{"id":3357,"date":"2021-11-30T12:35:23","date_gmt":"2021-11-30T12:35:23","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/en\/?p=3357"},"modified":"2021-12-09T11:11:52","modified_gmt":"2021-12-09T11:11:52","slug":"the-role-of-domestic-messaging-apps-in-irans-information-controls","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/2021\/11\/30\/the-role-of-domestic-messaging-apps-in-irans-information-controls\/","title":{"rendered":"The Role of Domestic Messaging Apps in Iran\u2019s Information Controls\u00a0"},"content":{"rendered":"

Just under three years have passed since <\/span>Filterwatch <\/span><\/i>wrote<\/span><\/a> about the significance and dangers of Iran\u2019s domestic messaging apps. We are seeing increasing instances of major privacy violations by these apps, as they seek to expand their user base. Although some might argue that these apps still fail to mount a serious challenge to international messaging platforms, their threat profile has only continued to grow over time.<\/span><\/p>\n

In this investigation, we look at further evidence that has emerged around the measures taken by these domestic platforms to force users to sign up, oftentimes without their consent or knowledge. We will also explore how these apps, despite their slow growth, constitute a major component of internet policy planning in Iran, and will play a significant role in the future of Iran\u2019s internet, and discuss how \u2013 given the extent of government involvement in their development and creation \u2013 they look set to continue playing a major role in Iran\u2019s ever-developing system of information controls.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Human Rights and Messaging Apps\u00a0<\/b><\/h2>\n

Messaging apps are among the most widely used forms of digital technology today, with popular messaging apps such as WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger (among some others) being accessed by billions of people globally. These apps\u2019 reach extends across a vast range of geographies and demographic groups, and they offer a cheap, fast, and (generally) reliable way to communicate. Over time, these apps have also evolved to take on different functions in addition to being a personal messaging service; such as being able to create large groups or \u2018channels\u2019, as well as adding business and e-payment functionalities.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

These features have given messaging apps an even more important role in politically closed countries. The fact that a number of international apps offer encrypted services offer users with more secure options for\u00a0 communication compared to many alternatives.\u00a0 At the same time, the ability to reach larger audiences has made them a powerful tool for amplifying the voices of activists, human rights defenders, and journalists, as well as marginalised and minority groups, allowing them to share information, and to organise protests and demonstrations. As a result, issues around the availability of these platforms in closed societies are heavily<\/span> intertwined<\/span><\/a> with the question of human rights online.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Authoritarian states around the world have already responded to this perceived threat, with many of them filtering (whether permanently or only during politically sensitive periods) messaging apps such as Telegram, <\/span>WhatsApp<\/span><\/a>, and <\/span>Signal<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Messaging Apps in Iran\u00a0<\/b><\/h2>\n

Iran has been at the forefront of censorship of communication apps and social media platforms, with a long history of blocking these platforms, especially during politically sensitive times. Telegram \u2013 which remains one of the most popular messaging apps in Iran \u2013 was filtered in 2018 through a judicial order, and in January 2021 the messaging app Signal was <\/span>blocked<\/span><\/a> for a second time.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

At the same time, Iran has been working on extensive plans for rolling out and popularising domestic equivalents to messaging apps and social media platforms. These efforts can be traced back to the Supreme Council for Cyberspace\u2019s 2017 resolution titled \u201cPolicies and Actions Regarding the Organisation of Social Media Messaging Applications\u201d. The document outlines a series of requirements and commitments for investing in, promoting, and facilitating the use of domestic messaging apps, including government-backed financial support and loans for domestic app developers, as well as data tariff discounts for users. The resolution was hugely influential in laying the foundations for the \u201c<\/span>Managing Social Messaging Apps<\/span><\/a>\u201d bill, which effectively served as the first draft of the highly dangerous and much-discussed \u201c<\/span>User Protection and Core Online Services<\/span><\/a>\u201d bill (hereafter the \u201cOnline Services Bill\u201d)\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Filterwatch <\/span><\/i>has already <\/span>written<\/span><\/a> about the policies and actions underpinning the development of domestic messaging apps in the past few years. More recently, in September 2020, the SCC <\/span>published<\/span><\/a> the \u2018National Information Network Macro[-Level] Plan and Architecture\u2019 resolution, which emphasised the role of messaging and social media platforms as part of the \u2018content\u2019 of Iran\u2019s localised internet project, the National Information Network (NIN). It also established the objective of \u201cexpanding the capacity of domestic messaging apps to 50 million users\u201d, a responsibility which has been assigned to the ICT Ministry.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The State of Iran\u2019s Domestic Messaging Apps\u00a0\u00a0<\/b><\/h2>\n

Iran\u2019s leading domestic messenger apps, such as Rubika, Soroush, Bale and iGap, all have close ties with government entities:\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n