran\u2019s deputy minister of communications recently warned that the government may <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.taadolnewspaper.ir\/fa\/news\/405509\/%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%84%DB%8C%D9%86%DA%A9-%D8%A2%D8%AE%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%86-%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%AE-%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%AA-%D8%AD%DA%A9%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%86%D8%AA\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">cut electricity<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> during future crises to disrupt satellite networks operating independently of domestic infrastructure.<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Recent statements by Iranian officials about Starlink reflect the government\u2019s growing concern over the technology. As satellite internet moves away from dedicated dishes and toward direct connectivity with ordinary mobile phones, Iran\u2019s traditional model of internet control\u2014based on control over operators, the international gateway, DPI, and network shutdowns\u2014loses some of its effectiveness. Consequently, state policy is pivoting toward spectrum control, physical control over equipment, punishment of users, disruption of supporting infrastructure such as electricity, and international pressure on service providers.<\/span><\/p>\n<h4><b>From SIM Card Cutoffs to the \u201cBlackout\u201d: Communications Infrastructure Becomes a Tool of Punishment<\/b><\/h4>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">SIM card disconnections are not new in Iran. <\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Filterwatch <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/2024\/11\/25\/investigative-report-october-2024-sim-card-shutdown\/\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">research<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> shows that this measure has been used since at least the summer of 2024 against journalists, civil society activists, students, and owners of online businesses.<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> However, September 2026 saw a sharp expansion of this practice, locally labeled the \u201cblackout\u201d, along with the introduction of content-control requirements as a condition for restoring blocked lines.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">According to a<\/span>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.zoomit.ir\/report\/467142--blackout-business-phone-lines-fashion-dress-code-\/\"> <span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Zoomit report<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, following the 12-day war, Instagram business owners were forced to \u201cclean up\u201d their pages according to guidelines from the Fashion and Clothing Organization Working Group in order to have their phone lines restored.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The process includes pledging to remove \u201ccriminal\u201d content, providing the addresses of all pages and channels, and complying with detailed rules governing clothing, the display of the body, and product advertising. Reconnection of phone lines is also made conditional on review and approval by the working group. In this way, access to telecommunications services\u2014and the ability to continue operating a business\u2014is tied to compliance with censorship and enforced self-censorship.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">This mechanism forms part of a broader expansion of digital and economic repression, particularly targeting women\u2014a shift <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/2025\/12\/25\/investigative-report-december-2025-paradigm-shift-in-the-repression-of-women-in-iran\/\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Filterwatch<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> has previously documented.<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> Blocking a SIM card creates a form of \u201csilent, cascading punishment,\u201d because mobile phone numbers have become gateways to banking, judicial, university services, online shopping, transportation, and even some urban mobility services.<\/span><\/p>\n<h4><b>Identity Verification: From User Verification to Controlling Access to Infrastructure<\/b><\/h4>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Last month, the\u00a0<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.zoomit.ir\/tech-iran\/468571-irnic-visual-identity-verification-mandatory\/\"> <span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">mandatory introduction<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> of \u201cvisual identity verification\u201d for individual users at IRNIC sparked widespread discussion on social media. Although verification to prevent fraud in domain registration is a reasonable measure, making the collection of sensitive visual data mandatory\u2014without offering less intrusive alternatives or clearly explaining why such data is necessary\u2014does not align with data protection and digital rights standards. <\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">This move by IRNIC, alongside similar practices introduced by\u00a0<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/digiato.com\/iran-technology-news\/return-internet-data-centers-authentication-debate\"> <span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">hosting companies<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, points to a broader trend toward linking digital services and IP addresses more closely to individuals\u2019 real identities.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">This move mirrors practices across Iranian web hosts, highlighting a broader shift toward binding digital resources and IP addresses directly to real-world identities. <\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Since July 2026, as data center connectivity was restored, enabling international internet access on domestic servers became <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.zoomit.ir\/report\/465572-iran-internet-datacenter-shahkar-issues\/\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">conditional<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> on user identity verification.