{"id":3980,"date":"2022-10-25T10:40:44","date_gmt":"2022-10-25T10:40:44","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/en\/?p=3980"},"modified":"2022-10-25T10:44:35","modified_gmt":"2022-10-25T10:44:35","slug":"irans-domestic-messaging-apps-abandoned-rafts-floating-on-the-ocean-of-internet-restriction-policies","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/2022\/10\/25\/irans-domestic-messaging-apps-abandoned-rafts-floating-on-the-ocean-of-internet-restriction-policies\/","title":{"rendered":"Iran\u2019s Domestic Messaging Apps: Abandoned Rafts Floating on the Ocean of Internet Restriction Policies\u00a0"},"content":{"rendered":"

The <\/span>role<\/span><\/a> of Telegram in the late 2017-early 2018 protests resulted in the app being blocked by the Judiciary on 30 April 2018 and intensified government attention on the role of messaging apps in the online ecosystem, triggering a heightened security response to the use of international messaging apps in Iran. With such increased sensitivities and the arrival of the \u2018Managing Social Messaging Apps\u2019 Bill, the road was paved for the infamous <\/span>internet restriction<\/span><\/a> legislation now widely <\/span>referred<\/span><\/a> to as the \u201cUser Protection\u201d Bill.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The plan called for government support for the production and promotion of domestic messaging apps as well as looking to enforce the use of servers inside the country by international apps which would also require them to share data with government bodies if requested. The initial draft of the \u2018Managing Social Messaging Apps\u2019 Bill - along with <\/span>five other internet-related bills <\/span><\/a>-\u00a0 went to the Majles, although none of them passed into law, they paved the way for the insidious progress of the National Information Network (NIN), internet shutdowns, and further information controls for those inside Iran.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

***<\/span><\/p>\n

Messaging apps such as \u2018Bale,\u2019 \u2018iGap,\u2019\u2019Rubika,\u2019 and \u2018Soroush\u2019 are just a few examples of the Iranian messaging apps that have entered the market during the past few years, a number of which have received considerable investment and support from the government.<\/span><\/p>\n

Though the Iranian government has had considerable success in establishing the NIN, imposing internet shutdowns, and implementing online censorship practices, usage of Iranian messaging apps is negligible compared to that of international counterparts. Even the blocking of foreign apps, government support, and widespread advertising for domestic platforms has failed to make any real change in this trend.<\/span><\/p>\n

Figures from the National Center for Cyberspace (NCC) between 23 October \u2013 21 November 2021 <\/span>claim<\/span><\/a> that a total of 20 million people have been using domestic messaging apps, representing some 36% of all users while figures from Iran\u2019s Statistical Center from a mid-2021 report <\/span>shows<\/span><\/a> that 88% social media users using Meta\u2019s \u2018WhatsApp\u2019 as their preferred messaging app.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

This report highlights the various nefarious and coercive ways the government is forcing users to download and use domestic platforms. In this report, we look at the current state of Iran\u2019s domestic messaging apps and the cause-and-effect relationship between Iranian users\u2019 lack of trust in domestic messaging apps and the inorganic methods used to expand their user base.<\/span><\/p>\n

Lack of Popular Support for Domestic Social Media Networks in Iran\u00a0<\/b><\/h1>\n

Despite widespread promotion using state media, including the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), Iranian messaging apps have not been able to attract a considerable user-base.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

What Do the Figures Say?\u00a0<\/b><\/h2>\n

Download <\/span>figures<\/span><\/a> for the nine main domestic messaging apps in Iran indicate that they have failed in gaining widespread adoption. For example, download figures from the Iranian app store Caf\u00e9 Bazaar from early 2022 show that the messaging app \u2018Eita\u2019 had been downloaded nine million times, ranking first, followed by \u2018Soroush Plus\u2019 with seven million downloads, \u2018iGap\u2019 with five million downloads, \u2018Bale\u2019 with four million downloads, and \u2018Gap\u2019 with just two million downloads.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

