{"id":3181,"date":"2021-08-18T13:30:39","date_gmt":"2021-08-18T13:30:39","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/en\/?p=3181"},"modified":"2025-06-03T08:41:00","modified_gmt":"2025-06-03T08:41:00","slug":"policy-monitor-july-2021","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/2021\/08\/18\/policy-monitor-july-2021\/","title":{"rendered":"Policy Monitor – July 2021"},"content":{"rendered":"

Following in the wake of June\u2019s presidential election, July saw Iran undergo a series of significant political and policy developments. The Supreme Council for Cyberspace (SCC) released the text for its most recent resolutions, including one on the \u201cProtection of Children and Teenagers in Cyberspace\u201d, suggesting the future implementation of a \u201c<\/span>layered filtering<\/span><\/a>\u201d system for under-18s. Significantly, the dangerous \u201cUser Protection and Core Online Services\u201d bill returned to Majles where MPs voted in favour of the bill being considered via a designated commission instead of a parliamentary vote, in accordance with Article 85 of Iran\u2019s Constitution.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Also this month, outgoing ICT Minister Mohammad-Javad Azari Jahromi attended his final public session in the <\/span>Majles<\/span><\/i> to answer MP\u2019s questions about Telegram\u2019s operations in Iran. The session took place at the same time as water shortage protests broke out in Khuzestan province, where protestors were met with a violent crackdown by the authorities. The crackdown was accompanied once again by localised internet shutdowns, which were used to silence protestors, prevent the sharing of information, and limit efforts to document human rights abuses. Jahromi left the <\/span>Majles<\/span><\/i> session without addressing the ongoing events in Khuzestan.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The events of this final month of Rouhani\u2019s administration neatly encapsulate its legacy \u2013 internet shutdowns, the expansion of information controls, and the continuation of human rights abuses in online and offline spaces. This legacy will continue to affect the lives and freedoms of Iranians going forward, with the notorious human rights violator Ebrahim Raisi continuing from where they left off. Raisi was responsible for ordering thousands of executions in the 1980s as a member of Tehran\u2019s <\/span>Death Commission<\/span><\/a>, and also served as Iran\u2019s Chief Justice during the deadly November 2019 protests.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

Supreme Council for Cyberspace Releases Text for the Latest Approved Resolutions\u00a0<\/b><\/h2>\n

In July, the Supreme Council for Cyberspace (SCC) published the text of two resolutions which were <\/span>approved<\/span><\/a> in June 2021, during the final SCC meeting chaired by outgoing President Hassan Rouhani.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The first is titled the \u201c<\/span>Protection of Teenagers and Children in Cyberspace<\/span><\/a>\u201d resolution, and the second being parts one and two of the resolution on \u201c<\/span>The Vision for Cyberspace on the Horizon of 2031\/2032<\/span><\/a>\u201d.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cProtection of Teenagers and Children in Cyberspace\u201d\u00a0\u00a0<\/i><\/b><\/h3>\n

The resolution sets out a series of objectives, policies, executive actions, and assigns responsibilities to governmental and state authorities to establish a \u201cprotected online environment\u201d for children and teenagers. This will be based on the \u201c<\/span>layered filtering<\/span><\/a>\u201d system, which assigns different levels of access to online content based on users\u2019 attributes, including gender, age, occupation and social status. Under this resolution, under-18s will have access to content as determined by the Islamic Development Organisation, the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, the Education Ministry, and the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB).\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Similar schemes already exist in the form of student, children, and family SIM cards provided by the <\/span>ICT Ministry<\/span><\/a> and ISPs such as<\/span> Hamrah-e-Aval (MCI)<\/span><\/a> and <\/span>Irancell<\/span><\/a>. These SIMs permit access to only pre-selected, whitelisted content, generally limited to domestic platforms and content.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The goal of the resolution is to \u201ccreate a designated cyberspace for children and teenagers with an Islamic-Iranian framework for the appropriate use of cyberspace, and harm-prevention.\u201d\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The resolution applies to anyone under 18 years of age. It defines a \u201cprotected environment\u201d as \u201can ecosystem on the National Information Network (NIN) that provides levels of access to information, services, and communication according to gender, age, and other social and cultural requirements for children and teenagers\u201d.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The \u201cmanagement and leadership\u201d for the implementation of this resolution has been assigned to the National Center for Cyberspace (NCC), through the creation of a new committee. This committee is to be made up of representatives from the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, Ministry of Education, the ICT Ministry, as well as representatives from a number of other ministries, Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), the Judiciary, the Police, Islamic Development Organisation, two members from the SCC, two private sector representatives, and University faculty members as appointed by the SCC Secretary and NCC Head NCC.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The creation and the implementation of this bill\u2019s requisite infrastructure is required to take place within six months after the the formation of the said committee. This will include the development of core services, the creation of new features including parental controls, ID verification, and licensing, and the implementation of \u201clayered access\u201d.<\/span><\/p>\n

The creation of criteria for validating \u201cprotected content and services\u201d, the approval of black- and whitelists, and the development of an oversight and classification system for online content and services will be undertaken in collaboration between the Islamic Development Organisation, the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, the Education Ministry, and the IRIB.<\/span><\/p>\n

The resolution also calls for \u201ceffective interaction and synergy\u201d with international service providers and international organisations, to seek their compliance with Iranian standards. This engagement is to take place via the ICT Ministry, Foreign Ministry and MCI, and the Ministry for Industries and Mines Ministry.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cThe Vision for Cyberspace on the Horizon of 2031\/2032 (Parts One and Two)\u201d<\/i><\/b><\/h3>\n

