{"id":3433,"date":"2022-02-15T17:54:56","date_gmt":"2022-02-15T17:54:56","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/en\/?p=3433"},"modified":"2025-06-03T08:40:56","modified_gmt":"2025-06-03T08:40:56","slug":"policy-monitor-january-2022","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/2022\/02\/15\/policy-monitor-january-2022\/","title":{"rendered":"Policy Monitor – January 2022"},"content":{"rendered":"

In January, official visits by Iran\u2019s President Ebrahim Raisi to Russia, and its Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian\u2019s visit to China marked significant moments for the new government\u2019s foreing policy agenda. Though few confirmed details on the substance of these meetings are available, including details of the Iran-China 25 year agreement which was signed last year, it was announced during the visit that the Iran-China agreement had now moved to the \u2018implementation stage\u2019. The announcement has raised concerns on whether this could mean even further advances on restricting Iran's internet.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Meanwhile Iranian online businesses and platforms continue to be put under strain by the country\u2019s authorities, as websites reported being blocked without notice due to \u201clicensing issues\u201d. However, it was not just Iranian authorities limiting online activities this month, as Instagram for a short period restricted the hashtag used to remember the victims of the tragic shooting down of the Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752. <\/span><\/p>\n

Our monthly <\/span>Network Monito<\/span>r<\/span><\/a> supplements this report with the latest on internet disruptions in Iran.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

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Supreme Council for Cyberspace Meeting Emphasises the Role of Domestic Apps and Services\u00a0<\/b><\/h2>\n

On <\/span>18 January<\/span><\/a> the Supreme Council for Cyberspace (SCC) held a meeting chaired by President Ebrahim Raisi. During the meeting, what was labelled as the importance of the expansion of domestic platforms and removing obstacles to their progress was discussed. Also During the meeting, the ICT Ministry was tasked with providing its action plan and timeline to \u201cremove barriers\u201d for the expansion of domestic platforms for business to the SCC.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

It is also worth noting that the SCC has been meeting regularly since the arrival of Raisi into office and the appointment of his Cabinet ministers in August 2021.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Iran\u2019s ICT Minister Denies Cooperation with China on a \u201cNational Internet\u201d<\/b><\/h2>\n

On <\/span>15 January<\/span><\/a> Iran\u2019s Foreign Minister, Hossein Amirabdollahian, arrived at his official visit to China, during which he announced that the 25-year Iran-China agreement<\/a> had entered its \u201cimplementation phase\u201d. Details of the deal, which was signed by the two countries in 2021, remains largely unknown. However, given China\u2019s highly restrictive and sophisticated methods of internet controls, the deal has caused major concerns for the future of Iran\u2019s internet.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

As discussions and speculations on the Iran-China deal were revived throughout January, Iran\u2019s ICT Minister, Eisa Zarepour replied to an Instagram <\/span>comment<\/span><\/a> calling China\u2019s involvement in creating a \u201cnational internet\u201d a \u201cbaseless rumour\u201d.\u00a0 However, given Iran\u2019s long term policies of internet localisation through the National information Network (NIN), and China\u2019s well documented surveillance and information control practises, these concerns are valid, and Filterwatch has already <\/span>written<\/span><\/a> about the threats of this deal on the erosion of digital rights in Iran.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Also further evidence of cooperation between the two countries on surveillance technologies has been emerging.\u00a0 In December 2021, IPVM - a surveillance research group - <\/span>reported<\/span><\/a> on a contract between Tiandy, a Chinese video surveillance company, and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), police, and the military. However, by scrutinising Tiandy\u2019s technologies\u2019 supply chains, the article raised questions about the implications of the US sanctions and whether they can be applied to block such relationships or not.<\/span><\/p>\n

Large Number of Iran\u2019s Online Businesses Blocked Just Weeks After Government Notice Prohibits the Move\u00a0<\/b><\/h2>\n