According to the Google Play Store, \u2018Soroush Plus' and \u2018Bale\u2019 only had one million downloads each; \u2018Eita\u2019 was not available on the Play Store, while \u2018iGap\u2019 was the most successful Iranian messaging app on the app store at five million downloads. It is of course possible that the apps have been downloaded through other means, e.g. through their websites and Telegram channels which would not be reflected in these figures.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Despite extensive government efforts to increase user uptake for the use of domestic messaging apps, Telegram and WhatsApp continue to remain the most popular among Iranian users. According to a <\/span>poll<\/span><\/a> conducted by Iran\u2019s Students Polling Agency between 23 July \u2013 22 August 2021, 71.4% of those polled used WhatsApp, with Instagram in second place at 53.1% and Telegram in third place with 40.4%. Domestic apps such as \u2018Rubika\u2019 with 8.6%, \u2018Soroush\u2019 with 5.1% and 'Bale\u2019 4.4% comparatively had much lower figures.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

It should be noted that the blocking of Telegram in 2018 has no doubt influenced this trend. However, what these figures reveal is the fact that the blocking of a major international messaging app such as Telegram has a limited effect on users taking up domestic versions as they have shown that they still prefer international apps.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The Insignificant Bandwidth Share of Domestic Platforms\u00a0<\/b><\/h2>\n

In December\/January 2018 Telegram and Instagram were restricted for a limited time due to \u2018security reasons.\u2019 A month later, the ICT Minister at the time, Mohammad-Javad Azari Jahromi <\/span>announced<\/span><\/a> that the country\u2019s total internet bandwidth use had dropped by 45% following the restrictions on the two apps.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Amir Mohammadzadeh Lajevardi, a Board Director at the Telecommunications Infrastructure Company (TIC) <\/span>stated<\/span><\/a> last year that the domestic internet only made up 20% of the country\u2019s bandwidth use, while the rest remaining bandwidth was taken up by international use the majority of which \u201cwent towards Meta owned platforms, meaning WhatsApp and Instagram\u201d according to Lajevardi. This means that the main share of foreign traffic has moved from Telegram to Meta products such as Instagram and WhatsApp.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The current policy on internet bandwidth use as set by the \u2018Macro-Plan and the Architecture of the National Information Network\u2019 resolution from the SCC, the goal is for 70% of the bandwidth to be used for domestic traffic and only 30% for international traffic.<\/span><\/p>\n

Getting Users Onto Iranian Platforms: Tricks for Clicks\u00a0<\/b><\/h1>\n

Figures mentioned above show that fears of the \u201cUser Protection\u201d Bill and the internet shutdowns have not been enough on their own to bring users onto domestic platforms. The current ICT Minister, Eisa Zarehpour also <\/span>commented<\/span><\/a> on this issue earlier this year saying that \u201cthe next layer of the NIN will be basic application services which - after messaging apps - includes search engines, maps, and navigation systems, where we must minimize our reliance on them as much as possible.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

There are several different reasons why users have not warmed to these domestic apps: government support on the one hand, and poor-quality or limited service on the other, along with users\u2019 mistrust of the apps in terms of security, transparency, and effectiveness, have done nothing to spur users\u2019 interest.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Below, we explain how the government has been providing support for these apps and the security concerns surrounding their use.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Government Loans<\/b><\/h2>\n

Despite their lack of popularity, domestic messaging apps have had access to state support with many of these apps having some government link or dependency.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Government partnerships behind the development of these apps is perhaps one of the fundamental reasons why many people do not trust them. In many cases, these partnerships have translated to financial support, promotional activities, providing special services and at times coercive methods for gaining users.<\/span><\/p>\n

In 2020, Ali Khazarian, the Spokesperson for the Parliamentary Article 90 Committee <\/span>said <\/span><\/a>that the 'Managing Social Messaging Apps' Bill would call for the government to dedicate 10% of income from international bandwidth sales to support domestic messaging apps and content creators. Citing a speech by the Supreme Leader where he had claimed the internet had been \u201cabandoned\u201d Khazarian said that the Bill was a way to prevent an \u201cunrestricted\u201d internet.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

In April\/May 2018 during Hassan Rouhani\u2019s presidency a 50 billion IRR <\/span>loan<\/span><\/a> was issued to support the expansion of\u00a0 \u201csuccessful apps,\u201d which the developers failed to pay back. In late 2021 Zarepour <\/span>agreed<\/span><\/a> to a six-month extension for repayment of their loans.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The Allure of Added Services to Win App Users\u00a0<\/b><\/h2>\n