The published <\/span>text of the resolution<\/span><\/a> is limited to two pages, containing only the first two of the resolution\u2019s four sections. These sections respectively focus on the \u201cValues\u201d and the \u201cVision\u201d guiding the Iranian state\u2019s management of cyberspace. The latter two sections which have not been included in this version of the published resolution concern \u201cAims\u201d and \u201cStrategies\u201d.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

According to the resolution, the \u201cValues\u201d and \u201cVision\u201d are informed by \u201cobserving the strategies of other countries\u201d, as well as \u201can analysis of the current and desired situation\u201d and \u201cthe country's laws, and the rulings of Iran\u2019s Supreme Leader\u201d.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Examples from among the 18 \u201cValues\u201d underpinning Iran\u2019s management of cyberspace include: \u201cIslamic beliefs, [and the] rules, ethics, and values \u200b\u200bof the Islamic Revolution\u201d; \u201cnational security\u201d;\u00a0 \u201chealthy content\u201d; \u201cself-sufficiency\u201d; \u201cindependence\u201d, \u201cnational sovereignty\u201d, and the \u201cdenial of foreign domination.\u201d\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The vision for 2031\/2032 for Iran\u2019s internet is primarily grounded in the idea of \u201cself-sufficiency\u201d, and developing an online ecosystem imbued with \u201cIslamic-Iranian values\u201d to meet the needs of Iranian users. The document also articulates an ambition to \u201cachieve first place in the provision of online services in West and Southwest Asia\u201d, though the resolution does not clarify how this goal to be achieved, or the metrics to measure its success. Lastly, the document claims that the development of the National Information Network (NIN) will result in \u201csafer and more reliable\u201d national digital infrastructure.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The resolution provides no details on how these visions are to be realised. However, it is likely that these will be detailed in the not-yet approved \u201cAims\u201d and \u201cStrategies\u201d components of the resolution. This resolution does, however, make clear that the SCC is setting long-term objectives for the development of Iran\u2019s internet, which go on to inform the policy decisions made by government ministries and state organisations.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Localised Internet Shutdown Implemented Amid Protests in Khuzestan Province\u00a0<\/b><\/h2>\n

On the evening of <\/span>15 July<\/span><\/a>, reports emerged of protests breaking out in a number of cities across the southwestern province of Khuzestan, with footage of the protests circulating on social media the next day.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The protests were sparked by a severe water crisis which has prevented many of the province\u2019s inhabitants from being able to reliably access clean drinking water and for agricultural means.\u00a0 This crisis comes in the midst of what Energy Minister Reza Ardakanian has <\/span>described<\/span><\/a> as Iran\u2019s \u201cdriest [year] in 50 years\u201d.<\/span><\/p>\n

On Sunday 18 July, the cybersecurity and digital rights researcher Amir Rashidi <\/span>confirmed<\/span><\/a> intermittent disruptions to mobile internet access in Khuzestan province, with disruptions particularly notable on two of the country\u2019s main internet providers MTN-Irancell and MCI. Rashidi notes that another unique feature of the Khuzestan disruptions is their levels of <\/span>hyper-localisation<\/span><\/a>: they are imposed specifically on those areas experiencing protests and unrest, and for varying periods of time to allow security forces to disperse gathering crowds.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The limitation of mobile services is particularly significant in this part of the country, with internet users in Khuzestan dependent on mobile services for connectivity; according to Iran\u2019s <\/span>Communication Authority (CRA)<\/span><\/a>, mobile internet penetration rates in the province are at 105.97%, compared to fixed broadband penetration rates of 7.97%. Rashidi also added that connectivity to domestic services and apps remained via the National Information Network.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

As protests continued in Khuzestan, they also spread to other parts of the country, accompanied with further internet disruptions. At least eight people have been <\/span>killed<\/span><\/a> according to Amnesty International, and 361 have been <\/span>arrested<\/span><\/a> according to the Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA). These figures are likely to\u00a0 increase as more information becomes available.Further details can be found in our <\/span>Khuzestan Shutdown Monitor<\/span><\/a> and our July Network Monitor.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

MPs Vote to Review the \u201cCore Online Services\u201d Bill Under Article 85 of the Constitution<\/b><\/h2>\n

On\u00a0 <\/span>28 July,<\/span><\/a> MPs approved for the \u201cUser Protection and Core Online Services\u201d bill (typically referred to as \u201c\u0637\u0631\u062d \u0635\u06cc\u0627\u0646\u062a\u201d in Persian) to be reviewed under Article 85 of Iran\u2019s Constitution, with 121 votes in favour. Under Article 85, the bill will be reviewed and approved by a designated Majles committee (rather than at a public session) before being sent to the Guardian Council for approval. The bill can then come into force for a \u201ctrial period\u201d (typically between three to five years), before being approved by the Majles. This trial period can also be extended. The decision removes any meaningful parliamentary oversight over the bill and further removes transparency from the legislative process, and limits all opportunities for scrutiny or public engagement of this significant and potentially very dangerous bill.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The <\/span>latest available iteration of the bill<\/span><\/a> (dated 15 July 2021) has undergone a number of changes since the previous draft. While the bill is still subject to further amendments as it goes through parliamentary procedures, some of the most concerning and significant proposals are detailed below. While the bill uses the word \u201cprotection\u201d in its title, this is misleading given the essence of the bill\u2019s contents, and so hereafter we will refer to it as the \u201conline services\u201d bill. Some of the main thematic issues in the bill are outlined below:<\/span><\/p>\n