{"id":5829,"date":"2026-03-06T11:03:55","date_gmt":"2026-03-06T11:03:55","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/?p=5829"},"modified":"2026-03-11T11:28:53","modified_gmt":"2026-03-11T11:28:53","slug":"network-monitoring-february-2026-a-new-phase-of-selective-internet-in-iran","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/2026\/03\/06\/network-monitoring-february-2026-a-new-phase-of-selective-internet-in-iran\/","title":{"rendered":"The Digital Frontline: Tiered Internet, Infrastructure Control, and Information Warfare in Iran"},"content":{"rendered":"

The landscape of internet access in Iran has entered a transformative and restrictive new phase, accelerated by the intersection of domestic unrest and international military conflict. While the country has historically relied on blanket filtering, recent developments\u2014documented primarily through Filterwatch and technical network data\u2014reveal a shift toward a systematic, tiered access model. This transition is no longer just about blocking content but about creating a \"selective internet\" where the National Information Network (NIN) serves as a primary tool for both service delivery and social control.<\/span><\/p>\n

Central to this new reality is the institutionalization of privilege through programs like the \"Stable Communication Network\" and the \"Pro Internet\" plan. These initiatives have established a legal and commercial framework where unrestricted access is treated as a luxury service. By offering unfiltered connectivity at high prices to select groups and businesses, the state has effectively turned a fundamental right into a tiered commodity. This shift is supported by a strengthening legal foundation, specifically the \"Strategic Document on Electronic Passive Defense\" approved in February 2026, which formally mandates the capability to disconnect the domestic network from the global internet during crises.<\/span><\/p>\n

As international connectivity became volatile following the military attacks of February 28, the authorities demonstrated a sophisticated ability to maintain essential domestic services while simultaneously silencing the broader public. This period was marked not only by infrastructure-level disruptions but also by a transition toward active digital deterrence. Through the use of mass SMS warnings, the targeted summons of ordinary users, and the compromise of popular domestic applications for state messaging, the mechanism of control has moved from the network core to the individual device. The following analysis details how these developments represent a long-term blueprint for the governance of cyberspace in Iran, moving away from temporary wartime measures toward a permanent structure of segregated digital access.<\/span><\/p>\n

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Key Policy Developments in February:\u00a0<\/b><\/h3>\n

Access for the Privileged: From the \u201cStable Communication Network\u201d to \u201cPro Internet\u201d<\/b><\/h4>\n

As a continuation of the whitelist-based access policy implemented after the suppression of the public protests in December\u00a0 2025 - January 2026 and the subsequent large-scale internet shutdown in\u00a0 January , information <\/span>emerged<\/span><\/a> about a program known as the \u201cStable Communication Network.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

On March 2, reports circulated indicating that within the MCI (Hamrah-e Aval) network, a USSD code had been promoted in some Telegram channels that sell VPN services. These channels claimed that users could dial the code to purchase unfiltered internet access at a price of roughly 40,000 tomans per gigabyte.<\/span><\/p>\n

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According to documents obtained by Filterwatch, this service\u2014defined internally within MCI as part of a project called the \u201cStable Communication Network\u201d\u2014was implemented simultaneously with the start of military attacks on Iran and the disruption of international internet connectivity.<\/span><\/p>\n

Information received by Filterwatch further suggests that some companies involved in Iran\u2019s filtering infrastructure, including Douran Company\u2014which is also active in the VPN market\u2014may have played a role in leaking details of the project and publicizing the USSD codes. The exposure ultimately led to the deactivation of the published codes. However, sources told Filterwatch that the project continues to operate, now with new codes and under the coordination of MCI\u2019s Network Security Directorate, in order to continue providing unrestricted internet access to select groups.<\/span><\/p>\n

It is important to note that this initiative is not limited to MCI. As part of the broader effort to expand whitelist policies and selective access mechanisms, similar arrangements are also being implemented by other operators, including Irancell.<\/span><\/p>\n

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Pro Internet<\/b><\/h4>\n

The \u201cPro Internet\u201d plan, <\/span>reports<\/span><\/a> about which first emerged on February 25, is another example of tiered internet access, introduced under the pretext of supporting businesses.<\/span><\/p>\n

Under this plan, users can purchase a special SIM card priced at 2,178,000 tomans, which provides access to unfiltered internet with an international IP address. The cost of traffic in this plan is 8,000 tomans per gigabyte, while traffic used on blocked websites and services is priced at 40,000 tomans per gigabyte.<\/span><\/p>\n

The scheme has been presented as an organizational solution intended to support commercial and international activities. It requires registration and formal identity verification in government systems, as well as a registered business license. In practice, however, there appears to be little strict enforcement to ensure that the service is used exclusively for organizational purposes. Anyone with a business license and the ability to pay the high costs can effectively obtain access to an unrestricted internet.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cPro Internet\u201d is advertised as offering features such as no disconnections, no filtering, and direct activation on the SIM card, and it is currently available through only one operator. The service is also capacity-limited, with access currently restricted to the first 500 registered users.<\/span><\/p>\n

This combination of high pricing and limited availability effectively turns unrestricted internet access into a luxury service for a small, privileged group, while the vast majority of users continue to face restricted, expensive, and unstable internet connectivity.<\/span><\/p>\n

Tariff Policy and Increasing Economic Pressure on Household Budgets<\/b><\/h4>\n

Alongside the creation of privileged access layers, restrictive policies have intensified within the general public layer of the network, aimed at managing consumption and increasing operators\u2019 revenues.<\/span><\/p>\n

The telecommunications regulator, which had authorized a 38% tariff <\/span>increase<\/span><\/a> in October 2025, structured the implementation in two phases in order to avoid strong public backlash: a 20% increase in December 2025 followed by an additional 18% increase in February 2026.<\/span><\/p>\n

At the same time, operators have effectively reduced users\u2019 choices by removing high-volume and cost-effective data packages from their offerings.<\/span><\/p>\n

Although the regulator had conditioned the price increases on \u201cimprovements in service quality,\u201d the continued network disruptions and the ongoing decline in international internet traffic have rendered this guarantee largely ineffective in practice.<\/span><\/p>\n

Strategic Document on Electronic Passive Defense<\/b><\/h4>\n

The approval of this 10-year strategic <\/span>document<\/span><\/a> in February has strengthened the legal foundation for infrastructure-level control of communications networks. The document outlines the country\u2019s security framework for managing and protecting digital infrastructure.<\/span><\/p>\n