Special added and provisions being included in domestic apps has been a tactic to force users onto these platforms.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

One example was the bank transfer services provided by the \u2018Bale\u2019 app, which is produced by the Sadad Informatic Corporation (Persian: <\/span>\u062f\u0627\u062f\u0647\u200c\u0648\u0631\u0632\u06cc \u0633\u062f\u0627\u062f) <\/span>and <\/span>financed<\/span><\/a> by the National Bank of Iran. The app's relationship with the bank no doubt gave it exclusive access to bank transfer services which was not available via other messaging apps at the time.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Other services include the currency exchange services for pilgrims attending Arba\u2019een ceremonies in Iraq which was <\/span>exclusively<\/span><\/a> provided by the \u2018Bale\u2019 app and allegedly <\/span>resulted<\/span><\/a> in more than 40,000 new users in just half a day. Iran\u2019s National Bank announced that they would not issue text messages for transactions under 300,000 IRR and users could manage their accounts through \u2018Bale\u2019 and some other domestic apps, forcing users onto these apps as a way to avoid extra financial charges.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\u2018Rubika\u2019 is another domestic app and the product of <\/span>Toska Company<\/span><\/a>. According to official records, its <\/span>major shareholders are<\/span><\/a>: \u2018Mobile Telecommunications Company\u2019, \u2018Nagsh-e-Aval-e-Keyfiat\u2019 (NAK), (Persian: <\/span>\u0646\u0642\u0634 \u0627\u0648\u0644 \u06a9\u06cc\u0641\u06cc\u062a<\/span>), and Noor Dana Development Capital, which are all subsidiaries of the TCI.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Toska had also <\/span>won<\/span><\/a> a controversial tender to promote value-added services on the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), and the company profited from this work by advertising Rubika during the most-watched television programs. This\u00a0 also forced millions of users to download the app in order to participate in state television polls through IRIB.\u00a0 In light of the promotional monopoly, various reports have been published about Toska\u2019s efforts to erect obstacles for the owners of online businesses, as well as other messaging apps. In an <\/span>interview<\/span><\/a> in 2020, Hossein Kiani, Director of Public Relations for the messaging app \u2018Gap\u2019 <\/span>said<\/span><\/a> \u201cRubika thinks of itself as a conglomerate with no competitor, and as a subsidiary of Toska, it blocks television ads for other messaging apps. Even if there\u2019s no written ban, in practice a series of bizarre administrative roadblocks prevent any kind of TV advertising for a messaging app like Gap.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

This is of course not an exhaustive list of measures used to force users onto these apps.\u00a0 According to a report from the Iranian news outlet <\/span>Tejarat News <\/span><\/i>on 19 August 2021, Rubika resorted to widespread copying of user profiles from Instagram onto Rubika without users\u2019 consent, a blatant breach of user data and privacy which resulted in the app\u2019s removal from the Google Play Store. State support based on the decisions of the Supreme Council for Cyberspace (SCC) continues for other messaging apps, large and small. The government has even forced online business owners to download domestic messaging apps in order to <\/span>receive<\/span><\/a> the \u201ce-Nemad\u201d or \u201cElectronic Trust Mark\u201d mandatory for online businesses in Iran, though It is not clear when this policy began, or with what institution.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The Ministry of Education also <\/span>asked<\/span><\/a> families and teachers to <\/span>use<\/span><\/a> a domestic messaging app during COVID-19 pandemic for remote learning in early 2020, before the official e-learning app, \u2018<\/span>Shad<\/span><\/a>\u2019 was used around April\/May 20, 2020. Students at Azad University were also <\/span>asked<\/span><\/a> to install the web-application of \u2018iGap\u2019 to gain\u00a0 access to their online portal from early 2021.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

