{"id":5632,"date":"2025-11-20T13:14:23","date_gmt":"2025-11-20T13:14:23","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/?p=5632"},"modified":"2025-11-20T13:14:23","modified_gmt":"2025-11-20T13:14:23","slug":"network-and-policy-monitoring-october-2025-implementation-of-the-32point-decree","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/2025\/11\/20\/network-and-policy-monitoring-october-2025-implementation-of-the-32point-decree\/","title":{"rendered":"Digital Repression in Iran: Implementing Undisclosed Policies for Tiered Access and Judicial Control"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In October 2025, the Iranian government intensified its strategy of digital repression through the practical, step-by-step implementation of policies derived from the undisclosed 32-article resolution of the Supreme Council of Cyberspace (SCC). The key development was the expansion of a tiered internet structure at the university level and the institutionalization of sweeping new legal controls. These actions confirm the state's move toward centralized control, content suppression, and the systematic erosion of digital rights.<\/span><\/p>\n<h4><b>Key Findings:<\/b><\/h4>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><b>Practical Implementation of Tiered Internet<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">: The selective unblocking of YouTube for students and faculty across major universities formally expanded\u00a0 the implementation of the policy of \u201cSegregated Access.\u201d This policy grants preferential, unfiltered access to specific, approved groups while maintaining stringent filtering for the general public, effectively creating a state-sanctioned digital elite.<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><b>Escalation of Judicial Control:<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> The state utilized legislative bodies to institutionalize repression. The \"Bill on Intensifying Punishment for Espionage\" became law, broadening the definition of espionage to suppress media and digital activism. This is coupled with plans for a \"Special Judicial System for Cyberspace,\" which risks the over-judicialization of online activity and civil dissent.<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><b>Conditional Platform Unblocking<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">: The Ministry of ICT began conditional negotiations to unblock the Telegram platform. However, the government's demands\u2014including transferring servers to Iran and deleting political content\u2014signal a goal of security-focused control rather than genuine freedom of access.<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><b>Steering the Digital Economy<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">: A new Content Revenue Sharing Document was implemented, which centralized user-paid internet fees into a state-controlled fund. Critics argue this mechanism shifts the digital economy from a market-driven model to a state-controlled funding model that steers content toward projects aligned with ideological indicators rather than user demand, fostering rent-seeking and private sector dependence.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h4><b>Network and Censorship Observations:<\/b><\/h4>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><b>Arbitrary Filtering<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">: Structural censorship continued against the domestic private sector and media, highlighted by the filtering of the web host LimooHost and the newspaper Ham-Mihan after reporting on rape allegations against a famous actor. Legal recourse for startups was simultaneously dismantled with the annulment of a key protective resolution.<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><b>Targeting Starlink:<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> Diplomatic efforts were escalated at the ITU to criminalize and eliminate alternative access sources, specifically Starlink satellite services, aimed at closing off external circumvention tools.<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><b>Major Network Disruption<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">: The month saw 48 total disruptions, with the majority of the recorded downtime (over 75%) attributed to a single, prolonged Partial Access Disruption that affected the Tehran\u2013Irancell datacenter for over ten days.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h4><b>1. Expansion of Tiered Internet at the University level<\/b><\/h4>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/t.me\/hamyarUT\/7139\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">announcement<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> by the University of Tehran on November 2, granting faculty and students open access to YouTube, formally confirmed the implementation of the concept of \"Segregated Access\" (or tiered internet). This policy was originally decreed in a\u00a0 32-article resolution of the Supreme Council of Cyberspace (SCC) on December 25, 2024 and was never publicly disclosed. The resolution outlined a system that included filtering based on individual profiles, mandating legal VPNs only for specific professions, and providing unfiltered internet for universities and technology companies.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The decision at the University of Tehran was reported via the student council\u2019s Telegram channel, which stated the goal was \"facilitating educational and research use of YouTube video content.\" The university\u2019s move was reportedly the result of joint meetings between the student council and the Vice-Presidents for Digital Technology and Students.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Just one day later, Filterwatch observed the rapid expansion of YouTube's unblocking to other institutions, including Semnan and Qom Universities. A Shargh newspaper <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.sharghdaily.com\/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B2%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%87-100\/1064144-%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B9-%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AC%DB%8C%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%84\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">report<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> further confirmed that by November 3, YouTube was accessible without filtering for students at several major public universities across Iran, including Beheshti, Amirkabir, Allameh, and Isfahan. It appears the Ministry of Science achieved this unblocking via the Committee for Determining Instances of Criminal Content.