{"id":2961,"date":"2021-03-12T16:05:46","date_gmt":"2021-03-12T16:05:46","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/en\/?p=2961"},"modified":"2023-03-21T15:49:17","modified_gmt":"2023-03-21T15:49:17","slug":"irans-plan-to-tackle-fake-news-threatens-real-journalism","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/2021\/03\/12\/irans-plan-to-tackle-fake-news-threatens-real-journalism\/","title":{"rendered":"Iran\u2019s Plan to Tackle \u201cFake News\u201d Threatens Real Journalism"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">On <\/span><a href=\"http:\/\/www.president.ir\/en\/118989\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">5 January 2021<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> the Supreme Council of Cyberspace (SCC) \u2013 Iran\u2019s top Internet governance and ICT policy-making body \u2013 ratified a resolution titled the \u201cDocument on Preventing and Combating the Dissemination of Misinformation and Fake News and Content in Cyberspace\u201d in a meeting chaired by President Hassan Rouhani. The full text of the resolution was first published on the SCC website on <\/span><a href=\"http:\/\/majazi.ir\/news\/90867-%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%BA-%D9%85%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%DB%8C-%D9%81%D8%B6%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%B2%DB%8C-%DA%A9%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%AE%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%B5-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%BE%DB%8C%D8%B4%DA%AF%DB%8C%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%84%D9%87-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D9%86%D8%B4%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%DB%8C.html?t=%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">13 February<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The text of this resolution raises some serious concerns about freedom of expression and digital rights in Iran. It also sheds light on how Iran is seeking capitalise on the alarmist global narrative around \u201cfake news\u201d and \u201cdisinformation\u201d online (which is being championed by both mainstream liberals and conservatives in European and North American democracies) to challenge the influence of online global platforms, with the goal of further advancing the censorship of Iranians\u2019 voices online.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<h3><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The Content of the Resolution<\/span><\/h3>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The three-page resolution appears to be a first step in establishing the legal framework and organisational capacity among different branches of government and ministries to monitor and legally punish publication of news which it labels untrue or misleading with the stated goals to protect the order in society and protect individuals against reputational damage. The resolution also states as one of its aims the \u201cprotection of election outcomes\u201d from being affected by such news.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The resolution provides three definitions in setting its remit:\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\"><b>\u201cUntrue information, news, or current affairs content\u201d:<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> Broadly defined as any content published online which is \u201cuntrue\u201d or \u201cmisleading\u201d, and that can damage \u201cpublic order\u201d, \u201cnational unity\u201d, \u201cstability\u201d, or \u201ctrust\u201d. It also extends the definition to any content that may damage individuals\u2019 or social \u201chealth\u201d, as well as either political, economical, or social aspects of \u201csecurity\u201d.\u00a0<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\"><b>\u201cPublisher\u201d:<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> Defined as any publicly available entity on the internet that publishes information, news, or current affairs content, and which has an audience of more than 5,000.\u00a0<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\"><b>\u201cPlatform\u201d<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">: Defined as any site or infrastructure that can govern publishers \u2013 either technically, or based on guidelines.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">On the basis of these definitions, the framing of the language around reporting news, and the audience threshold of 5,000, it appears that the resolution is designed to target independent journalists or activists inside Iran. Specifically, it targets those who use social media accounts such as Instagram pages, Twitter accounts or Telegram channels to disseminate information that would not otherwise be published in Iranian newspapers, or other local media.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The document sets out a number of responsibilities for the Judiciary, the ICT Ministry, Ministry of Culture &amp; Islamic Guidance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, IRIB, and the Press Supervisory Board.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">There are three elements of the document that really stand out.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Firstly, the Judiciary is tasked with bringing forward new bills setting out definitions and punishments relating to the dissemination of untrue news, and outlining the responsibilities of the publishers and platforms. They are required to do this within three months from when the resolution was issued (20 January 2021). Notably, they are asked to design punitive measures that could act as a deterrent against individuals publishing \u201cuntrue\u201d content.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Secondly, the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance (MCIG) is asked to establish the infrastructure to identify and monitor publishers that are covered by this resolution. The MCIG is also asked to establish a mechanism for \u201ccollaboration\u201d between publishers and appropriate government bodies to facilitate \u201crapid responses to developing events\u201d.