In one of the latest examples, Iranian customs in 2022 <\/span>required<\/span><\/a> those who intend to receive a registration code for an imported mobile phone to install the domestic messaging app \u201cWe.\u201d This lesser-known app operates under the supervision of the \u2018Samih Intelligent Application Systems Company\u2019 which is tied to the University of Tehran. This research center is directed by Habibollah Arasteh, who in 2018- 2019 served as the top official in charge of strategic intelligent systems and the Chief Director for the launch of the General Customs System, at the order of the Economy Minister. It appears Arasteh\u2019s presence in the domestic messaging app ecosystem is fundamentally connected with this affiliation.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Cheaper Internet Traffic Dedicated for Domestic Services\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/b><\/h2>\n

A major and controversial <\/span>measure<\/span><\/a> to support domestic services is the policy to charge domestic internet traffic at around half the price of international traffic, which violates net-neutrality principles\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

On 22 July 2018 \u2018iGap\u2019 <\/span>announced<\/span><\/a> that Iran\u2019s three major mobile network operators would charge users a third of the price of international traffic <\/span>based<\/span><\/a> on the decision from the Communications Regulatory Authority (CRA) to support domestic apps. In light of the CRA\u2019s other decisions regarding domestic and foreign data tariffs, <\/span>operators must pay <\/span><\/a>the normal tariff for international traffic, half this rate for domestic traffic, and one-third of this rate for domestic messaging apps.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

In late 2021, the NCC <\/span>announced<\/span><\/a> highly contested user numbers figures and traffic rates for domestic messaging apps. According to figures provided by Amir Khorakian, Deputy for Legal and Parliamentary Affairs at the National Center for Cyberspace the <\/span>Soroush Plus<\/span><\/i> app ranked first among domestic apps with an alleged 12.2 million registered users, however the app is said to only have 2.2 million active users each month.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Soroush Plus\u2019 own<\/span> website<\/span><\/a> claims to have more than 22 million users, which is at odds with the NCC figures. According to Khorakian, <\/span>estimates<\/span><\/a> from their sources indicate around 20 million unique user accounts on domestic messaging apps, a fourth of which are said to be active users.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Digiato<\/span>,<\/span><\/i> which reports on Iran\u2019s internet, <\/span>highlighted <\/span><\/a>contradictions in the figures from the NCC. According to Digiato\u2019s report the monthly internet traffic for Soroush averaged 10 MB, a figure that reached 1.2 GB on the NIN. If we divide this traffic usage between Soroush\u2019s alleged monthly users, we get a figure of less than one KB per user which translates to an average Soroush user sending about 50 words a month- an unlikely scenario.<\/span><\/p>\n

Another ambiguous part of this chart provided by Khorakian is the traffic usage rate by Information Exchange Points (IXPs) listed as zero for \u2018Gap\u2019 and \u2018iGap.\u2019 This means that users of these two apps either don\u2019t use domestic networks at all or use VPNs while using the apps. Given that according to this chart, the monthly traffic figure recorded for \u201ciGap\u201d does not exceed a few Gigabytes, the second theory can be ruled out.<\/span><\/p>\n

Despite the fact that internet traffic used by domestic messaging apps was supposed to be assessed on the basis of domestic internet use, an <\/span>IRNA<\/span><\/i> report<\/span><\/a> from 2020 which quoted a CRA Deputy at the time indicated that the use and support for domestic messaging apps had not moved forward per government promises. For example, some used domestic messaging apps for video calls in order to pay half-price for their internet use but many users <\/span>reported <\/span><\/a>that their data package had run out afterward.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Security and Transparency Concerns<\/b><\/h2>\n

Distrust of domestic messaging apps is widespread not just among ordinary users, but also among government officials themselves. In a 2018 video Rasoul Kazemi, the former \u2018iGap\u2019 Director <\/span>said<\/span><\/a> that the greatest support officials could give would be to \u201cuse domestic messaging apps themselves.\u201d Kazemi commented on their unwillingness to embrace domestic products: \u201cI think [people\u2019s] greatest concern about using domestic messaging apps is the leaks and misuse of their private information.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

In a 2020 interview Mohsen Ghaffouri, the Director of \u2018Eita\u2019 - whose parent company \u2018Andishehyavaran-e Tamaddon-e Emrooz\u2019 (Persian: <\/span>\u0646\u062f\u06cc\u0634\u0647\u200c\u06cc\u0627\u0648\u0631\u0627\u0646 \u062a\u0645\u062f\u0646 \u0627\u0645\u0631\u0648\u0632)<\/span> is based at the Development Center of Qom University stated that \u201ceven government employees don\u2019t use domestic messaging apps or social media networks, to protect government data.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

