{"id":2994,"date":"2021-05-13T11:39:15","date_gmt":"2021-05-13T11:39:15","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/en\/?p=2994"},"modified":"2025-06-03T08:41:02","modified_gmt":"2025-06-03T08:41:02","slug":"policy-monitor-april-2021","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/2021\/05\/13\/policy-monitor-april-2021\/","title":{"rendered":"Policy Monitor – April 2021"},"content":{"rendered":"

Although the Rouhani administration is entering its final months, there seem to be no signs of policy-makers slowing the pace of announcements on Iran\u2019s information controls agenda. This month we observed a worrying number of advancements towards the realisation of Iran\u2019s \u201c<\/span>layered filtering<\/span><\/a>\u201d initiative, including further announcements about the unblocking of YouTube for certain users, as well as details on a new initiative from the ICT Ministry supporting the development of domestic mobile phones.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Elsewhere, the audio discussion app Clubhouse continued to make headlines, as Iranian authorities disrupted access to the service. No institutions took formal responsibility for these disruptions, although a representative of the National Centre for Cyberspace (NCC) did call for domestic companies to develop a domestic analogue for Clubhouse \u2013 a niche that was attempted to be filled by the multi-functional domestic messaging and media app Rubika. Meanwhile, further incentives for the use of Iranian messaging apps were introduced, as COVID-19 vaccine appointments were made available via the Iranian messaging app iGap.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Our monthly Network Monitor<\/a> supplements this report with a technical analysis of network disruptions and internet shutdowns. Read it to get a better sense of how internet disruptions affected Iranian users in April.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

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Head of Iran\u2019s Passive Defence Organisation: National Information Network to Give Segregated Access to the Internet<\/b><\/h2>\n

In a TV interview on <\/span>2 April<\/span><\/a>, the Head of Iran\u2019s Passive Defence Organisation, Gholamreza Jalali claimed that the National Information Network (NIN) is \u201cnot seeking to sever access to the global internet\u201d but instead to grant \u201ctiered access to the internet\u201d.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Jalali did not provide further details about how different levels of internet access would be granted, however his statement seems to be in reference to the system of \u201clayered filtering\u201d which has been in development for a number of years. ICT Minister Mohammad-Javad Azari Jahromi first hinted at the plans around two years ago, when in a public session in Majles he stated that filtered content should be different for university students, teachers, and journalists.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The practice of granting different levels of access to the global Internet sits at the core of the \u201c<\/span>layered filtering<\/span><\/a>\u201d model of filtering, which <\/span>Filterwatch<\/span><\/i> has warned about for some time.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

We have observed further evidence of the emergence of this system, with plans for the launch of \u201c<\/span>legal VPNs<\/span><\/a>\u201d taking clearer shape. Plans for the implementation of \u201clegal VPNs\u201d are currently under review at the National Centre for Cyberspace (NCC), which appear likely to facilitate this layered filtering system.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Allowing certain sections of Iranian society controlled, closely-monitored access to the global Internet while restricting it to the rest of the population is a vision of the tiered, localised internet that Iranian authorities are trying to create.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Working Group to Implement the Supreme Council for Cyberspace Resolution on \u201cFake News\u201d Established at the National Centre for Cyberspace\u00a0<\/b><\/h2>\n

On <\/span>7 April<\/span><\/a>, the NCC held a meeting to discuss the Supreme Council of Cyberspace (SCC)\u2019s resolution on so-called \u201cfake news\u201d, named the \u201cDocument on Preventing and Combating the Dissemination of Misinformation and Fake News and Content in Cyberspace\u201d. Among those in attendance were SCC Secretary Abolhassan Firouzabadi, and ministers including Jahromi.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