<\/span><\/p>\n<h4><b>Context of Previous Denials<\/b><\/h4>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The implementation of \u201cSegregated Access\u201d or a \u201cTiered Internet\u201d follows months of contradictory statements from key officials. Following the SCC's December 24, 2024\u00a0 resolution, <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/2025\/08\/01\/investigative-report-july-2025-tiering-internet\/\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">discussions<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> about segregated internet access intensified between the Ministry of Science and the Ministry of Information and Communications Technology.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">On January 8, 2025, Science Minister Hossein Simaei Sarraf announced negotiations with the Ministry of ICT to unblock YouTube for academia.<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">However, Minister of Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Sattar Hashemi publicly countered, emphasizing that he \"does not believe in a tiered internet.\"<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In April 2025, the Ministry of Science reported submitting a formal proposal to the Ministry of ICT, which the latter ministry promptly denied approving.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Despite these formal denials, the provision of open YouTube access for a specific group\u2014the academic community\u2014has now effectively brought the controversial policy, approved last December, into action.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">This policy is not the only aspect of this undisclosed resolution currently being implemented. Concurrent negotiations to unblock Telegram, contingent on the platform \"accepting the laws of the Islamic Republic,\" are also underway, fulfilling another clause of the same SCC resolution.<\/span><\/p>\n<h4><b>2. Negotiations with Telegram: Conditional and Security-Focused Unblocking\u00a0<\/b><\/h4>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">On October 31, media outlets <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.sharghdaily.com\/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA-6\/1063932-%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%87%D9%85-%DB%8C%DA%A9-%D9%86%D9%85%D8%A7%DB%8C%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%87-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%B9-%D9%81%DB%8C%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%86%DA%AF-%D8%AA%D8%A7-%D9%BE%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%87%D9%81%D8%AA%D9%87-%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B7-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%B3%D9%88%DB%8C-%D8%AA%D9%84%DA%AF%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%BE%D8%B0%DB%8C%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%AA%D9%87-%D8%B4%D8%AF\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">reported<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> that the Ministry of ICT had resumed negotiations with the Telegram platform. The terms of these talks, however, reveal a goal of conditional and security-focused reopening. Key demands reportedly include:<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Transferring servers to Iran.<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Deleting \"political content.\"<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Cooperation with Iran\u2019s Judiciary.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The very next day, conflicting reports emerged: the Filter Lifting Review Committee reportedly voted against unblocking both Telegram and YouTube. Concurrently, the Speaker of Parliament firmly <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.zoomit.ir\/tech-iran\/451154-qalibaf-denies-iran-telegram-agreement\/\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">declared<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, \"No platform will be unblocked without accepting the laws of the Islamic Republic.\"<\/span><\/p>\n<h4><b>Parliamentary Debate and Allegations<\/b><\/h4>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The prospect of a conditional reopening prompted mixed reactions within Parliament:<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Reza Sepahvand strongly <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.sharghdaily.com\/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA-6\/1063788-%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B7-%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%B9-%D9%81%DB%8C%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%86%DA%AF-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%86%D9%88%D8%B4%D8%AA-%D9%84%D9%88%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%AD-%D9%BE%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D9%85%D9%88-%D8%B3%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D9%81-%D8%AA%DB%8C\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">criticized<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> the conditions, comparing them to the \"unacceptable demands of the Palermo and CFT conventions,\" concluding that \"These conditions are tantamount to saying no to the platforms.\"<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In contrast, Mostafa Pourdehghan <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.sharghdaily.com\/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA-6\/1063932-%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%87%D9%85-%DB%8C%DA%A9-%D9%86%D9%85%D8%A7%DB%8C%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%87-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%B9-%D9%81%DB%8C%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%86%DA%AF-%D8%AA%D8%A7-%D9%BE%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%87%D9%81%D8%AA%D9%87-%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B7-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%B3%D9%88%DB%8C-%D8%AA%D9%84%DA%AF%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%BE%D8%B0%DB%8C%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%AA%D9%87-%D8%B4%D8%AF\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">claimed<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> that Telegram had already accepted Iran's demands, asserting that the only remaining obstacle was the \"50-trillion-rial VPN industry\" (approximately USD $90\u2013100 million).