In our 2020 report titled \u201cDigital Rights and the Responsibilities of Tech Companies in Iran\u201d<\/span> we evaluated the role of Iranian tech companies -\u00a0 including the role of messaging apps - in support of digital rights in Iran using the Ranking Digital Rights methodology developed based on UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights. Our report found that all of the Iranian messaging apps received low scores in terms of their policies, which to an extent is derived from the fact none of these companies participated in multi-stakeholder planning and collaboration and collective governance between companies, civil society organizations, academic institutions, investors, governments, and other stakeholders.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

As mentioned, one of the biggest concerns about using domestic messaging apps is the <\/span>possibility<\/span><\/a> of the misuse of user data by security and government institutions or even for commercial purposes and these fears are not unfounded.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

On 14 March 2022 the ICT Minister Eisa Zarepour <\/span>confirmed <\/span><\/a>that security forces could be given access to user data on domestic messaging apps with a warrant from the Judiciary \u201cin special cases\u201d however he did not elaborate on what he meant by \u201cspecial cases.\u201d\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Previously, in 2019 Mohsen Ghafouri the CEO of \u2018Eita\u2019 <\/span>said<\/span><\/a> that the idea that domestic apps were unsafe was a \u201cfabrication by Iran\u2019s enemies\u201d and added that the \u201ceasier pursuit of legal and criminal cases on domestic apps\u201d meant more security for users.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Golden Telegram and Hotgram: The Rise and Fall of Telegram<\/b><\/h2>\n

Apart from messaging apps developed inside Iran, we\u2019ve seen instances where domestic groups have simply used existing messaging apps to gather user information. Golden Telegram and Hotgram are unofficial clones or client apps of Telegram which were launched by developers inside Iran. These apps used Telegram\u2019s API to display user account information, messages, and channels, and used a built-in VPN. According to Hassan Beigi the then member of the Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, <\/span>citing<\/span><\/a> the ICT Minister at the time: \u201cthese\u00a0 apps belong to the Islamic Republic of Iran,\u201d and were \u201clegal,\u201d which according to Beigi at the time of the interview \u201chad 25 million members.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

It remains a mystery as to how these apps use the information they gather, without transparency regarding user data collection and storage and the parties which can access it, it is virtually impossible to hold any party accountable until damage is done. It appears nonetheless that the SCC is seeking to create legal mechanisms for accessing user information on domestic messaging apps and domestic services in general.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

A short while ago, the Secretary to the SCC Abolhassan Firouzabadi <\/span>announced <\/span><\/a>that in light of the developments in Iran\u2019s digital economy actions were needed for the private sector to provide services to the government and where necessary users\u2019 financial and welfare information should be kept for purposes of various governmental decisions and economic modeling. Such actions would seem to violate Iranian users\u2019 privacy.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Conclusion<\/b><\/h2>\n

While there has been no warm reception for domestic messaging apps, they remain available with significant government support and domestic developers continue to spend large sums of money through loans available to them to produce updates and add new features. Government policy in this area attempts to encourage more people to use these services, and in several cases, requires people to use them\u00a0 to access public services.<\/span><\/p>\n

Privacy concerns with domestic messaging apps, as well as a lack of clear data protection laws are among the leading reasons why people hesitate to use them. Nonetheless, the government\u2019s move to raise the cost of international internet services and violation of net neutrality principles will inevitably force more users to adopt these apps. <\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The role of Telegram in the late 2017-early 2018 protests resulted in the app being blocked by the Judiciary on 30 April 2018 and intensified government attention on the role of messaging apps in the online ecosystem, triggering a heightened security response to the use of international messaging apps in Iran. With such increased sensitivitiesContinue reading \"Iran\u2019s Domestic Messaging Apps: Abandoned Rafts Floating on the Ocean of Internet Restriction Policies\u00a0\"<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":13,"featured_media":3983,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"om_disable_all_campaigns":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[3],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-3980","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-investigations","entry"],"acf":[],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3980","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/13"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3980"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3980\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/3983"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3980"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3980"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3980"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}