On <\/span>4 January<\/span><\/a>, a notice from the President\u2019s Legal Affairs Deputy, Mohammad Deghan, stated that in order to \u201creduce the obstacles for the country\u2019s startup community\u201d any disputes and complaints concerning startups from public authorities are to be addressed through a working group under control of the President\u2019s Legal Affairs Deputy as a first step before it can be escalated further.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

A few weeks later, in a statement released on <\/span>20 January<\/span><\/a>, the Iranian online e-commerce website 1DayOff, confirmed that their website had been \u201cblocked without notice following a request from Iran\u2019s ECommerce Union due to their lack of licence\u201d. The incident gained a significant amount of attention on social media, especially from concerned online business owners and startups, as well as by tech news outlets. According to a <\/span>report<\/span><\/a> by the tech magazine <\/span>Peivast <\/span><\/i>on 22 January, between late October to November 2021, the Union had requested the blocking of an additional 26 websites from the Police due to a licencing issues; in some cases the Union had even asked for the Police to prevent the website and the businesses\u2019 operations on social media platforms.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Iran\u2019s private tech sector has come under increasing pressure from government and public authorities, as a number of tech platforms and business owners have faced <\/span>arrests<\/span><\/a>,<\/span> prison sentences<\/span><\/a>, fines, or as seen above, have been blocked. While the government's recent notice and new working group aimed to ease such pressures, it is evident that it has so far not been adhered to. It is also worth noting that a similar notice was issued by the previous government which was largely ignored and proved ineffective.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

These issues are a major concern for both Iran\u2019s tech sector and those who rely on these services. The lack of clarity from Iranian authorities over the management of online businesses, and lack of uptodate and appropriate legislation and regulations for this sector and instead focusing on legislation to further restrict Iran\u2019s internet comes at a major cost to freedom of expression and technological innovation and expansion in the country.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

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Support Scheme for Iran\u2019s Domestic Mobile Phone Manufacturers to Resume\u00a0<\/b><\/h2>\n

On <\/span>19 January<\/span><\/a>, the ICT Ministry, the National Centre for Cyberspace (NCC), and the Industry\u00a0 and Mines Ministry agreed on a scheme to provide support, such as loans and financial backing, to \u201ccapable mobile phone manufacturers\u201d in the country.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The ICT Ministry\u2019s financial support scheme for domestic mobile phones began under the previous government and the former ICT Minister Mohammad-Javad Azari Jahromi, under whom the production of domestic mobile phones and operating systems gained momentum. Jahromi\u2019s ICT Ministry selected GLX, Parlar, and Sedna as the companies eligible for support, however due to delays, the scheme did not come into effect before the change in government in August last year. It is unclear if the same companies are selected and eligible for support in the new scheme, however, during the first year, the selected companies are to produce around one million devices, with further financial support during the second year.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Iran\u2019s domestic mobile phones play an important role in the implementation of <\/span>\u201c<\/span>layered filtering<\/span><\/a>\u201d in Iran, which is set to create a system which gives different levels of access to the global internet as decided by the government.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

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Instagram Restricts Hashtag Used to Remember the Victims of the Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752 Crash\u00a0<\/b><\/h2>\n

The <\/span>8 January<\/span><\/a> marked the second anniversary of the tragic shooting down of the Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752 \u2014 which resulted in the deaths of all 176 passengers and crew on board \u2014 by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The victims of the tragedy are remembered online under the hashtag #IWillLightACandletoo and in Persian under #\u0645\u0646_\u0647\u0645_\u0634\u0645\u0639\u06cc_\u0631\u0648\u0634\u0646_\u062e\u0648\u0627\u0647\u0645_\u06a9\u0631\u062f, however the hashtag was soon <\/span>restricted<\/span> by Instagram<\/span><\/a> for <\/span>\u00a0<\/span>\"because the community has reported some content that may not meet Instagram's Community Guidelines\". While it is not clear who or why the hashtag was reported, Internet Security expert Amir Rashidi suspects that users close to the Iranian government may have reported the hashtag to stop the hashtag from spreading and gaining attention. The restriction was later lifted and said to be a \u2018mistake,\u2019 according to Instagram\u2019s parent company, Meta (Facebook).\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Iran\u2019s ICT Ministry Reacts to the Removal Posts Related to the Anniversary of Qasem Soliemani\u2019s Assasination on Instagram and Facebook<\/b><\/h2>\n