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Finally, the resolution asks for collaboration between the MCIG and the Foreign Ministry in identifying points of contact at foreign platforms and social media companies, and establishing a mechanism for Iran\u2019s diplomatic representatives to contact these companies to seek their collaboration in combating so-called \u201cuntrue news\u201d when needed.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<h3><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The Objectives of the Resolution<\/span><\/h3>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">First and foremost, we must acknowledge that Iranian authorities\u2019 long record of regulating and restricting online and offline speech strongly suggests that international human rights standards will not be taken into consideration when defining \u201cmisleading\u201d or \u201cuntrue\u201d news. Iran\u2019s dismal <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/rsf.org\/en\/iran\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">press freedom record<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> is a testament to the fact that any tools granted to state authorities to police online speech will be used to censor dissenting voices and independent journalism.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Within this context, in light of the resolution\u2019s broadly defined goals and mechanisms, and lacking in any checks on its scope, this resolution must be understood as posing a grave new threat to press freedom in Iran, and to Iranians\u2019 right to freedom of expression online.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">From the content of the resolution it is clear that the goal of this resolution is not to monitor every post online or to block access to every single social media platform, but rather to create an environment in which self-censorship is further encouraged. It appears that this SCC resolution seeks to further institutionalize the tactics used by Iran\u2019s Cyber Police (FATA) against influencers, not only intimidating them into compliance with the law, <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/medium.com\/filterwatch\/irans-cyber-police-society-based-policing-and-the-rise-of-peer-surveillance-6f0bb3744893\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">but also forcing them to publicly state<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> that their actions are in line with the instructions of law enforcement authorities.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The resolution must also be viewed as part of Iran's continued shift towards the offline policing of online spaces. The growing role of FATA in applying pressure to those internet users with large audiences appears to be Iran's preferred method of controlling civic and social spaces in Iran in recent years.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">This tactic, which was firstly visible in Iran\u2019s fight against Instagram influencers, was used aggressively against ordinary citizens in the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic in Iran; as many as <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/filter.watch\/en\/2020\/05\/26\/irans-self-isolated-internet-is-ill-equipped-to-confront-covid-19\/\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">3,600 people<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> were arrested by FATA for spreading \u201cfalse information and rumours\u201d online by the end of April 2020. The same methods have previously been deployed against journalists; most notably, the journalist <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/cpj.org\/awards\/mohammad-mosaed-iran\/\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Mohammad Mosaed<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> was arrested in 2019 after his Twitter posts during the near-total internet shutdown in November 2019.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">This resolution, and Iran\u2019s broader offline policing of the internet in part stem from Iranian authorities admitting their inability to control online spaces solely through filtering and other technical methods. However, this failure should not be viewed as a cause of celebration for those concerned with human rights in Iran. It is likely that the rapid implementation of this resolution will result in a heavy crackdown on ordinary citizens, activists and journalists \u2013 particularly given its timing.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">It is no accident that the authorities are bringing forward this new resolution on online speech only months ahead of the June 2021 presidential elections \u2013 elections which may pose serious challenges to the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic if turnout remains <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.bbc.co.uk\/news\/world-middle-east-51605942\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">as historically low as in the 2020 elections<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">. It is unlikely that this election will see the emergence of any particularly vibrant campaigns, or that any candidates will be willing to engage in substantive critiques of the Islamic Republic. However, many of the leading figures that are currently discussed as potential candidates certainly stand to benefit from the silencing of independent journalists in accordance with this resolution.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In the absence of any such campaigns, the months leading up to the presidential election may turn into an intense period of public scrutiny of the Guardian Council\u2019s hand-picked candidates by independent media and activists. The SCC resolution\u2019s preemptive act of intimidation against journalists and activists is likely to be welcomed by the establishment candidates, several of whom sit on the SCC, and are in fact responsible for writing and passing this resolution.