During the meeting, the execution of the resolution was discussed under three main parameters; prevention and deterrence, coordination between organisations, and legal and judicial support for its implementation. A working group was also established for the further implementation of the resolution.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The resolution, which was approved by the SCC earlier this year, poses a significant threat to freedom of expression online in Iran, in particular in the run-up to the June 2021 presidential elections. <\/span>Filterwatch<\/span><\/i>\u2019s full analysis of the resolution is available <\/span>here<\/span><\/a>.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Registration for Phase III Trials for Iranian COVID-19 Vaccine Available via iGap Messenger\u00a0<\/b><\/h2>\n

During a press conference on <\/span>21 April<\/span><\/a>, officials from the state-owned enterprise the \u201cExecution of Imam Khomeini's Order\u201d (EIKO) announced that registration for phase III trials of the Iranian COVID-19 vaccine \u201cCOVIran Barakat\u201d had opened via the Iranian messaging app iGap, and a dedicated phone line. The COVIran Barakat vaccine is produced by EIKO, which is under the control of Iran\u2019s Supreme Leader,\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

In 2018, the iGap messaging app, which was established by Mohammad Rasoul Kazemi, was taken over by a company known as Kian Iranian. The company\u2019s shareholders include Hamrah-e-Aval (MCI), which is owned by the Telecommunication Company of Iran (TCI) and Parsian Bank.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

While some Iranian messaging apps have struggled to sustain an active user base, they remain an essential component of Iran\u2019s plans for internet localisation. As such, a number of incentives and essential services have been offered via domestic messaging apps in order to attract Iranian users to these apps. Such schemes are alarming, in light of these apps often lacking adequate privacy and security measures, and being vulnerable to government data requests.<\/span><\/p>\n

YouTube Set to Be \u201cUnblocked\u201d For Journalists and Academics in Another Step Towards Layered Filtering in Iran\u00a0<\/b><\/h2>\n

On <\/span>6 April<\/span><\/a>, Iran\u2019s Prosecutor General Mohammad-Jafar Montazeri announced that YouTube is set to be unblocked for \u2018certain sections of society\u2019. YouTube was blocked in Iran in 2010.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

A day prior to Montazeri\u2019s comments, Sajad Bonabi, Deputy ICT Minister for HR, Finance, and Support also <\/span>announced<\/span><\/a> the same news and added that a number of websites such as YouTube would be unblocked for certain groups such as journalists, university students and professors. According to Bonabi, the details relating to the unblocking are to be communicated by the Committee for Determining Instances of Criminal Content (CDICC) and the Prosecutor General.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

This marks a very concerning milestone in the segmentation of internet access in Iran. The practice of granting different levels of access to the global Internet sits at the core of the \u201c<\/span>layered filtering<\/span><\/a>\u201d model of filtering, which Filterwatch has warned about for some time.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

We have observed further evidence of the emergence of this system, with plans for the launch of \u201c<\/span>legal VPNs<\/span><\/a>\u201d taking clearer shape. Allowing certain sections of Iranian society with controlled, closely-monitored access to the global Internet while restricting it to the rest of the population is a vision of the tiered, localised internet that Iranian authorities are trying to create.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Iranian News Website Publishes Parliamentary Budget Committee\u2019s Allocations for Cyber Operations<\/b><\/h2>\n

On <\/span>28 April<\/span><\/a> a table was published by the news agency <\/span>IRNA <\/span>showing the Parliamentary Budget Committee increasing the Majles-approved budget for IRIB\u2019s \u201ccyber activists\u201d as well as for the Islamic Development Organisation\u2019s \u201ccyber section\u201d for the current Iranian calendar year (March 2021-March 2022).\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The table gathered major attention online. A copy of the table was <\/span>tweeted<\/span><\/a> by Effat Hayati, Youth Affairs Assistant to the ICT Minister, where she joked that she \u201cwished she were a cyber activist for the IRIB\u201d. Her tweet referred to IRIB and the ICT Ministry\u2019s long-standing dispute over their authority over online content development in Iran.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The following day, on <\/span>29 April<\/span><\/a> IRNA retracted the table and issued an apology for publishing \u201cfalse news\u201d. IRNA stated that the table was retracted due to the \u201ccarelessness of the journalist in labelling the table\u2019s title\u201d and \u201can incomplete editing process\u201d.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