On <\/span>3 January,<\/span><\/a> a letter from Iran\u2019s ICT Ministry addressed to Meta (formerly Facebook) condemning the removal of posts from Facebook and Instagram relating to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) General Qasem Soleimani on the second anniversary of his assasination by a US drone strike was published online. The letter called for an end to the \u201ccensorship\u201d on the platform and for the deleted or suspended accounts and posts to be restored. The Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance also <\/span>reported<\/span><\/a> that the Instagram page of its Minister Mohammad Mehdi Esmaeili was \"removed\" following a post about Soleimani.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

This is <\/span>not the first time<\/span><\/a> Meta has removed posts about Soleimani; since his assasination in 2020, posts about the killing have been removed from Meta\u2019s platforms due to \u201cUS sanctions\u201d as the IRGC is designated as a terrorist organisation by the US. However this is the first time Iran\u2019s ICT Ministry - which is now under the control of the new ICT Minister Eisa Zarepour - has had a major public reaction to the incident. However, the Ministry\u2019s reaction made no mention of the <\/span>restriction<\/span><\/a> of the #IWillLightACandletoo and in Persian under #\u0645\u0646_\u0647\u0645_\u0634\u0645\u0639\u06cc_\u0631\u0648\u0634\u0646_\u062e\u0648\u0627\u0647\u0645_\u06a9\u0631\u062f used to remember the victims of the tragic shooting down of the\u00a0 Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752 \u2014 which resulted in the deaths of all 176 passengers and crew on board \u2014 by the IRGC shortly after the assasination of Soleimani. <\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Iranian Research Organisation Releases Figures on Iranian\u2019s Social Media Use\u00a0<\/b><\/h2>\n

Between <\/span>December\/January<\/span><\/a>, Iranian research organisation, Beta, released a report on Iranian's use of Instagram, one of the few remaining international platforms not blocked by the Iranianian government.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Though the research methodology is unclear, the report states that the number of Instagram users increased from 47 million to 48 million users between December 2020 to December 2021. The report also states that 1.7 million Iranian businesses operate via Instagram, 2,000 of which were categorised as large to medium businesses. Also according to Tejarat News, 20% of social media users in Iran - equivalent to 11 million people - use these platforms as means to create a source of income, nine million of which do so via Instagram.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

A considerable number of Iranians rely on social media, especially Instagram, for business or as a major source of income. Continued discussions and threats around blocking Instagram by Iranian authorities is a major cause for anxiety, especially as the prospect of Iran's internet restriction bill becoming law looms over them, potentially having a major impact on people\u2019s incomes, especially as the country\u2019s economic conditions continue to decline.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

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Iranian State Broadcaster Briefly \u201cHacked\u201d\u00a0<\/b><\/h2>\n

On <\/span>27 January<\/span><\/a>, Iran\u2019s state broadcaster, Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) was hacked for around ten seconds according to the organisation. During the ten seconds, photos of Maryam and Masoud Rajavi, leaders of the Iranian controversial political opposition group Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK), along with a voice chanting \"Salute to Rajavi, death to Khamenei!\" appeared on several of IRIB\u2019s television and radio channels. However, an MEK spokesperson <\/span>denied<\/span><\/a> knowledge of the incident.<\/span><\/p>\n

