As we slowly move past the aftermath of the fourteenth presidential election,despite the absence of significant progress in policy-making, there have been numerous changes in the area of network and internet access.
Key Findings:
- Policy-Making:
- Policy-making institutions, like the Parliament, are acting contrary to the recommendations provided by their own research center.
- Civil society’s efforts to expose the dark policies of censorship have encountered security challenges.
- The government is engaged in the development and implementation of tiered internet access.
- Network and Connectivity:
- In the two days leading up to the first round of the fourteenth presidential election, disruptions were so severe that they effectively made it impossible to use the internet.
- The electricity supply crisis became one of the main factors causing data centers to be disconnected from the network, leading to severe internet disruptions.
- Blanket filtering was applied to specific ranges of IP addresses from OVH and port 22.
- The Neshan navigation app was initially filtered for not imposing restrictions on its users regarding the use of VPNs, but it was unfiltered after a period.
Parliament
At the level of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Parliament), two different approaches were in play: one being the “report by the Parliamentary Research Center” and the other the “two-urgency bill,” each essentially following opposing directions.
The Parliamentary Research Center, in a report titled “Dynamics of Issues and Disarray in Iran’s Cyberspace,” (alternate link) examined the state of Iran’s “cyberspace” from various dimensions.
This report confirmed that despite the “high internet penetration rate in the country,” “low internet quality,” “existing disruptions, restrictions on the internet and its low speed,” and “weakness in electronic security” are factors causing disarray. In other words, disruptions in the network, repeatedly denied by Iranian officials, were not only confirmed in this report but were also identified as one of the factors causing disarray.
The report also identified the “extensive use of foreign messengers and social networks compared to domestic ones” as another factor causing disarray. This points to the failure of the internet censorship policy, as users continue to favor foreign platforms despite extensive censorship efforts.
The Parliamentary Research Center report identified the presence of several “decision-making bodies” and “various mechanisms” in the field of filtering as one of the factors causing disarray and stated that the “entry of other bodies into decision-making in this area” has led to “confusion and complexity” in censorship.
At this point, we witness a contradiction between the findings of the Parliamentary Research Center and the urgent bill proposed by the representative from Bukan.
The issue arose when Mohammad Qasim Osmani, the representative of Bukan, introduced an urgent bill, dubbed the “Unfiltering Bill” in Iran’s official media, and openly criticized the Parliamentary Presidium for their arbitrary handling of the matter. Investigations by Filterwatch reveal that this bill aims to expand the decision-making power of the Supreme National Security Council regarding internet filtering.
In fact, contrary to the recommendations and findings of the Parliamentary Research Center, which pointed to the existence of multiple bodies and mechanisms in filtering as a source of confusion, the urgent bill from the representative of Bukan proposed adding yet another body to the decision-making group on filtering.
The representative from Bukan’s proposal essentially mirrors the policy pattern of temporary and regional internet shutdowns applied to filtering, which had previously been executed at the order of the Supreme National Security Council during protests.
Given these considerations, our current concern should be the proposal of a bill that seeks to expand the authority of the Supreme National Security Council.
This report identifies the primary challenges ahead as those related to domestic messaging apps and social media, highlighting weaknesses such as “traffic limitations, low reliability, limited capabilities, restrictions on user-friendliness and customization (generally technical aspects), network limitations, and the inability to connect with global users.”
Although the Parliamentary Research Center’s report gave a positive assessment of Iran’s position in the internet speed index, it failed to address a critical issue: the violation of network neutrality and the segregation of traffic into domestic and international categories, resulting in users experiencing different speeds and costs for network access. Access to domestic content is faster and cheaper than access to international content.
Government
The administration of Ebrahim Raisissued a resolution mandating the Ministry of Communications, in collaboration with the Filtering Committee, to implement tiered internet access in Pardis Park (a technology center) by the end of this year. This directive was issued amidst ongoing efforts in Parliament to expand the authority of the Supreme National Security Council in the area of filtering.
The network disruption in the two days leading up to the election was so severe that it effectively made it impossible to use the network. In July this year, one day after the election, the IODA and ArvanCloud Radar charts, which display the status of data centers, showed that \internet and data centers were disrupted.
Regarding infrastructure, the electricity production crisis and outages, which have become a recurring issue during the hot summer months, not only led to power cuts in production and industrial facilities but also caused major data centers in Iran to lose power, plunging the internet into a critical state.
The energy imbalance crisis reached a level in which, over the past three months, major data centers faced power outages, leading to significant network access disruptions.
Filterwatch, in conversations with various sources, obtained documents indicating that following the severe voltage drops and multiple power outages, data centers were instructed to supply their electricity via generators for at least two hours daily.
Curtailing VPNs
Applying blanket filtering on specific IP address ranges of major cloud companies was generally a method to counter VPNs. For instance, most IP address ranges of Digital Ocean are immediately filtered if VPN traffic is detected by Iran’s filtering systems known as DPI (Deep Packet Inspection).
Filterwatch’s investigations indicate that this situation has also extended to European companies. In recent months, many IP address ranges from the French company OVH have experienced severe disruptions on port 22, used for remote server access.
Disrupting port 22 usually aims to obstruct HTTP tunneling. This method is used to establish connections between two computers, which in Iran is used as a means to circumvent censorship, especially during internet outages.
Additionally, according to a statement by the Neshan navigation app, it appears that one reason for filtering this service by the Telecommunication Infrastructure Company was that this router did not create barriers for users using VPNs; although, this routing application was unfiltered after some time.
At the end of this navigation application’s statement, it states: “Neshan will never impose restrictions on users who use VPNs.”
Among the Islamic Republic’s policies to reduce citizens’ use of VPNs is to pressure domestic companies, forcing them to impose restrictions on users who access services with non-Iranian IP addresses, compelling them to turn off their VPNs.
Civil Society
In recent weeks, civil society’s efforts to expose “dark censorship” policies have faced increased obstacles and security crackdowns. The Electronic Commerce Association, which had previously published two comprehensive reports on censorship, delayed the release of its third report due to pressure from security officials and published it only after the first round of elections.
Pouya Pirhosseinloo, Chairman of the Internet and Infrastructure Commission of the Electronic Commerce Association, said at the “Priorities and Issues of the Ministry of Communications” meeting on July 24, 2024, about this report: “The next minister and government must confront sanctions, filtering, and the monopoly of the Telecommunication Infrastructure Company.”
The issues of sanctions, filtering, and the monopoly of the Telecommunication Infrastructure Company are three major findings and requests of the third report of the Electronic Commerce Association.
Pirhosseinloo added about the next government: “Eventually, elections will be held again, and the same people will want to take an anti-restriction and freedom-seeking stance, and at that point, they must be held accountable. Someone must have the courage to say that filtering does not work. No one at a high level dares to express this issue.”
