{"id":2655,"date":"2020-11-16T11:52:41","date_gmt":"2020-11-16T11:52:41","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/en\/?p=2655"},"modified":"2025-06-03T08:41:04","modified_gmt":"2025-06-03T08:41:04","slug":"policy-monitor-october-2020","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/2020\/11\/16\/policy-monitor-october-2020\/","title":{"rendered":"Policy Monitor – October 2020"},"content":{"rendered":"

The publication of this month\u2019s Policy Monitor coincides with the first anniversary of the violent crackdown during the November 2019 fuel price protests which broke out across Iran following the sudden announcement of fuel price increases.<\/span><\/p>\n

As Iranians took to the streets across the country to make their voices heard, the <\/span>country plunged into darkness<\/span><\/a> as a near total internet shutdown was implemented, silencing the voices of protesters. <\/span>According to Amnesty International<\/span><\/a>, thousands of protestors were arrested, and at least 304 people were killed by security forces during the period of unrest. The brutal suppression campaign continued in the <\/span>aftermath<\/span><\/a>, and many families are still wondering about the fate of those who were arrested or disappeared after the protests.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

These extensive human rights violations cannot be forgotten. Filterwatch will continue to highlight these injustices, in the hope that they will never be repeated. This shutdown has demonstrated once again the crucial importance of allowing a free flow of information to uphold freedom of expression, and to document and highlight human rights violations, especially during the most challenging times.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

While we continue with our work on Filterwatch, to help release the rights of all Iranian citizens, we have also been working to develop resources to help Iranians be prepared for a future shutdown. The <\/span>Iran After Dark <\/span><\/a>platform contains information about tools that you can use to mitigate the effects of internet shutdowns, and information about how to prepare for and document shutdowns when they occur.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

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Supreme Council for Cyberspace Publishes the Text for \u2018National Information Network Macro[-Level] Plan and Architecture\u2019 Resolution\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

The Supreme Council for Cyberspace (SCC) <\/span>released<\/span><\/a> the text for the resolution on the \u201cNational Information Network Macro[-Level] Plan and Architecture\u2019 resolution passed in <\/span>September<\/span><\/a>.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Contained under four articles, the resolution focuses on the following topics: Policies Governing the NIN, Operational and Strategic Goals on the Horizon for 2025 \u2013 which includes targets set in <\/span>February<\/span><\/a> \u2013 which are focused on further expanding and promoting the use of domestic services to make progress on the localisation of Iran\u2019s internet, the architecture of the NIN (which are explained in the two diagrams shown below), and lastly, on the components of the NIN which are separated into infrastructure and services. The publication of the resolution once again demonstrated the Iranian official\u2019s long-term commitment to the process of localisation of the Internet in Iran.<\/span><\/p>\n

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Diagram Explaining Iran\u2019s Cyberspace\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

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Technical Architecture of the NIN\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

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Supervisory Majles Member \u2018Banned\u2019 from Executive Council of Information Technology Meetings\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

According to a report on <\/span>24 October<\/span><\/a> Masoumeh Pashaei Bahram \u2013 MP for Marand and Jolfa, member of the Parliamentary Mines and Industry Commision, and the Executive Council of Information Technology\u2019s<\/span> (ECIT) parliamentary supervisor \u2013 has been \u2018banned\u2019 from attending the council\u2019s meetings. According to Pashaei Baharam, the decision to ban her came after she issued a warning to President Rouhani \u2013 who chairs the ECIT \u2013 that \u2018given the current circumstances\u2019 the agenda is focused on non-priority items rather than on more urgent issues such as \u2018the integration of financial systems, as well as requiring transparency from customs, and uploading data in trading systems\u2019. The Council has not commented on her suspension.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The ECIT's main task is currently the development and implementation of e-Government services, although there has been much <\/span>debate<\/span><\/a> about the role of this Council following the termination of other councils operating in parallel with the SCC after 2015. Since the 11th Parliament commenced,\u00a0 the parliament has taken a more critical stance on the government\u2019s cyberspace policies, which they have criticised for what they view as lack of progress.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

ICT Ministry Hands \u201cResponsibilities of IT Service Providers\u201d Bill to the Cabinet for Review\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