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">For instance, both Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the sitting Majles Speaker, and Ebrahim Raisi, Iran\u2019s Chief Justice, are both potential lead candidates, and have both previously been accused by journalists of financial improprieties. Similarly, a number of IRGC generals are being considered as potential candidates, all of whom would fear independent investigations into their human rights records and financial dealings. Such reports may never be allowed to be published in Iranian newspapers, but are generally able to reach online audiences via the Telegram or Twitter feeds of journalists and activists inside the country. This is why the timing of this resolution must be understood in the context of this upcoming election.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<h3><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Where Does This Fit Into Global \u201cFake News\u201d and Disinformation Discourse?\u00a0<\/span><\/h3>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">This resolution is not just a product of Iran\u2019s internal politics, or authorities\u2019 aims to further control online discourse in the run-up to the 2021 presidential elections; it has also clearly been framed to take advantage of the global panic over \u201cfake news\u201d and \u201cdisinformation\u201d online, likely in an attempt to insulate Iranian authorities from charges of censorship.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">It is striking how the language used in these resolutions is not formulated around the typical charges of \u201cthreatening national security\u201d or \u201ccollaboration with enemy states\u201d. Instead, it uses language not far from that used by commentators in many democratic nations, formulated around the negative impacts of the internet on politics and elections. This may also be a calculated move made in the hope of encouraging some form of collaboration from international platforms \u2013 another stated goal of this resolution.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In the past, Iran has not been particularly proactive in asking tech giants to take down undesirable content. However, with this new shift in language, and the potential enlisting of Iran\u2019s diplomatic capacities, this resolution may result in a change of approach.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">If this change of direction materializes in the coming months, global tech companies have a responsibility to commit to full transparency in their dealings with Iranian officials, and not to compromise on the human rights of Iranian internet users under pressure from Iranian authorities.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<h3><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The Resolution\u2019s Implications<\/span><\/h3>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">It is not unusual to hear commentary from more conservative elements of the Iranian establishment about the urgent need to rein in the influence of independent online media. However, more often than not, these suggestions and comments result in no notable practical action.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">However, given that this resolution was issued by Iran\u2019s highest ranking Internet policy-making body, and in light of Iran\u2019s long record of engaging in aggressive offline policing of online spaces, this resolution should be taken extremely seriously. It is highly likely that we will begin seeing visible impacts of this resolution upon journalists and civil society in the run-up to the June 2021 presidential elections.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">What is yet to be seen is the possible backlash to its implementation from independent activists and journalists in Iran. Internet shutdowns in recent years have led many journalists, activists, and digital economy entrepreneurs to turn against the Rouhani administration and ICT Minister Mohammad-Javad Azari Jahromi. Prior to these shutdowns, many in Iran wrongly viewed Rouhani\u2019s administration as an ally in defending digital rights against hardliners \u2013 a point of view that is much less commonly held in Iran these days.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The implementation of policies such as this resolution should make it clear to a greater number of Iranians that the battle for digital rights in Iran is not solely a struggle against the censorship of websites, but is in fact much broader: it is a struggle for robust legal protections for the rights to free speech and privacy, as well as for uninterrupted, uninhibited, and safe access to the open global Internet.<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>On 5 January 2021 the Supreme Council of Cyberspace (SCC) \u2013 Iran\u2019s top Internet governance and ICT policy-making body \u2013 ratified a resolution titled the \u201cDocument on Preventing and Combating the Dissemination of Misinformation and Fake News and Content in Cyberspace\u201d in a meeting chaired by President Hassan Rouhani. The full text of the resolution<a class=\"more-link\" href=\"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/2021\/03\/12\/irans-plan-to-tackle-fake-news-threatens-real-journalism\/\">Continue reading <span class=\"screen-reader-text\">\"Iran\u2019s Plan to Tackle \u201cFake News\u201d Threatens Real Journalism\"<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":2962,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"om_disable_all_campaigns":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[3],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-2961","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-investigations","entry"],"acf":[],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2961","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2961"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2961\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/2962"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2961"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2961"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2961"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}