{"id":5267,"date":"2025-05-16T13:32:43","date_gmt":"2025-05-16T13:32:43","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/?p=5267"},"modified":"2025-06-03T08:40:49","modified_gmt":"2025-06-03T08:40:49","slug":"network-and-policy-monitoring-april-2025-digital-silence-imposed-in-bandar-abbas","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/2025\/05\/16\/network-and-policy-monitoring-april-2025-digital-silence-imposed-in-bandar-abbas\/","title":{"rendered":"Digital Repression in Bandar Abbas: Explosions, Crackdowns, and Connectivity Blackouts"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><strong>Arrests of Influencers, Legal Action against Journalists and Media Outlets, and Widespread Network Disruptions<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">After explosions at the Sina pier of Shahid Rajaee Port in Bandar Abbas, Iranian authorities took actions that included imposing sweeping restrictions on social media influencers, apparently to suppress the free flow of information, and disrupting regional communication infrastructure. From roughly 10:00 p.m. local time on April 26 to midnight on April 27, VPN access was unavailable for users of Iran\u2019s two major mobile operators, Hamrah-e Aval and Irancell. During this period, WhatsApp was completely blocked on Hamrah-e Aval, while Irancell users could only exchange text messages, with voice and video calls disabled.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In April alone, over 47 network disruptions occurred, predominantly\u00a0 during peak hours, hindering access for millions. Despite these widespread outages,\u00a0 relevant authorities, such as the Ministry of ICT or the Supreme Council of Cyberspace, issued no clear response or public clarification. Notably, 40% of the disruptions affected mobile internet, the primary online gateway for most Iranians. Furthermore, failures in critical infrastructure, including data centers and power grids,\u00a0 contributed to this problem raising concerns about potentially worsening conditions during the summer\u2019s increased electricity demands. The impact even extended to domestic e-government services, underscoring the underlying instability\u00a0 and fragility of Iran\u2019s National Information Network infrastructure.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">These actions demonstrate the Islamic Republic\u2019s tendency to react quickly to situations it views as potential threats to public opinion.\u00a0 Driven by a desire to control public opinion during perceived crises, the Islamic Republic swiftly implements measures to suppress the free flow of information, positioning its official narrative as the only valid source. This tactic, however, directly violates citizens\u2019 fundamental rights to access information and communicate without restriction.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In the aftermath of the\u00a0 Bandar Abbas port explosions, the security apparatus in Hormozgan province moved quickly to control the free flow of information. Social activists and influential Instagram users were summoned and coerced into deleting their online posts. Individuals who had traveled from other cities to assist or report on the incident found themselves confined to\u00a0 hotels such as Kasra, Alvand, and Diana, where they were subjected to mandatory waiting periods for interrogation and scrutiny of their mobile devices by security police.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Filterwatch has also obtained a document indicating that the Culture and Media Prosecutor\u2019s Office issued warnings to journalists, instructing them to refer to the incident as \"an event at the Sina container terminal at Rajaee Port\u201d, a move aimed at downplaying the severity of the explosions.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The Islamic Republic\u2019s efforts to suppress the free flow of information began in earnest in 2009 with the passage of the so-called \u201cComputer Crimes Law.\u201d Article 18 of this law criminalizes the publication of any content deemed to \u201cdisturb public opinion.\u201d Since then, a series of additional measures including regulations on preventing and countering the dissemination of false news, a draft law on combating fake news, and a proposed bill restricting public commentary by celebrities\u2014have been introduced to reinforce Article 698 of the Islamic Penal Code, which criminalizes the \u201cspreading of lies with the intent to agitate public sentiment.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The Iranian government\u2019s long-standing commitment to controlling access to information was recently reaffirmed in December 2024\u00a0 when the Supreme Council of Cyberspace ordered\u00a0 a revision of state mechanisms for identifying and addressing so-called criminal content on both domestic and foreign <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/2025\/02\/10\/investigative-report-january-2025-unblocking-or-expanding-censorship\/\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">platforms<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The swift warning issued by the Prosecutor\u2019s Office against \u201cfalse news\u201d related to the Port explosion, and the subsequent legal actions against media and journalists, serve as a stark reminder of this ongoing effort to control the information landscape, especially during sensitive events.<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Arrests of Influencers, Legal Action against Journalists and Media Outlets, and Widespread Network Disruptions After explosions at the Sina pier of Shahid Rajaee Port in Bandar Abbas, Iranian authorities took actions that included imposing sweeping restrictions on social media influencers, apparently to suppress the free flow of information, and disrupting regional communication infrastructure. From roughly<a class=\"more-link\" href=\"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/2025\/05\/16\/network-and-policy-monitoring-april-2025-digital-silence-imposed-in-bandar-abbas\/\">Continue reading <span class=\"screen-reader-text\">\"Digital Repression in Bandar Abbas: Explosions, Crackdowns, and Connectivity Blackouts\"<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":13,"featured_media":5268,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"om_disable_all_campaigns":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[4],"tags":[282,198,227,199,174,283],"class_list":["post-5267","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-network-monitor","tag-bandar-abbas-port-explosions","tag-censorship","tag-hamrah-e-aval","tag-internet-access","tag-irancell","tag-network-disruption","entry"],"acf":[],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5267","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/13"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5267"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5267\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/5268"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5267"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5267"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5267"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}