<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">This debate even reached state TV commentators, who proposed the idea of a \"<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.sharghdaily.com\/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D9%81%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%B1%DB%8C-298\/1063837-%D9%BE%DB%8C%D8%B4%D9%86%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AF-%DB%8C%DA%A9-%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B4%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%B3%DB%8C%D9%85%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%B9-%D9%81%DB%8C%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D9%84%DA%AF%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%B9-%D9%81%DB%8C%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B2\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">phased reopening of Telegram<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">,\" with suggestions ranging from total state control to hourly access windows. This demonstrates that regardless of the specific mechanism, the general policy guiding all approaches to unblocking remains the strict control of user access to the internet.<\/span><\/p>\n<h4><b>Financial and Corruption Allegations<\/b><\/h4>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Separately, on November 3, Amir Hossein Sabeti, a Tehran representative in Parliament, introduced a significant corruption angle,<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.isna.ir\/news\/1404081308129\/%D8%AA%D8%B0%DA%A9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%86%D9%85%D8%A7%DB%8C%D9%86%D8%AF%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84%D9%87-%D8%AB%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%A8%DA%A9-%D8%B2%D9%86%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%D9%88-%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D8%AA-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> claiming<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> that Iranian businessman Babak Zanjani played a role in the Telegram issue. (Zanjani is widely known for major financial and oil-related corruption cases from the 2010s). Sabeti alleged that, under the supposed agreement, the NikaPay company\u2014which he claimed Zanjani owned\u2014would become the exclusive authority for managing Telegram's financial transactions in Iran. While NikaPay's public relations office subsequently issued an official statement <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.ilna.ir\/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%DB%8C-3\/1710106-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B6%DB%8C%D8%AD-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B7-%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%88%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%B4%D8%B1%DA%A9%D8%AA-%D9%86%DB%8C%DA%A9%D8%A7%D9%BE%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%BE%DB%8C-%D8%AA%D8%B0%DA%A9%D8%B1-%D8%AB%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B5%D8%AD%D9%86-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86%DB%8C-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">denying<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> any connection to Babak Zanjani, the company remains the official platform for handling Telegram\u2019s financial transactions in the country.<\/span><\/p>\n<h4><b>3. From Judicializing Cyberspace to Content Control and Steering<\/b><\/h4>\n<h5><b>3.1.<\/b><b>The \"Intensified Punishment for Espionage\" Bill Becomes Law<\/b><\/h5>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">One key provision of the SCC's 32-article resolution required the government to propose new legislation for increased oversight of online content. Although the Masoud Pezeshkian administration initially drafted the \"Bill to Combat the Publication of False News Content in Cyberspace,\" it retracted the proposal due to public opposition.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Alternative legislation quickly filled the policy void. Notably, the \"<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/rc.majlis.ir\/fa\/law\/show\/1848931\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Bill <\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">on Intensifying Punishment for Espionage and Cooperation with Hostile Governments and Groups\" was approved by the Guardian Council last month. The final version significantly expands the scope of the crime of espionage to include information, media, and various digital activities. This new law provides a powerful legal mechanism for suppressing the work of media activists, journalists, and general internet users.<\/span><\/p>\n<h5><b>3.2 Designing a Special Judicial System for Cyberspace<\/b><\/h5>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Legislative control is being supplemented by a structural shift within the Judiciary. <\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">\u00a0The Judiciary and the National Center for Cyberspace (NCC) prepared the plan for a Special Judicial System for Cyberspace as the \"fourth action item of Iran's Strategic Document in Cyberspace.\" Its aim is to establish a dedicated judicial mechanism for online crimes and disputes.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">However, the NCC\u2019s collaboration between the Judiciary, operating under\u00a0 the strategic framework of <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Siyanat<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> (Protection\/Safeguarding), risks the over-judicialization of cyberspace. <\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">This framework could dangerously pave the way for <\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">\u00a0ordinary user disputes, media activities, or even civil protests to security and judicial bodies under the pretexts of \"cyber violations\" or \"content crimes.