It is not clear how the incident took place and who was involved. The IRIB has <\/span>said<\/span><\/a> that the attack was \u201chighly complex\u201d and is being investigated. There have been a significant number of cyberattacks on Iran\u2019s critical and state infrastructure and services in the past few months, including an attack on the country\u2019s <\/span>petrol stations<\/span><\/a> and <\/span>CCTV footage from inside Evin political prison<\/span><\/a> being published online.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Iran\u2019s National Bank Denies the Leak of 75 Million Customer Records Online\u00a0<\/b><\/h2>\n

On <\/span>25 January<\/span><\/a> unconfirmed and unofficial reports claiming that a database containing 75 million personal customer records from National Bank of Iran, Melli Bank, such as full names, national ID numbers, and addresses were leaked online and placed for sale began circulating on social media. In a <\/span>statement<\/span><\/a> released by Melli Bank on 26 January, the bank said that their investigations on the accuracy of the leak reports are ongoing but that they have found no evidence on the accuracy of the reports.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Major customer data leaks, especially from banks, have a long history in Iran, such as the <\/span>data leak<\/span><\/a> from Iran\u2019s Mellat Bank in 2021 and Saderat Bank in<\/span> 2020<\/span><\/a>. Despite the repeated leaks, Iran currently has no laws or regulations in order to protect users and encourage better transparency, accountability, and protections from online businesses and institutions.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

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Iran\u2019s ICT Minister Mentions Slow Internet Speeds on Instagram Post\u00a0<\/b><\/h2>\n

In an Instagram post on <\/span>12 January<\/span><\/a>, Iran\u2019s ICT Minister, \u00a0Zarepour commented on the much discussed slow internet speeds in the country. According to Zarepour\u2019s Instagram post, the slow internet speeds are caused by network traffic distribution which means \u201cdata moving to different parts of the has to travel through the capital city of Tehran,\u201d which slows down speeds.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Zarepour added that the ICT Ministry, the Telecommunication Infrastructure Company (TIC), Communications Regulatory Authority (CRA), and the network operators are among some of the organisations working together to \u201credesign the country\u2019s [data] traffic flow\u201d so that data is distributed via local routes instead of through Tehran. This is to be done by creating local Internet Exchange Points (IXPs) and Internet Gateways (IGW) to support network traffic flow. This project is to be implemented across different parts of Iran in phases.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Iranians have been <\/span>experiencing<\/span><\/a> extensive<\/span><\/a> internet disruptions especially when accessing international services and VPNs. According to an investigation by the Iranian tech news website Zoomit <\/span>published <\/span>in<\/span><\/a> October 2021, the drop in network quality is due to the fact that since Raisi\u2019s arrival in office, the SCC has not issued a licence for the TIC\u00a0 to increase their purchase of global bandwidth to meet rising domestic demand. As a result, operators have been downgrading the speed and quality of their services in order to continue to be able to meet their customers\u2019 needs. A claim which the Head of TIC <\/span>denied<\/span><\/a> in December.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Communication Regulatory Authority Releases Latest Figures on Iran\u2019s Internet Penetration Rates\u00a0<\/b><\/h2>\n

According to the latest figures published by Iran\u2019s Communication Regulatory Authority (CRA) in <\/span>January<\/span><\/a> there are currently 11,921,000 fixed internet subscribers, or a 14% penetration rate, while there are 91,844,281 mobile internet subscribers, which places mobile internet penetration rate at 109.27%.\u00a0 While mobile internet rates in the country remain high and are increasing, fixed internet penetration rates are extremely low and slow progressing in comparison. <\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

In January, official visits by Iran\u2019s President Ebrahim Raisi to Russia, and its Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian\u2019s visit to China marked significant moments for the new government\u2019s foreing policy agenda. Though few confirmed details on the substance of these meetings are available, including details of the Iran-China 25 year agreement which was signed last year,Continue reading \"Policy Monitor – January 2022\"<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":5,"featured_media":3434,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"om_disable_all_campaigns":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[4],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-3433","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-network-monitor","entry"],"acf":[],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3433","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/5"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3433"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3433\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/3434"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3433"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3433"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3433"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}