{"id":5779,"date":"2026-01-24T15:28:35","date_gmt":"2026-01-24T15:28:35","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/?p=5779"},"modified":"2026-01-26T15:36:26","modified_gmt":"2026-01-26T15:36:26","slug":"network-monitoring-january-2025-internet-repression-in-times-of-protest-2","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/2026\/01\/24\/network-monitoring-january-2025-internet-repression-in-times-of-protest-2\/","title":{"rendered":"A Clear Message from the Supreme National Security Council Opposing the Restoration of Internet Access"},"content":{"rendered":"

More than two weeks into the internet shutdown in Iran, <\/span>statements<\/span><\/a> by the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council have confirmed that restoring internet access is not currently on the agenda of security institutions. As in previous instances, the Council has cited security concerns to avoid providing a clear\u00a0 timeline for reconnection. . Instead, officials have adopted\u00a0 terms such as \u201clocalized\u201d and \u201cissue-based\u201d restoration\u2014language that signals\u00a0 the activation of a whitelisting strategy, granting selective access only to individuals or organizations vetted and approved by the authorities.<\/span><\/p>\n

Although reports began circulating after midnight on January 17 indicating that some users had regained internet connectivity, and technical data shows a slight uptick\u00a0 in network traffic, these connections remain highly limited and do not indicate a broad return to\u00a0 public\u00a0 access. The implementation of selective,\u00a0 restricted connectivity\u2014a tactic the Iranian government has repeatedly employed in the <\/span>past<\/span><\/a>\u2014follows a pattern similar to internet control models observed in countries such as <\/span>Russia<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

As Alan Woodward, Professor of Computer Security at the University of Surrey, <\/span>told<\/span><\/a> BBC Persian: \u201cIt appears that a process is underway in Iran to deprive everyone of any form of electronic access unless it has been authorized and approved by the government.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

1. Internet Network Conditions in Iran (January 14\u201321)<\/b><\/h4>\n
1.1 Government Focus on the National Information Network (NIN)<\/b><\/h5>\n

Between January 14 and January 16, access to the international internet, inbound international calls, and SMS services remained completely cut off. This applied both within Iran and to roaming services from outside the country into Iran. During this period, the government\u2019s strategy\u00a0 was clearly centered on internalizing communications traffic and forcing reliance on the National Information Network (NIN).\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Selective Restoration:<\/b> Concurrently,\u00a0 authorities began a phased , selective restoration of access, particularly across domestic messaging platforms. Initial access was restored first for verified channels and accounts, well-known individuals, and subsequently for users whose identities had been authenticated. This pattern suggests that the \u201cTrusted Identity System for the National Cyberspace\u201d - long-standing government <\/span>plan<\/span><\/a> - has likely entered an operational phase. Under this model, future access to international platforms may be restricted to designated VPNs subject to strict user identification, effectively transforming the internet from a public utility into a personalized, traceable environment.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Iran.ir Portal<\/b>: On January 15 domestic media\u00a0 encouraged users to visit iran.ir to access available services and websites.\u00a0 Presented as a centralized directory of \"approved\" websites, this portal effectively serves as the official reference for a state-sanctioned intranet, directing users only to resources the authorities have chosen to keep accessible.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

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1.2 The Beginning of Changes in Access Levels (Since January 16)<\/b><\/h5>\n
Restoration of SMS Services<\/b><\/h5>\n

On January 16, domestic and roaming SMS sending and receiving services were <\/span>restored<\/span><\/a>. This marked the first step in a tiered\u00a0 restoration plan previously announced by state-affiliated media, such as Fars News Agency, which <\/span>outlined<\/span><\/a> a sequence of return: first SMS, then domestic platforms, and finally, international access.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

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Fluctuating Traffic Patterns\u00a0<\/b><\/h5>\n

From January 16 onward, network data\u00a0 from IODA and Kentik displayed\u00a0 a stop\u2013start pattern. The volume of restored traffic amounted to only 0.2%\u00a0 of Iran\u2019s normal, pre-shutdown traffic levels.<\/span><\/p>\n

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Traffic would briefly spike\u00a0 before being suppressed again - a behavior experts attribute to the testing and fine-tuning of a\u00a0 classified filtering system.\u00a0 This aligns with statements from the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council\u2019s <\/span>statements<\/span><\/a> regarding \u201clocalized\u201d access as well as\u00a0 <\/span>Delirian<\/span><\/a>, the spokesperson for the National Cyberspace Center. In a live television interview, he confirmed that special access arrangements had been defined for sectors such as international trade under the supervision of chambers of commerce\u2014statements that substantiate an institutional and selective access model, even if such a framework is officially denied.<\/span><\/p>\n

Access to Google Services<\/b><\/h5>\n

By the afternoon of\u00a0 January 17, Google Search became <\/span>accessible<\/span><\/a> on some operators\u2019 networks. Access was first restored on mobile networks\u2014specifically MCI, Irancell, and Rightel\u2014and was gradually extended to fixed-line internet users. However, critical services such as Gmail and Google Meet remain blocked or their traffic is still not passing.<\/span><\/p>\n

Media and Businesses Connectivity<\/b><\/h5>\n