An analysis of the resolution on lifting internet filtering suggests that the government aims to refine its approach by expanding restrictions more efficiently while minimizing the financial and social costs associated with enforcement.
Nearly two months have passed since the Supreme Council of Cyberspace last convened. Although the 32-article resolution from this session has yet to be published, some provisions of its draft, released by Mehr News Agency, indicate serious steps by the government toward imposing greater restrictions on citizens. Key provisions include the creation of state-approved clone versions of apps, tighter bans on the purchase and sale of VPNs, and the conditional unblocking of certain platforms only if they comply with the laws of the Islamic Republic. Additionally, the government is required to propose new legislation aimed at further tightening content control on the internet.
While the resolution was introduced in pro-government media as a means to “lift filtering” on WhatsApp and Google Play, a critical but overlooked aspect is the criminalization of publishing “fake news” online. This provision practically restricts user interaction, content creation, and dissemination. Although measures such as tiered internet access and the introduction of a state-approved YouTube clone pose serious security risks for users in Iran, the expansion of content control laws marks an unprecedented level of restriction.
The implementation of this resolution empowers security and judicial institutions to impose restrictions more freely while reducing their costs. Additionally, the number of users under surveillance will significantly increase.
The resolution mandates the government to “review and adjust measures for dealing with criminal content on both domestic and foreign platforms.”
Consecutive Resolutions for Controlling Online Content
The Supreme Council of Cyberspace’s mandate for the government to review and adjust measures against criminal content comes despite the existence of a 2020 resolution titled “Prevention and Combat of the Spread of False Information, News, and Content in Cyberspace.”
According to this resolution, “any information, news, or journalistic content published online—whether textual, audio, visual, or multimedia—that disrupts public order, spreads anxiety, undermines stability, cohesion, trust, health, and security of individuals and society in economic, social, and political dimensions, or leads to illicit gains shall be deemed a crime.”
At that time, the council obliged the judiciary to “define instances of apparent crime” and “adjust penalties accordingly.” The resolution also mandated the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance to “develop and implement comprehensive mechanisms for monitoring and verifying the accuracy of online information, news, and content.” Furthermore, the ministry was instructed to “establish a legal documentation system and take action against foreign publishing platforms that fail to cooperate,” in collaboration with entities such as the Prosecutor General’s Office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Additionally, Article 6 of the 2020 resolution required the state broadcaster (IRIB) to actively counter false news through on-the-ground reporting and new journalism methods to raise public awareness, enhance social resilience, and reduce the impact of misinformation.
This resolution covered all channels, websites, applications, and bots with more than 5,000 followers, requiring them to be verified by the judiciary, the Ministry of Culture, and the Ministry of Communications. These accounts were to be categorized as “digital media,” “data platforms,” or “ordinary users.” The ambiguous definition of “follower” in this resolution meant that a wide range of influential news channels and regular users fell under its jurisdiction.
Simultaneously, additional laws have been enacted by various judicial entities to monitor online content creation. Some examples include:
- Article 247 of the Criminal Procedure Code: This law authorizes the seizure of a suspect’s communication devices to prevent access to “tools of crime,” providing a legal basis for confiscating users’ electronic devices—something that was previously done without specific legal grounds.
- Article 217 of the Criminal Procedure Code: Allows trials in absentia if the offense is prosecutable without a private complainant and sufficient evidence exists. Given the broad interpretation of “fake news,” this law enables authorities to take legal action against users without their presence in court. Previously, such crackdowns were mostly limited to security cases or implemented under specific operations like “Noor,” but their scope has now expanded significantly.
- The Judiciary’s Transformation and Excellence Document (May 2024): Grants judicial officers access to users’ personal records, banking information, and communication data (phone lines, SIM cards, and internet usage). The increased access has facilitated new, low-cost, and remote punitive measures. According to investigations by Filterwatch, this system was tested in the experimental SIM card blocking initiative.
Hammering the Final Nail in the Coffin of Freedom
The absence of free media, restrictions on political and labor organizations, and other limitations have led Iranian users to rely on the internet, particularly social media, as a platform for information dissemination, free exchange of ideas, and protest movements.
For instance, following the death of Mahsa (Jina) Amini in the custody of the morality police, social media played a pivotal role in shaping and expanding the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement. Reports on injured, deceased, and arrested protesters were disseminated through various platforms.
After suppressing these protests, security and judicial institutions intensified efforts to prevent similar movements by increasing control over social media content.
In 2023 and 2024, during the anniversary of Mahsa Amini’s death, social media activists were summoned by security agencies and warned against posting content on the matter. During events like Ebrahim Raisi’s helicopter crash, Israel’s attack on Iran, and Iran’s military operations “True Promise 1 and 2,” the judiciary explicitly banned public commentary.
In the latest case, individuals who expressed intent to join gatherings marking the anniversary of Green Movement leaders Mir Hossein Mousavi and Zahra Rahnavard’s house arrest were arrested before the protests even began.
The speed of these crackdowns and the reduction in costs for the government are key objectives that this resolution helps achieve. Its implementation intensifies user surveillance and punitive actions—tasks previously carried out by security forces but now bolstered through mandatory user authentication platforms in collaboration with the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Communications. The judiciary is responsible for enforcing these laws.
Additionally, the SIM cards of certain users—journalists, civil activists, online business owners, and regular users—have been systematically disconnected since early 2024. The combination of rapid enforcement, broad social coverage, and judicial access to SIM card, banking, and residential data has enabled large-scale crackdowns in a short period.
Currently, security crackdowns require extensive human resources and large budgets, making them costly for the state. However, this new resolution streamlines mass surveillance and repression with minimal social and financial consequences for the government.
Simply put, the Supreme Council of Cyberspace, along with other state institutions, is legislating to restrict the last remaining avenues of “freedom of expression” and “access to information.”
Further Restrictions in the December 2024 Draft
The leaked draft of the December 2024 resolution contains additional measures aimed at further restricting internet freedoms:
- Enhancing technical expertise to effectively counter VPNs and increasing crackdowns on unauthorized anti-filtering tools.
- Regulating internet access by social class and providing state-approved VPNs.
- Intensifying legal action against violations on foreign platforms.
- Drafting and pursuing the passage of a platform liability law.
- Exclusively providing essential electronic services (subsidies, fuel cards, police, and judiciary services) through selected domestic platforms.
- Implementing a “Family Security Plan” in cyberspace.
- Banning government agencies from officially using foreign platforms and mandating presence on domestic platforms.
- Establishing a sustainable ecosystem for user-generated content on domestic platforms.
The enforcement of such laws led to the arrest of over 1,000 individuals during the 14th presidential election cycle for online activities or promoting election boycotts. Nonetheless, authorities continue to draft new laws to further control online users.