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Clubhouse Remains Inaccessible to Iranians As Authorities Deny Responsibility\u00a0<\/b><\/h2>\n

Disruptions to the audio-based social media app Clubhouse continued throughout April. On <\/span>12 April<\/span><\/a> ICT Ministry Spokesperson Jamal Hadian tweeted that following the ISPs ignoring the warning about \u201cillegal disruption\u201d to Clubhouse, the ICT Ministry submitted a complaint to Tehran\u2019s Prosecutor\u2019s Office against their CEOs.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Following Hadian\u2019s statement, on <\/span>22 April<\/span><\/a> the Cabinet issued a resolution to operators which requires that the Communications Regulatory Authority (CRA) communicate any evidence of\u00a0 disruptions to ISPs within 24 hours, and to publish this evidence publicly. According to the resolution, if operators fail to resolve any disruptions within 24 hours, as required by the CRA, the CRA can fine the operator(s) up to 50 billion IRR (11,875,074.00 USD)\u00a0 per day until the issue is resolved. If the issue persists for more than a week, the CRA can look into the temporary suspension or reduction of the length of the operator\u2019s licence. On <\/span>1 May<\/span><\/a> however, the country\u2019s Administrative Court issued an interim order blocking the Cabinet\u2019s resolution.<\/span><\/p>\n

To date, Clubhouse remains blocked on MCI, Irancell, and TCI. No government authorities have yet accepted responsibility for the disruption. The online censorship and filtering process remains deeply opaque, making it very difficult to establish clear accountability for decisions such as this one.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Iranian Social Media App Rubika Adds \u201cAudio Chatrooms\u201d to Its Services\u00a0<\/b><\/h2>\n

On <\/span>25 April<\/span><\/a> the Iranian social media app Rubika announced that it has added a functionality to host \u201cAudio Chatrooms\u201d with a potential capacity of thousands of users. This comes after a surge in the popularity of the audio-based discussion app Clubhouse in Iran, which has been filtered since April. Earlier this month, Amir Khorakian, the Deputy for Legal and Parliamentary Affairs at the National Centre for Cyberspace (NCC) <\/span>invited<\/span><\/a> the country\u2019s private sector to create a domestic version of Clubhouse.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The multi-purpose app lists as its shareholder the state-owned mobile telecommunication company Hamrah-e-Aval (MCI), which offers tariff-free use of the app to their customers. Clubhouse has also been inaccessible to MCI users from April.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Iranian apps and services lack adequate security measures compared to their international counterparts, especially given the lack of adequate data protection laws in Iran. It should be noted that major <\/span>privacy concerns<\/span><\/a> remain in relation to Clubhouse itself, particularly in the face of the recent <\/span>leak<\/span><\/a> of 1.3 million user records from the app.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Iranian users should be cautious about the privacy and security risks associated with such apps. These risks are particularly pronounced in relation to domestic apps, where user data is hosted locally, and vulnerable to being surveilled or requested by state authorities.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Instagram Removes Posts Relating to the Death of IRGC Commander\u00a0<\/b><\/h2>\n

On <\/span>19 April<\/span><\/a> a number of social media users reported that Instagram posts relating to the death of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps\u2019s (IRGC) Quds Force Deputy Commander Mohammad Hossein-Zadeh Hejazi had been removed for \u201cbeing [related to] dangerous or violent organisations\u201d.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Instagram has removed content relating to IRGC officials on a <\/span>number of occasions<\/span><\/a> following their designation as a \u201cterrorist organisation\u201d by the US.<\/span><\/p>\n

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ICT Ministry Announces Support for Domestic Smartphones and Tables\u00a0<\/b><\/h2>\n

