{"id":4223,"date":"2023-04-19T11:08:06","date_gmt":"2023-04-19T11:08:06","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/en\/?p=4223"},"modified":"2023-05-24T17:20:19","modified_gmt":"2023-05-24T17:20:19","slug":"an-internet-for-the-few-irans-digital-segregation-plans-edge-closer-to-reality","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/2023\/04\/19\/an-internet-for-the-few-irans-digital-segregation-plans-edge-closer-to-reality\/","title":{"rendered":"An Internet For the Few: Iran\u2019s Digital Segregation Plans Edge Closer to Reality"},"content":{"rendered":"

Since the tragic death of Mahsa Jhina Amini in September 2022 and the ensuing protests, access to the internet in Iran has been in a <\/span>state<\/span><\/a> of near-constant crisis. At the height of violent crackdowns against protests, further <\/span>internet restrictions<\/span><\/a> were also introduced. Measures such as digital curfews, localized shutdowns, the blocking of platforms such as WhatsApp, Instagram, the blocking of app stores, and attacks on access to VPNs marked the country\u2019s transition to its most restricted internet in its history.<\/span><\/p>\n

The immediate <\/span>impacts<\/span><\/a> of these restrictions on the rights and freedoms of those inside Iran are well-documented. In the long-term, Iranian authorities are also leveraging this crisis to set in motion further plans for an authoritarian internet. We have seen similar patterns in the past, such as the measures introduced during and since<\/a> the 2009 protests to intensify internet censorship, and the use of a nationwide internet shutdown<\/a> to suppress massive protests in November 2019, and the testing of the National Information Network (NIN).<\/span><\/p>\n

This time, the authorities are making a slow but steady move towards rolling out plans for digital segregation or, as Filterwatch has <\/span>referred<\/span><\/a> to it, \u201clayered\u201d or \u201ctiered\u201d filtering. In practice, this plan means that specific groups will be given preferential access to the internet and international services, as determined by the government, allowing for a massive expansion of the state\u2019s powers in controlling internet access and surveillance, and posing major new threats to digital rights in Iran in the medium to long term.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Layered filtering presents a solution to one of Iran\u2019s biggest internet policy dilemmas: maintaining pervasive internet restrictions while preserving the economic and other benefits which require access to the global internet. Amid the sustained intensified internet restrictions and an <\/span>outpouring<\/span><\/a> of <\/span>reports<\/span><\/a> on the high financial burden of internet disruptions to businesses, layered filtering has been catapulted into action. Iran\u2019s ICT Minister, Eisa Zarepour has already made <\/span>recent announcements<\/span><\/a> on preferential access to international and blocked content being granted to freelancers, developers, teachers and academics in a collaboration between the ICT Ministry and the Science, Research and Innovation Ministry.<\/span><\/p>\n

In contrast, the majority of those in Iran will be limited to domestic services such as messaging apps, social media networks, and other services available via the NIN, which have been receiving renewed government support, and <\/span>allegedly<\/span><\/a> experienced a boost in users though these figures are difficult to verify.\u00a0<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

There are still several unknowns about Iran\u2019s readiness for the wider rollout of layered filtering, and it will take some time for its different components to come together for its full operationalization, nonetheless, as it will be detailed below, the move towards digital segregation will intensify threats to digital rights in Iran.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Layered filtering could reduce the cost of internet restrictions and shutdowns in the short to medium term, but also in the long term, this could enable Iran to reduce its need for internet shutdowns as it shifts its focus to using more granular internet controls. As a result, privacy and security concerns will become even more prominent as people are forced to rely on domestic apps and services which offer weaker privacy and security measures, and as Iranian authorities seek to gain greater control over internet access, we could witness further crackdowns on safe circumvention tools. In tandem with the expansion of the state\u2019s power over the internet, freedoms of expression and association will erode further.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Another reason why layered filtering is significant is that it is emblematic of the development of internet control policies in Iran. The history of layered filtering should remind us that Iran\u2019s most vague, ambitious, and even seemingly self-sabotaging internet policies should be taken seriously in order to fully understand the challenges that lie ahead, and to develop plans to resist them.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

An Internet For the Few: A History of Layered Filtering Plans\u00a0<\/b><\/h2>\n

Some of the earliest indications towards layered filtering can be traced to Iran\u2019s former ICT Minister, Mohammad-Javad Azari Jahromi who served under the former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani. In September 2019, Jahromi attended a <\/span>session<\/span><\/a> in Majles (parliament) on\u00a0 his performance, where he remarked that the\u00a0 \u201cproblem with Iranian filtering\u201d was that it imposed blanket restrictions on all those inside Iran, emphasizing that certain professions and students should not be subject to the same level of internet restrictions as the general population. Beyond these comments from Jahromi, and the current ICT Minister\u2019s <\/span>denial <\/span><\/a>\u00a0of its existence, there is no publicly available official documentation that explicitly refers to layered filtering. Despite this lack of transparency, layered filtering has been in practice already in several ways.<\/span><\/p>\n

