{"id":1835,"date":"2020-02-03T04:08:55","date_gmt":"2020-02-03T04:08:55","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/en\/?p=1835"},"modified":"2021-01-13T12:39:36","modified_gmt":"2021-01-13T12:39:36","slug":"filterwatch-network-monitor-january-2020","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/2020\/02\/03\/filterwatch-network-monitor-january-2020\/","title":{"rendered":"Network Monitor \u2014 January 2020"},"content":{"rendered":"
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By Amir Rashidi, James Marchant, and Kaveh Azarhoosh<\/h2>\n

Since the assassination of Major General Qasem Soleimani on 3 January there has been a significant escalation of political tensions inside Iran. Particularly since the tragic shooting down of Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752, and authorities\u2019 failed initial attempts as misinformation and misdirection, popular anger has begun to boil over into the streets once again.<\/p>\n

Although we have not yet seen the imposition of a protracted total internet shutdown like\u00a0we observed<\/a>\u00a0during the fuel price protests of November 2019, we have seen a number of indications that authorities are implementing targeted disruptions of citizens\u2019 access to the Internet.<\/p>\n

Given Iran\u2019s recent track record of responding to popular dissent, and in light of the total internet shutdown imposed during the unrest in November, Small Media is deeply concerned about the possibility that Iran will impose further internet controls and disruptions if protests in Iran continue to grow.<\/p>\n

With serious questions still to be answered by Iranian authorities regarding the decision-making process in November that led to the nationwide internet shutdown, it is crucial that the Iranian government, the National Security Council, the ICT Ministry, the Supreme Council for Cultural Revolution, and the Supreme Council for Cyberspace are all held to account for any attempts they make to restrict access to the global Internet.<\/p>\n

Small Media urges the Iranian government not to restrict citizens\u2019 right to protest, or to undermine the safety and security of protesters in Iran by attempting to disrupt the access to the internet. We will continue to monitor any interruptions to internet access in Iran, and plan to release our full documentation around January\u2019s service disruptions later in the month.<\/p>\n

Below is our documentation of the internet disruptions recorded since 6 January. A detailed report outlining incidents throughout January will be published on Filterwatch at the end of the month.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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There were disruptions to Telecommunication Company of Iran (TCI) services from 18:53 until 22:30 local time. News websites inside Iran also\u00a0confirmed<\/a>\u00a0these disruptions. According to official reports, the service outages were caused by a technical issue which was later resolved.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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Oracle Intelligent Map<\/a>\u00a0showed a large dip in traffic on AS25184 Afranet and AS1756 Shiraz Hamyar Co, signalling disruption on those ISPs. The reason for these disruptions is unclear.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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From around 18:00 local time, network disruptions were observed \u2014 firstly to 3G and 4G mobile services around Azadi Square in Tehran, and then on Telecommunication Infrastructure Company, affecting users nationwide.<\/p>\n

Our investigation shows that Instagram was the platform mainly affected by this disruption:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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This MRT report showed more than 40% packet loss on Instagram and WhatsApp.<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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The MRT report showed 100% packet loss on Instagram. This means that all customers using this ISP were unable to use Instagram.<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Based on Oracle Intelligence Map, Iran\u2019s international internet connections were disconnected twice on the same day:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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Iran\u2019s international internet connections were almost cut entirely. Inbound traffic shifted from passing into Iran via Orange (France Telecom) to Telecom Italia during this period.<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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Around 1:34PM we observed significant levels of packet drop on WhatsApp. This indicates the same pattern that we saw during the November internet shutdown.<\/p>\n

Firstly, we have seen that Iran tries to block all channels of communications which are still unfiltered (including WhatsApp). In the event that protests escalate, and the blocking of circumvention tools or channels of communications is viewed as insufficient, we expect that authorities might move to further disrupt the internet or finally impose a total shutdown.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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The MTR report shows that access to WhatsApp was heavily disrupted ahead of the shutdown.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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Around 17:20 local time, MCI and Irancell services were disrupted \u2014 mainly around Azadi Square and other areas that saw significant numbers of protestors on the streets. Based on data collected from three different data centers across Iran, MCI was completely disconnected from the global internet.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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Mobile data services remained suspended in some parts of Tehran, including continued disruptions around Azadi Square.<\/p>\n

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A screenshot from a phone affected by the service disruption around Azadi Square.<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Oracle Intelligence Map<\/a>\u00a0shows a significant internet traffic shift from January 9\u201313, with a total impact score of 191.4 (representing a very significant service disruption). During this period most circumvention tools were also filtered.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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A screenshot from Oracle Intelligence Map showing disruptions in Iran between January 9\u201313.<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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We observed a total shutdown lasting around 15 minutes starting at 17:19 local time in Tehran.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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An internet shutdown affected over half of all the BGP routes in Iran. Source: OIM<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/section>\n<\/article>\n
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As public dissent flared up in the aftermath of the IRGC\u2019s accidental downing of Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752, internet disruptions were observed in Iran once again.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":6,"featured_media":1837,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"om_disable_all_campaigns":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[4],"tags":[51],"class_list":["post-1835","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-network-monitor","tag-filterwatch-network-monitor","entry"],"acf":[],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1835","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/6"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1835"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1835\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1837"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1835"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1835"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/filter.watch\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1835"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}