\"<\/span><\/p>\n<h5><b>3.3 Steering Content Instead of Supporting Content<\/b><\/h5>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Continuing the intensified oversight of digital content, the implementation of the Content Revenue Sharing Document\u2014emphasized in the December 25, 2024 resolution\u2014represents a major new step. Its rollout last month sparked significant reactions as it seeks to fundamentally shift the digital economy from a market-driven model to a state-controlled funding model.<\/span><\/p>\n<h4><strong>The Core Conflict: Funding vs. Control<\/strong><\/h4>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The plan aims to re-direct money users pay for internet access (traffic fees) to fund specific domestic platforms and content creators. Proponents, including over 1,500 domestic platforms (such as Eitaa, Bale, Tapsell, etc.), argue that this plan acts as a \"cultural subsidy\" by channeling user fees back into local production.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">However, the policy faces criticism because it is designed to steer output rather than support genuine market competition. The funds are not distributed based on consumer demand, user traffic, or a Pay-per-traffic model. Instead, distribution is based on non-transparent, ideological indicators defined by state-affiliated bodies.<\/span><\/p>\n<h4><strong>Concerns: Subsidies Risk Becoming Control<\/strong><\/h4>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The plan raises several serious concerns for the digital economy and free information flow:<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Risk of Monopoly and Resource Capture: Critics argue that unions acting as both regulators and beneficiaries cannot be impartial. This mechanism turns a genuine subsidy into \"resource capture,\" securing monopolies for specific institutions and potentially encouraging independent producers to migrate away. Content creators, such as the CEO of Aparat, believe the plan is \"interventionist\" and will push content producers to foreign services.\u00a0<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Lack of Transparency (Rent-Seeking): Centralizing operator revenue into a single fund and distributing it based on ideological indicators\u2014rather than market metrics\u2014risks funding state-approved projects that lack a genuine audience. This process is conducive to rent-seeking instead of supporting creativity and free competition.<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Conflict with Market Principles: The plan fundamentally contradicts the logic of the digital market. By dictating who receives a share of public traffic money, the government becomes the key financier. The likely outcomes are reduced private sector confidence, decreased incentive for innovation, and increased financial dependence of producers on state funding.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">This document is part of a broader push for digital cultural policy, which also includes the \"National Trust Symbol for Quality Content\" and the \"Comprehensive Program for Promoting and Enhancing Cyberspace Literacy.\" All these plans signal the government's pursuit of the \"cultural management of the digital space\" and an integrated framework for monitoring and steering user behavior.<\/span><\/p>\n<h4><b>4. Structural Filtering and Targeting of Alternative Access<\/b><\/h4>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">While the government highlights the implementation of <\/span><b>\"tiered internet\"<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> as a form of \"lifting filters\" for specific groups, the reality in October was a continuation of widespread, <\/span><b>structural filtering<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> that impacted everything from digital startups to individual user accounts.<\/span><\/p>\n<h5><b>4.1. Sudden and Arbitrary Suppression of Digital Platforms and Services<\/b><\/h5>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The month saw several high-profile incidents of arbitrary content and platform blocking:<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">October 17: The web hosting platform <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/peivast.com\/p\/245625\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">LimooHost<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> was filtered for four hours, causing a significant disruption to over 70,000 online businesses that rely on its services.<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">October 27: The Social Commerce platform <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/peivast.com\/p\/246643\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Komoda<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, which serves two million users, was taken offline without any prior warning.<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Late October: The website of the <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/iranwire.com\/fa\/news-1\/145882-%D9%88%D8%A8%D8%B3%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%AA-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B2%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%87-%D9%87%D9%85%D9%85%DB%8C%D9%87%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%B3-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AC-%D8%B4%D8%AF\/\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Ham-Mihan<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> newspaper was also filtered following the publication of a prominent report on the <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/iranwire.com\/en\/features\/145887-the-alleged-rape-case-that-has-shaken-iran\/\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Pejman Jamshidi rape allegations case.