It was reported on <\/span>14 October<\/span><\/a> the ICT Ministry handed a bill on \u201cThe Responsibilities of IT Service Providers\u201d to the Cabinet\u2019s Social Affairs and e-Government Commission for review.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The bill is reported to contain 42 articles on \u201cmethods of use and offering online information services\u201d. It describes the responsibilities of \u2018service providers\u2019 and \u2018users\u2019 of such services. It contains a provision for information and data \u2018service providers\u2019 to be exempt from the ban on using satellite receivers. The bill also asks that service providers use \u2018suitable equipment\u2019 to protect user\u2019s private networks and are required to provide encryption technologies to their users. The bill however also allows for the tapping, disclosure, and disconnection of private connections held within their networks, which will disclose users\u2019 private information with the order of a \u2018competent legal authority\u2019, which looks to seriously undermine the aforementioned requirement to protect users\u2019 private networks.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

At the moment the bill appears to be under review by the cabinet. It will require cabinet approval before it is passed onto the parliament for review. However, it remains to be seen if this bill can pass this hurdle, as <\/span>previous bills<\/span><\/a> introduced by the ICT Ministry under Mohammad-Javad Azari Jahromi \u2013 such as the Data Protection and Privacy Bill \u2013 have <\/span>failed <\/span><\/a>\u00a0to secure swift cabinet approval in the past.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

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Second Stage of \u2018Support for Domestic Messaging Apps\u2019 Launched\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

On <\/span>28 October<\/span><\/a> Amir Khorakian, Deputy for Cultural, Social and Content Affairs at the National Centre for Cyberspace (NCC) announced the beginning of the second phase of state support for domestic messaging apps.<\/span><\/p>\n

According to Khorakian, the support is in line with the Supreme Council for Cyberspace\u2019s resolution on \u2018<\/span>Policies and Actions for Managing Social Messaging Apps<\/span><\/a>\u2019, passed four years ago, which sets out an action plan and policies for supporting domestic messaging apps to be actioned by various government organisations. He added that the second phase of support to domestic messaging apps will include: connecting them to internet service operators, allowing a share of\u00a0 income from internet traffic revenue, providing dedicated free data centres, facilitating licenses for apps, adding e-Government services to domestic messaging apps, and creating systems for advertising apps and resolving legal and judicial issues, among others.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Supporting the development and promotion of domestic messaging apps remains an issue of high importance in Iran\u2019s strategic plans for internet policy. With new efforts to improve the quality and increasing incentives to create dependence on domestic messaging apps rather than their international equivalents, the role of domestic messaging apps in Iran\u2019s internet ecosystem and its system of layered filtering is becoming increasingly prominent.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

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Internet Disruptions Reported in Tehran, Various National Internet Service Providers<\/b><\/p>\n

A number of internet disruptions were observed this month in Tehran as well as disruptions to a number of Internet Service Providers (ISP) across the country. Find out more about the details of these disruptions in our October 2020 Network Monitor<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Irancell Claims to Roll Out 5G Hotspots in Tehran \u2018Soon\u2019\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

On <\/span>20 October<\/span><\/a> Bijan Abbasi Arand, Executive Director of Irancell, announced that the operator will roll out 5G network services in hotspots in Tehran. According to Abbasi Arand, the 5G pilot scheme has been launched in two hotspots, namely in Irancell\u2019s main building and in the Telecommunications Research Centre. He added that two new, publicly accessible hotspots will be added \u2018soon\u2019.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

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URL Shortening Website Bitly Briefly \u2018Filtered\u2019\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

On <\/span>20 October<\/span><\/a> Digiato <\/span><\/i>reported that the URL shortening website Bitly was inaccessible by Iranian IP addresses. Though the reason behind this was not immediately clear, it was believed that the website may have been filtered by Iranian authorities, specifically by the Committee for Determining Instances of Criminal Content (CDICC) given that the website had previously been filtered around two years ago, then unfiltered shortly after. There were suggestions and complaints that the website was being used by \u2018criminals\u2019 and in \u2018phishing attacks\u2019. The attribution to bitly could have been due to how the shortened URLs appear.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

A few days later <\/span>it was reported<\/a> that Bitly was unfiltered and accessible once again. However, officials have not made any comments about this filtering decision.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Gambling Websites Can be Reported via Domestic Messaging Apps\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