On <\/span>20 April<\/span><\/a> the ICT Ministry announced a new drive to support domestic tablet and smartphone production, and called for eligible companies to \u201ctake part in the national programme\u201d. The support includes the development of production and testing infrastructure, as well as financial support such as low interest loans.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Domestically produced mobile phones, which often also use home-grown Iranian operating systems and Iranian apps, are an important part of Iran\u2019s internet localisation plans. A series of incentives (including their lower price point) have been designed to encourage Iranian consumers to switch away from foreign Android- and iOS-based devices to domestic products.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

ICT Ministry to Distribute Millions of \u201cStudent SIM Cards\u201d.<\/b><\/h2>\n

On <\/span>6 April<\/span><\/a> Jahromi announced that the ICT Ministry is to distribute 10 million \u201cstudent SIM cards\u201d as well as \u201cfree student internet packages\u201d, aimed at school-aged students. Jahromi did not clarify the types of online content that would be made available through the SIM cards, or whether the free internet packages include access to the domestic or international internet.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

In recent months, a number of Iranian ISPs such as Shatel and Irancell have been <\/span>introducing <\/span><\/a>student internet and SIM cards. Though monitoring the internet use of children is a common concept, some of these services make use of the ICT Ministry\u2019s whitelisted content. Allowing different sections of society different levels of access to the internet as approved by state authorities \u2013 including school children and university students \u2013 is part of the \u201c<\/span>layered filtering<\/span><\/a>\u201d system of information controls, which pose a major threat to Iranian internet users\u2019 rights online.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Iranian Users Report Disruption to Accessing Google Services\u00a0<\/b><\/h2>\n

On around <\/span>5 April<\/span><\/a> a number of Iranian users reported an inability to access Google services, which either were previously available to Iranians or were accessible through VPNs. Users also reported challenges accessing platforms that used Google services, such as Spotify. A number of content creators have also complained of lower levels of income from YouTube.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Iranian internet users\u2019 access to a number of international online services had already been limited due to US sanctions. However, no new technology related sanctions have been announced in recents months, and Google has not formally addressed the issue, leaving the reason behind the restrictions unclear. This has left users speculating that the new restrictions are related to Google\u2019s increased accuracy in locating customers.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Filterwatch <\/span><\/i>has already written<\/a> about tech sanctions and tech giant\u2019s overcompliance with sanctions contributing to Iran\u2019s efforts in <\/span>furthering<\/span> the development of the NIN.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

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Irancell Launches Commercial Cloud Services\u00a0<\/b><\/h2>\n

On <\/span>17 April<\/span><\/a> the telecommunication company Irancell, which lists Iran Electronics Industries - a subsidiary of Iran\u2019s Ministry of Defence as one of its shareholders \u2013 announced the launch of its cloud services for commercial use.<\/span><\/p>\n

Cloud infrastructure services are a vital component of the NIN, allowing domestic services to make use of domestic infrastructure.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Iranian cloud infrastructure projects have made headlines in recent months, following the <\/span>announcement <\/span><\/a>of the \u201cIran Cloud\u201d project, which is a collaboration between Iran\u2019s ICT Ministry and private sector companies such as Arvan Cloud. This high-profile case has highlighted the supporting role played by private sector companies in developing the infrastructure to facilitate internet shutdowns and surveillance, and also their ultimate responsibilities to not be complicit in; or to resist these schemes\u2019 implementation.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Although the Rouhani administration is entering its final months, there seem to be no signs of policy-makers slowing the pace of announcements on Iran\u2019s information controls agenda. This month we observed a worrying number of advancements towards the realisation of Iran\u2019s \u201clayered filtering\u201d initiative, including further announcements about the unblocking of YouTube for certain users,Continue reading \"Policy Monitor – April 2021\"<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":5,"featured_media":2995,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"om_disable_all_campaigns":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[4],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-2994","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-network-monitor","entry"],"acf":[],"aioseo_notices":[],"aioseo_head":"\n\t\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t