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/a><\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Individual Censorship: These major blockings occurred alongside multiple reports of Instagram pages being <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/x.com\/alirezaer\/status\/1981249823958331462\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">seized<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> and female singers' <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/iranwire.com\/fa\/news-1\/145821-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%B4%D8%AF%D9%86-%D8%B5%D9%81%D8%AD%D9%87-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%DA%AF%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%86%D8%AF%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B2%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B2%D9%86%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D9%BE%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%AA\/\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">accounts<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> in Mazandaran being deleted by order of the Public Security Police.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Critically, the legal protections for startups were dismantled last month. The Cabinet's February 2018 <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/qavanin.ir\/Law\/TreeText\/?IDS=12876656635738353144\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">resolution<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, known as \"Reducing Obstacles for Startup Businesses,\" previously served as a legal basis for startups to protest or pursue legal action against such blockings. However, the Deputy Minister for Digital Economy at the Ministry of ICT, Ehsan Chitsaz, announced that this resolution and its 2019 amendment have been <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.sharghdaily.com\/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D9%81%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%B1%DB%8C-298\/1063805-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%DB%8C%DA%A9-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84-%DA%AF%D8%B0%D8%B4%D8%AA%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AC%DB%8C%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%85%DB%8C%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D8%AF%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%85%D8%A7%DB%8C%D9%87-%DA%AF%D8%B0%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AC%DB%8C-%D8%AC%D8%B0%D8%A8-%DA%A9%D8%B1%D8%AF\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">annulled<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> by the Administrative Justice Court, effectively removing a key legal safeguard for the digital private sector.<\/span><\/p>\n<h5><b>4.2. Diplomatic Efforts to Combat Starlink<\/b><\/h5>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In parallel with domestic restrictions, Iranian policymakers are actively attempting to eliminate the few remaining avenues for fast, high-quality, and unfiltered internet access, particularly those offered by satellite systems like Starlink.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">On October 19, the Islamic Republic of Iran submitted a report to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), once again registering its complaint regarding the blocking of Starlink satellite services within Iranian territory.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">While Iran's formal complaint currently faces technical and legal impasses, the report notes that diplomatic efforts by Iran and Russia have successfully escalated the issue of \"unauthorized satellite operations.\" The matter has been moved from the Radio Regulations Board to the long-term regulatory process within the broader ITU and its future conferences. This escalating diplomatic focus aims to set precedents for how signals from these systems should be harmonized, limited, or legally exempted from regulations at national borders.<\/span><\/p>\n<h4><b>5. Internet Disruptions this Month\u00a0<\/b><\/h4>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In October 2025, <\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">network measurement tools recorded <\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">a total of 48 internet disruptions, accounting for a total of 337 hours of <\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">measurable downtime.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<h5><b>5.1. Major Outages<\/b><\/h5>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The vast majority of the month's disruption\u2014256 hours (over 75% of the total disruption time)\u2014was attributable to a single, prolonged outage at the Tehran\u2013Irancell datacenter. This incident began at 8:00 AM on October 22 and persisted until November 1. ArvanCloud data characterized this as a Partial Access Disruption that was observed continuously on international routes (including the Bing route), marking it as the single most significant and longest-lasting disruption of October<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<figure id=\"attachment_5637\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment_5637\" style=\"width: 2560px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><a href=\"https:\/\/filter.watch\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2025\/11\/Screenshot-1404-08-15-at-220949-scaled-1.png\"><img decoding=\"async\" class=\"wp-image-5637 size-full\" src=\"https:\/\/filter.watch\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2025\/11\/Screenshot-1404-08-15-at-220949-scaled-1.png\" alt=\"\" width=\"2560\" height=\"771\" srcset=\"https:\/\/filter.watch\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2025\/11\/Screenshot-1404-08-15-at-220949-scaled-1.png 2560w, https:\/\/filter.watch\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2025\/11\/Screenshot-1404-08-15-at-220949-scaled-1-300x90.png 300w, https:\/\/filter.watch\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2025\/11\/Screenshot-1404-08-15-at-220949-scaled-1-1024x308.png 1024w, https:\/\/filter.watch\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2025\/11\/Screenshot-1404-08-15-at-220949-scaled-1-768x231.png 768w, https:\/\/filter.watch\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2025\/11\/Screenshot-1404-08-15-at-220949-scaled-1-1536x463.png 1536w, https:\/\/filter.watch\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2025\/11\/Screenshot-1404-08-15-at-220949-scaled-1-2048x617.png 2048w, https:\/\/filter.watch\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2025\/11\/Screenshot-1404-08-15-at-220949-scaled-1-1568x472.png 1568w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 2560px) 100vw, 2560px\" \/><\/a><figcaption id=\"caption-attachment_5637\" class=\"wp-caption-text\" data-caption=\"Disruption%20in%20access%20to%20international%20destinations%20%28including%20Bing%29%20from%20the%20Tehran%E2%80%93Irancell%20data%20center%2C%20as%20observed%20on%20ArvanCloud%20Radar.