Many Iranian officials and politicians, MPs, Ministers (Jahromi himself was an avid Twitter user) the President, and even the Supreme Leader are present and active on blocked platforms such as Twitter, and the since blocked Instagram, a clear sign of the hierarchical and discriminatory internet access in the country. Though it could be said that they are relying on VPNs and similar methods to ordinary Iranians, in a 2021 <\/span>interview<\/span><\/a> the then MP and Jahromi critic Hamideh Zarabadi, commented that \u201cmany officials have unrestricted access to the internet\u201d and can \u201cuse blocked platforms such as Twitter and Telegram\u201d without consequence.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Also during Jahromi\u2019s time as ICT Minister, an internet scheme for journalists was introduced where those approved by the Ministry of Culture would r<\/span>eceive<\/span><\/a> unfiltered internet access via ICT Ministry. Evidence of this emerged during the November 2019 nationwide internet shutdown where some journalists were able to use Twitter during that time.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Though this scheme has not been publicized to the same extent under the current government, the Iranian news outlet Shargh Daily <\/span>reported<\/span><\/a> that around 160 journalists approved by the Ministry for Culture have been to be given access to the scheme following the continued internet shutdowns and disruptions since September 2022. Shargh Daily also reported that while this allows access to certain content and platforms, it is still subject to some limitations and controls. Due to a lack of transparency, it is difficult to verify who, and how many journalists have preferential access to the internet and how exactly it operates.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/span>Following the announcements from Zarepour on special internet access for freelancers and programmers, other groups have followed suit in the past few months. Already, there have been reports from news outlets inside the country that members of Iran\u2019s Chamber of Commerce and Tehran\u2019s ICT Union were some of first to allegedly receive \u201cunfiltered\u201d internet.\u00a0 Other government bodies and organizations have attempted to gain similar, preferential access to the internet. Various organizations and professional bodies such as medical associations, Ministry for Agriculture, Iran\u2019s Football Federation, have been circulating letters on social media asking for \u201cunfiltered access to the internet\u201d from the ICT Ministry, indicating an acceptance of this system as the new norm instead of relenting on the internet restrictions both old and recent.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

But these developments have not been without backlash. This February, Zarepour <\/span>announced<\/span><\/a> plans to offer a special SIM card for tourists that would provide them with unrestricted access to the internet. This time, the disregard for the conditions of the people living in Iran, who have endured months of heightened internet restrictions and faced violence at the hands of\u00a0 government forces, was so clear that the ICT Minister <\/span>backtracked<\/span><\/a> his comments in the face of major uproar. Opposition has also come from Iran\u2019s IT sector, with Tehran\u2019s ICT Guild <\/span>rejecting<\/span><\/a> layered filtering as a viable alternative to removing the internet restrictions in Iran.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The Role of the National Information Network\u00a0<\/b><\/h2>\n

Under the eight years of the Rouhani administration, we witnessed major investment and <\/span>planning<\/span><\/a> into Iran\u2019s localized internet, known as the National Information Network (NIN). \u00a0 Domestic content, services, and platforms provide alternatives to the blocked international versions and using localized infrastructure, which can at times allow users to remain online (domestically) during a shutdown to reduce disruption to economic activities.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The existence of the NIN not only simplifies and, to an extent, is meant to reduce the cost of internet shutdowns, it is also vital for the realization of layered filtering. As more and more international services are blocked, people will need alternatives to continue their daily digital activities and eventually, many inside the country will be limited to these services.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Confronted with pervasive internet restrictions in recent months, many have had no choice but to rely on these often insecure or government backed domestic platforms to maintain business and other online activities. Since the start of the protests, officials have <\/span>reported<\/span><\/a> an increased number of users on domestic messaging and social media platforms, especially in light of the blocking of Instagram and WhatsApp. The Telecommunication Company of Iran (TCI) also <\/span>reported<\/span><\/a> an increase in the use of domestic internet traffic, and a drop in international traffic.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Though accurate figures on the use of domestic platforms and content are difficult to obtain, it would not come as a surprise if these services have experienced growth in user numbers in light of intense internet restrictions and shutdowns. Coupled with policies such as cheaper domestic internet traffic and other incentives are designed to increase the number of users on these platforms, which have a <\/span>track record<\/span><\/a> of violating user privacy, offer weaker security protections, and can increase the risk of surveillance and data misuse.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The Fate of VPNs - A New Plan for Crackdowns<\/b><\/h2>\n

Legal VPNs have been on the policy agenda for several years, including under both Ahmadinejad and Rouhani\u2019s administrations. Filterwatch has already <\/span>written<\/span><\/a> about the long history of planning for the rollout of these VPNs over the past few years. In April 2020, the then Secretary to the Supreme Council for Cyberspace (SCC) Abolhassan Firouzabadi <\/span>announced<\/span><\/a> that a regulatory guidance for \u201cLegal VPNs\u201d had been finalized by the Committee for Determining Instances of Criminal Content (CDICC) adding that the ICT Ministry would\u00a0 be in charge of deciding who would\u00a0 have access to legal VPNs. Though the scheme never materialized under Rouhani, the subject is set\u00a0 high on Zarepour\u2019s\u00a0 internet policy agenda.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