On <\/span>18 October<\/span><\/a> it was announced that gambling, betting, and phishing websites can be reported for \u201curgent and instant blocking\u201d to the office of the Deputy Prosecutor for Cyberspace via domestic messaging apps such as Soroush, Aita, Gap and Rubika, and for ease of reporting by users by contacting the user @netreport via the messaging apps.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

15 Apps and Websites Filtered for \u2018Infringing Intellectual Property Rights\u201d\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

According to an announcement on <\/span>31 October<\/span><\/a> from the Regulatory Organisation for Audio and Visual Media (SATRA), 15 websites and applications were \u2018blocked\u2019 following complaints received from the copyright right holder for the Iranian TV show <\/span>Aghazadeh<\/span><\/i> (<\/span>\u0622\u0642\u0627\u0632\u0627\u062f\u0647).\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

SATRA plays a significant role in filtering and blocking websites especially for instances of copyright infringement. Movie streaming websites have also been known to have been <\/span>filtered<\/span><\/a> with the judiciary\u2019s involvement for copyright infringement .\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

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MAHER Confirms Cyberattack on 'Two\u00a0Government Organisations'\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

On <\/span>13 October<\/span><\/a> Iran\u2019s Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), MAHER, confirmed a cyberattack on two \u2018government organisations\u2019 impacting their hardware and software infrastructure. According to MAHER, national warnings were issued to other government organisations, who made the decision to temporarily shut down some of their services. The source of the attacks was unconfirmed.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Managing Director of Iranian Video Streaming Service \u2018Aparat\u2019 Receives Prison Sentence<\/b><\/p>\n

On <\/span>25 October<\/span><\/a> reports confirmed earlier speculation that Mohammad Javad Shekuri Moghadam, the Managing Director of the Iraninan video streaming platform Aparat, had been sentenced to twelve years imprisonment by Judge Mohammad Moghiseh, at the 28th Branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Court.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The confirmation came following a statement released by Aparat to media outlets, though it appears that Aparat\u2019s statement did not confirm the charge(s) behind the sentence. However, the released extract from the order suggests that along with Shekuri Moghadam, seven other individuals have also been sentenced, suggesting that the sentence is connected to a video uploaded on Aparat by a user channel known as \u2018Gelofen TV\u2019, where children were asked if they knew \u2018how they were born\u2019.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Shakuri has been sentenced to ten years imprisonment for \u2018encouraging corruption\u2019, one year for \u2018propaganda against the system\u2019 and one year for \u2018publishing vulgar content\u2019. The length of the sentence, and reference to Articles 639 and 742 of the Islamic Penal Code in the court order, as well as involvement of the Islamic Revolutionary Court, has led some <\/span>experts<\/span><\/a> to believe that there may be other charges in addition to the publication of this single video.<\/span><\/p>\n

In any event, this case brings into question the responsibilities of platforms and hosting services in respect of user-generated content. Iran\u2019s laws currently do not offer clarity on the issue of intermediary responsibility, however, Iran\u2019s Computer Crimes Law does hold Internet Service Providers responsible for users accessing illegal content.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

In this case, firstly clarity is needed regarding the charges for Apart\u2019s Managing Director, as well as legal clarity and safeguards regarding the responsibilities of Iranian platforms for user-generated content. Though some organisations such as SATRA have supported the notion that platforms should <\/span>not be held liable<\/span><\/a> for all user-generated content, it appears that the SCC\u2019s position is to hold platforms liable. Though it is unclear, in the case of this video. According to a statement from Aparat, the company will appeal the sentence. In any case it is clear that Iranian policy makers are seeking to implement the most efficient solution to limiting the freedom of speech of users in Iran, and it appears that delegating censorship of user generated content to platforms is their preferred method at the moment.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The publication of this month\u2019s Policy Monitor coincides with the first anniversary of the violent crackdown during the November 2019 fuel price protests which broke out across Iran following the sudden announcement of fuel price increases. As Iranians took to the streets across the country to make their voices heard, the country plunged into darknessContinue reading \"Policy Monitor – October 2020\"<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":5,"featured_media":2754,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"om_disable_all_campaigns":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[4],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-2655","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-network-monitor","entry"],"acf":[],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2655","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/5"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2655"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2655\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/2754"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2655"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2655"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2655"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}