<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> Data centers and intermediary hosts must verify identity, linking assigned IP addresses to phone numbers registered under the user's national ID.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">While identifying IP owners via the Shahkar system is not new, the critical shift is that identity registration is now an active precondition for network access. International internet access remains disabled until Shahkar verification is complete, turning identity checks into a gateway for network access.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Users on X (formerly Twitter) have documented these enforcement mechanics across service providers. <\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">For example, ParsVDS implemented a\u00a0 <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/x.com\/NabiKAZ\/status\/2103356742033621269?s=20\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">five-step <\/span><\/a>\u00a0<span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">identity and address registration process within the \u201cData Center Services Management System,\u201d while Mizbanfa <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/x.com\/the_azzi\/status\/2103310117034668089\/photo\/1\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">made<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> cPanel credentials and Shell Access contingent on Level 2 identity verification.<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> Without full registration, administrative controls, and international connectivity remain locked.<\/span><\/p>\n<figure id=\"attachment_6044\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment_6044\" style=\"width: 750px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><a href=\"https:\/\/filter.watch\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2026\/10\/Inside-Banner.png\"><img decoding=\"async\" class=\"wp-image-6044 size-large\" src=\"https:\/\/filter.watch\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2026\/10\/Inside-Banner-1024x633.png\" alt=\"\" width=\"750\" height=\"464\" srcset=\"https:\/\/filter.watch\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2026\/10\/Inside-Banner-1024x633.png 1024w, https:\/\/filter.watch\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2026\/10\/Inside-Banner-300x185.png 300w, https:\/\/filter.watch\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2026\/10\/Inside-Banner-768x475.png 768w, https:\/\/filter.watch\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2026\/10\/Inside-Banner-1536x950.png 1536w, https:\/\/filter.watch\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2026\/10\/Inside-Banner-2048x1266.png 2048w, https:\/\/filter.watch\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2026\/10\/Inside-Banner-1568x969.png 1568w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 750px) 100vw, 750px\" \/><\/a><figcaption id=\"caption-attachment_6044\" class=\"wp-caption-text\" data-caption=\"Caption%3A%20Sample%20declaration%20that%20businesses%20are%20required%20to%20sign%20in%20order%20to%20continue%20operating%2C%20including%20commitments%20to%20remove%20%E2%80%9Ccriminal%20content%2C%E2%80%9D%20provide%20the%20addresses%20of%20their%20pages%20and%20channels%2C%20and%20comply%20with%20rules%20governing%20clothing%20and%20product%20advertising.\">Loading...<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<h5><b>\u201cData Depletion\u201d: An Audit Without Independent Verification<\/b><\/h5>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">One of the recent complaints from users about the state of Iran\u2019s internet concerns what has become known as<\/span>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/digiato.com\/iran-technology-news\/deta-depletion-complaints-operators-regulatory\"> <span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">\u201cdata depletion\u201d<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">: internet packages running out unusually quickly compared with previous months.<\/span> <span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">After these complaints intensified, the regulator<\/span>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/digiato.com\/iran-technology-news\/cra-internet-depletion-report\"> <span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">announced<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> that random tests of fixed and mobile operators\u2019 data packages had found no discrepancy in the amount of data recorded.<\/span> <span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">However, the same<\/span>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/digiato.com\/iran-technology-news\/cra-internet-depletion-report\"> <span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">report<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> also confirmed that a significant number of IP addresses and domestic content addresses had not been registered or updated in the preferential-tariff system.<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> As a result, in some cases traffic that should have been charged at the domestic rate was instead deducted from users\u2019 packages as international traffic.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Regardless of the cause, the outcome for users is effectively what they describe as \u201cdata depletion\u201d: their internet packages are consumed faster than expected because some traffic is deducted at a higher rate than it should be. Therefore, the fact that a system records \u201cone gigabyte as one gigabyte\u201d in a particular test does not, by itself, address users\u2019 complaints. The issue is not only how many bytes are counted, but also how those same bytes are classified and at what tariff they are deducted from a user\u2019s package.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The regulator has also cited higher volumes and quality of video content, automatic software updates, autoplay, cloud backups, and background app activity as reasons why users\u2019 packages may be depleted more quickly. These factors are certainly real, but they are not new and, on their own, do not explain why users have specifically reported a noticeable change in the rate at which their data packages are being consumed in recent months.