For years the Iranian government has attempted\u00a0 to control the sale and use of VPNs in the country. The legal status of VPNs in Iran remains somewhat vague, currently under the <\/span>Computer Crimes Law 2009\/2010<\/span><\/a>, the sale and distribution of VPNs is banned.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Zarepour\u2019s comments on 19 October confirmed this position. On this day Zarepour spoke to journalists about VPNs and <\/span>commented<\/span><\/a> that \u201cthe use and sale of VPNs in the country is prohibited, but unfortunately it has not been criminalized,\u201d adding that plans were being made to enforce the criminalization of VPNs. As his comments suggesting crackdowns on VPN use quickly gained widespread attention online, a <\/span>correction<\/span><\/a> by the ICT Ministry followed: only the <\/span>sale<\/span><\/i> of VPNs would be criminalized, and not their<\/span> use.\u00a0<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

Following Zarepour\u2019s comments on the crackdown on the sale of VPNs, it was announced that the ICT Ministry is responsible for identifying and blocking unauthorized VPNs and those behind them, while the Judiciary is responsible for related prosecutions. Those charged for such \u2018crimes\u2019 will receive a penalty in accordance with<\/span> Article 753<\/span><\/a> of the Islamic Penal Code which is dedicated to those who \u201ccommit computer-related crimes\u201d which includes financial penalties and imprisonment.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The timing of this announcement of a stricter crackdown on VPN sales and the progress of layered filtering do not seem coincidental. Currently, those inside Iran are more reliant on VPNs than ever, with the blocking of WhatsApp, Instagram, and numerous other platforms. Since the start of the protests in September 2022. The blocking of major app stores such as the Google Play Store and the Apple App Store were short term measures to crackdown against VPNs at the start of the protests, but the long-term crackdowns such as criminalization efforts suggest an urgency in even more measures to bring the VPN market under control.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Crackdowns on VPN use inside Iran is a step that needs to be taken concurrently with the operationalization of the layered filtering. The hacktivist group Anonymous released a series of <\/span>files and videos<\/span><\/a> which expose what appears to be a prototype website for legal VPNs. A video shows the different functions on a website called VPN.ir including necessary steps to apply for a legal VPN. Other exposed files suggest that the Committee for Determining Instances of Criminal Content (CDICC) is meant to have oversight over these VPNs to ensure that they are not used beyond their permitted purpose. Though the leaked files are not definitive sources, it provides some insight into how the Iranian authorities might envision the rollout of this plan.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

An Internet For the Rest: The Threats to Digital Rights\u00a0<\/b><\/h2>\n

We are now witnessing the normalization of heavily throttled internet speeds, and unprecedented restrictions to the international internet in Iran. As mentioned, domestic messaging apps are reporting noteworthy user growth and will likely continue to increase in popularity given the lack of viable alternatives. Despite the ICT Minister making great effort to reject layered filtering, we are seeing layered filtering unfold almost in real time.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Meanwhile, those inside Iran, such as various internet and ecommerce related representative bodies, activists, and journalists have publicly expressed opposition to the scheme and the extensive internet restrictions currently in place. This is despite widespread arrests, detentions, and intimidation of activists by government authorities in recent months, they are making it clear that this plan should be accepted as a viable alternative for removing Iran\u2019s internet restrictions.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

It may still take some time for this plan to be fully implemented for the wider public, making it especially important for the international community to take the threats of digital segregation seriously now, as it sets to create more channels for surveillance and further threats to the rights to freedom of expression, association, and privacy. It is now more vital than ever to monitor the developments around this topic to gain a clearer understanding of how this plan will evolve and fully assess its threats to those inside Iran in order to resist them.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

As Iran\u2019s latest pathway to digital authoritarianism becomes clear, it is also important to keep in mind the lessons that can be drawn from the evolution of layered filtering and digital segregation policies: a serious reminder not to underestimate the plans of the Iranian state for the oppression of its people no matter how impossible or paradoxical they may seem.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n





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Since the tragic death of Mahsa Jhina Amini in September 2022 and the ensuing protests, access to the internet in Iran has been in a state of near-constant crisis. At the height of violent crackdowns against protests, further internet restrictions were also introduced. Measures such as digital curfews, localized shutdowns, the blocking of platforms suchContinue reading \"An Internet For the Few: Iran\u2019s Digital Segregation Plans Edge Closer to Reality\"<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":13,"featured_media":4225,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"om_disable_all_campaigns":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[3],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4223","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-investigations","entry"],"acf":[],"aioseo_notices":[],"aioseo_head":"\n\t\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t