\">Loading...<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In addition to the datacenter issue, the Rightel operator (AS57218) experienced a notable disruption on October 17, lasting approximately eight hours (10:00 AM to 6:00 PM). <\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Data from <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/ioda.inetintel.cc.gatech.edu\/asn\/57218-IR?from=1760735400&amp;until=1760908200&amp;view=view1\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">IODA<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> and <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/radar.cloudflare.com\/as57218?dateStart=2025-10-17&amp;dateEnd=2025-10-20\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Cloudflare Radar<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> confirm a noticeable drop in BGP Reachability for the Rightel network (AS57218). This outage affected several provinces, including Tehran, Gilan, Qom, Isfahan, and East Azerbaijan, causing intermittent degradation of connection quality.<\/span><\/p>\n<figure id=\"attachment_5636\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment_5636\" style=\"width: 2000px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><a href=\"https:\/\/filter.watch\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2025\/11\/ioda-as57218-rightel-_-iran-islamic-republic-of-25-10-17-21-10.png\"><img decoding=\"async\" class=\"wp-image-5636 size-full\" src=\"https:\/\/filter.watch\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2025\/11\/ioda-as57218-rightel-_-iran-islamic-republic-of-25-10-17-21-10.png\" alt=\"\" width=\"2000\" height=\"1120\" srcset=\"https:\/\/filter.watch\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2025\/11\/ioda-as57218-rightel-_-iran-islamic-republic-of-25-10-17-21-10.png 2000w, https:\/\/filter.watch\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2025\/11\/ioda-as57218-rightel-_-iran-islamic-republic-of-25-10-17-21-10-300x168.png 300w, https:\/\/filter.watch\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2025\/11\/ioda-as57218-rightel-_-iran-islamic-republic-of-25-10-17-21-10-1024x573.png 1024w, https:\/\/filter.watch\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2025\/11\/ioda-as57218-rightel-_-iran-islamic-republic-of-25-10-17-21-10-768x430.png 768w, https:\/\/filter.watch\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2025\/11\/ioda-as57218-rightel-_-iran-islamic-republic-of-25-10-17-21-10-1536x860.png 1536w, https:\/\/filter.watch\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2025\/11\/ioda-as57218-rightel-_-iran-islamic-republic-of-25-10-17-21-10-1568x878.png 1568w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 2000px) 100vw, 2000px\" \/><\/a><figcaption id=\"caption-attachment_5636\" class=\"wp-caption-text\" data-caption=\"A%20temporary%20disruption%20in%20Rightel%E2%80%99s%20internet%20connectivity%20due%20to%20a%20BGP%20routing%20drop%20on%2018%20October\">Loading...<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<h5><b>5.2 Analysis of Disruption Patterns\u00a0<\/b><\/h5>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><b>Weekly Concentration<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">: The largest share of disruptions (52.1%) was recorded during the period of September 30 to October 6. Major fluctuations were concentrated in the first half of the month, shifting towards continuous datacenter outages in the final weeks.<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><b>Geographic Scope:<\/b> <span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Most disruptions remained localized, with <\/span><b>95%<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> classified as local (affecting a single city or region). <\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">\u00a0Only 4% simultaneously affected multiple provinces.<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><b>Timing and Scale<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">: In October, the major share of disruptions involved datacenters, and more than half were recorded during off-peak hours (mostly between midnight and morning). In terms of user impact, 93% of the disruptions were classified as \"small-scale\" (affecting fewer than 500,000 users).<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>In October 2025, the Iranian government intensified its strategy of digital repression through the practical, step-by-step implementation of policies derived from the undisclosed 32-article resolution of the Supreme Council of Cyberspace (SCC). The key development was the expansion of a tiered internet structure at the university level and the institutionalization of sweeping new legal controls.<a class=\"more-link\" href=\"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/2025\/11\/20\/network-and-policy-monitoring-october-2025-implementation-of-the-32point-decree\/\">Continue reading <span class=\"screen-reader-text\">\"Digital Repression in Iran: Implementing Undisclosed Policies for Tiered Access and Judicial Control\"<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":44,"featured_media":5633,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"om_disable_all_campaigns":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[4],"tags":[198,333,332,297],"class_list":["post-5632","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-network-monitor","tag-censorship","tag-false-news-content-in-cyberspace","tag-segregated-access","tag-tiered-internet","entry"],"acf":[],"aioseo_notices":[],"aioseo_head":"\n\t\t<!-- All in One SEO Pro 4.9.8 - aioseo.com -->\n\t<meta name=\"description\" content=\"In October 2025, the Iranian government intensified its strategy of digital repression through the practical, step-by-step implementation of policies derived from the undisclosed 32-article resolution of the Supreme Council of Cyberspace (SCC). 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