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">More importantly, the regulator\u2019s review relied largely on random testing and assessments of systems that the regulator itself is responsible for overseeing, rather than on independent verification of specific user complaints during the periods in question. A measurable and verifiable response to these complaints would require each user to have access to auditable, itemized usage records showing the time of consumption, exact volume of data used, whether the traffic was classified as domestic or international, and the tariff applied to each record. That information would also need to be independently verifiable. Until such data is available, the findings of a limited audit cannot be considered sufficient to close the case on \u201cdata depletion.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<h3><b>Part Two: The State of Iran\u2019s Internet Network<\/b><\/h3>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">On September 14, Behzad Akbari, CEO of the Telecommunication Infrastructure Company (TIC) and deputy minister of communications, <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.mehrnews.com\/news\/6946660\/%DB%B9%DB%B0-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B5%D8%AF-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%81%DB%8C%DA%A9-%D8%A8%DB%8C%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%84%D9%84-%D8%A8%D8%B1%DA%AF%D8%B4%D8%AA-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%85-%DB%B3%DB%B0-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B5%D8%AF-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%86%D9%87-%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%B9%D9%84%DB%8C%D9%87-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">claimed<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> international traffic had largely recovered, stating: <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">\u201cIn terms of traffic, we are now at 90 percent of the international traffic level we had in January.\u201d<\/span><\/i><i><\/i><i><\/i><i><\/i><i><\/i><i><\/i><i><\/i><i><\/i><i><\/i><i><\/i><i><\/i><i><\/i><i><\/i><i><\/i><i><\/i><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/i><i><\/i><i><\/i><i><\/i><i><\/i><i><\/i><i><\/i><i><\/i><i><\/i><i><\/i><i><\/i><i><\/i><i><\/i><i><\/i><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">However, data from network monitoring firm Kentik contradicts this claim. Doug Madory, Kentik\u2019s Director of Internet Analysis, shared the latest chart of Iran\u2019s internet traffic with Filterwatch and said: <\/span><strong>\u201cAccording to our data, Iran\u2019s traffic is still at around 60 percent of its pre-January 8 level.\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n<figure id=\"attachment_6045\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment_6045\" style=\"width: 750px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><a href=\"https:\/\/filter.watch\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2026\/10\/signal-2026-10-05-19-22-37-276_002.jpg\"><img decoding=\"async\" class=\"wp-image-6045 size-large\" src=\"https:\/\/filter.watch\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2026\/10\/signal-2026-10-05-19-22-37-276_002-1024x575.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"750\" height=\"421\" srcset=\"https:\/\/filter.watch\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2026\/10\/signal-2026-10-05-19-22-37-276_002-1024x575.jpg 1024w, https:\/\/filter.watch\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2026\/10\/signal-2026-10-05-19-22-37-276_002-300x169.jpg 300w, https:\/\/filter.watch\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2026\/10\/signal-2026-10-05-19-22-37-276_002-768x431.jpg 768w, https:\/\/filter.watch\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2026\/10\/signal-2026-10-05-19-22-37-276_002-1536x863.jpg 1536w, https:\/\/filter.watch\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2026\/10\/signal-2026-10-05-19-22-37-276_002-1568x881.jpg 1568w, https:\/\/filter.watch\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2026\/10\/signal-2026-10-05-19-22-37-276_002.jpg 1855w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 750px) 100vw, 750px\" \/><\/a><figcaption id=\"caption-attachment_6045\" class=\"wp-caption-text\" data-caption=\"Kentik%E2%80%99s%20chart%20shows%20that%2C%20as%20of%20this%20report%E2%80%99s%20publication%2C%20Iran%E2%80%99s%20internet%20traffic%20remains%20at%20approximately%2060%25%20of%20its%20pre-January%208%2C%202026%20level.\">Loading...<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Throughout the month, users experienced severe VPN instability and unpredictable performance across different operators. Circumvention tools often failed on one provider while remaining functional on another. A recurring pattern was the temporary loss of international connectivity while domestic network access remained intact\u2014a state users term \u201cIran Access.\u201d\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">A notable drop in Cloudflare network traffic from Iran beginning <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/radar.cloudflare.com\/traffic\/ir\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">October 4 <\/span><\/a>\u00a0<span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">coincided with user reports of VPN failures and targeted protocol interference, suggesting potential changes in state filtering methodologies.<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> Together, these developments have strengthened speculation that the methods used to enforce filtering and restrict access to the international internet may be changing.<\/span><\/p>\n<figure id=\"attachment_6046\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment_6046\" style=\"width: 750px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><a href=\"https:\/\/filter.watch\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2026\/10\/cloudflare-radar_traffic-volume-xy_ir_20260929-20261006.png\"><img decoding=\"async\" class=\"wp-image-6046 size-large\" src=\"https:\/\/filter.watch\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2026\/10\/cloudflare-radar_traffic-volume-xy_ir_20260929-20261006-1024x408.png\" alt=\"Line chart titled 'Traffic volume in Iran' showing relative change from Sep 29 to Oct 6 for total bytes (blue), HTTP bytes (light blue), and HTTP requests (orange); orange spikes around Oct 4; beige shaded area after Oct 4.\" width=\"750\" height=\"299\" srcset=\"https:\/\/filter.watch\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2026\/10\/cloudflare-radar_traffic-volume-xy_ir_20260929-20261006-1024x408.png 1024w, https:\/\/filter.watch\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2026\/10\/cloudflare-radar_traffic-volume-xy_ir_20260929-20261006-300x120.png 300w, https:\/\/filter.watch\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2026\/10\/cloudflare-radar_traffic-volume-xy_ir_20260929-20261006-768x306.png 768w, https:\/\/filter.watch\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2026\/10\/cloudflare-radar_traffic-volume-xy_ir_20260929-20261006-1536x612.png 1536w, https:\/\/filter.watch\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2026\/10\/cloudflare-radar_traffic-volume-xy_ir_20260929-20261006-1568x625.png 1568w, https:\/\/filter.watch\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2026\/10\/cloudflare-radar_traffic-volume-xy_ir_20260929-20261006.png 1600w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 750px) 100vw, 750px\" \/><\/a><figcaption id=\"caption-attachment_6046\" class=\"wp-caption-text\" data-caption=\"According%20to%20Cloudflare%E2%80%99s%20traffic%20volume%20chart%2C%20a%20noticeable%20decline%20in%20traffic%20began%20on%204%20October%20and%20continued%20through%206%20October%2C%20when%20this%20report%20was%20published.\">Loading...<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">One technical hypothesis is the targeted disruption of circumvention tools relying on Cloudflare\u2019s infrastructure for routing or traffic obfuscation. This would account for severe circumvention failures without producing major BGP routing drops or massive dips in total nationwide bandwidth.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Kentik\u2019s Doug Madory <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/x.com\/DougMadory\/status\/2106919413194567740?s=20\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">confirmed<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> that this traffic drop was specific to Cloudflare\u2019s network (AS13335) and did not drastically alter Iran's overall inbound\/outbound volume.<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Senior network engineer Mark Pashmforoush noted that these disruptions often evade traditional monitoring platforms like IODA or Cloudflare Radar:\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">\u201cIODA and Cloudflare Radar mostly watch routing and whether a network can be reached at all. Most of what users felt in September left both of those intact.\u201d\u00a0<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">According to Pashmforoush, at one point every TCI (Mokhaberat) and MCI (Hamrah-Avval) prefix they monitor \u201cdropped to almost zero speed for two hours.\u201d The links remained up, meaning that from outside the network appeared to be functioning, \u201cbut nothing useful got through.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">He explained that filtering is increasingly moving toward stealth throttling:\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">\u201cThe filtering increasingly relies on limits that monitors cannot see. We are currently measuring a throttle that allows the first six packets of a TCP or UDP connection to pass normally, after which the connection slows so much that it becomes unusable. \u201dBecause monitoring tools test with short connections, he explained, they may report the network as healthy while real users get almost nothing.\u201d<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Regarding \u201cIran-access,\u201d Pashmforoush noted several technical drivers. International links may fail while domestic traffic continues normally; firewall maintenance can also produce short periods of Iran-access, particularly between 3 and 4 a.m. Tehran time, when firewalls are tuned and updated. A third cause, he said, lies inside Iranian data centers. Many VPN setups pass through a server inside Iran before leaving the country, and if that server loses its foreign internet access, users relying on it remain stuck on Iran-access until the provider reconnects it.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Addressing potential infrastructure overhauls, Pashmforoush concluded:\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">\u201cSo far we see constant tuning rather than a rebuild. The firewall is getting more precise and harder to see from outside. The internet stays technically on while it becomes unusable for the things people need. That makes this kind of censorship harder to measure and harder to prove. This may be a sign of new capabilities.\u201d<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Developments over the past month show that communications controls are expanding rapidly into every layer of users\u2019 digital lives. This includes official announcements targeting satellite internet technologies, cutting off\u00a0 SIM cards and phone lines of Instagram-based businesses, conditioning infrastructure access on identity verification, and linking services and network resources to real-world identities. Taken together, these<a class=\"more-link\" href=\"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/2026\/10\/14\/network-monitoring-september-2026-regime-fear-of-filtering-failure\/\">Continue reading <span class=\"screen-reader-text\">\"Iran\u2019s Government Fears Its Filtering Is Failing: From the \u201cBlackout\u201d to Declaring War on Starlink\"<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":13,"featured_media":6043,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"om_disable_all_campaigns":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[4,2],"tags":[353,393,394,281],"class_list":["post-6041","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-network-monitor","category-policy-monitor","tag-digital-blackout-in-iran","tag-direct-to-cell","tag-punitive-sim-card-disconnection","tag-starlink","entry"],"acf":[],"aioseo_notices":[],"aioseo_head":"\n\t\t<!-- All in One SEO Pro 5.0.3 - aioseo.com -->\n\t<meta name=\"description\" content=\"Developments over the past month show that communications controls are expanding rapidly into every layer of users\u2019 digital lives. 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